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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The Current System of Income Maintenance 
Projected figures for 1975 show that income security payments will 
total $141.7 billion accounting for 45 percent of all federal public 
expenditures [l9]. Primarily these payments go to families who do not 
have the ability to earn an adequate income, i.e. retired individuals, 
fatherless families with children, and the mentally and physically 
handicapped. 
The two major forms of assistance are social insurance including 
Social Security, Unemployment Insurance and other social insurance pro­
grams, and need-based benefits including Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), Food Stamps, Medicaid, Housing, Education, and similar 
social services. 
These need-based programs have been criticized for a variety of 
undesirable effects. Many public welfare programs have resulted in 
inequities where nonworkers and those who fail to fulfill their family 
responsibilities are better off than workers and couples with children. 
For example, cash benefits available to certain families with unemployed 
fathers (AFDC-UF) exceed the maximum Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits 
in some states [5]. Also since every UI recipient is not eligible for 
maximum payments, the number of cases for which welfare is better than UI 
is significant. 
Other criticisms of the current system are the notch affect and high 
negative tax rates. The notch effect is a situation where a small change 
in income greatly affects the amount of benefits. For example, in 24 
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states the last dollar that removes a family from eligibility for cash 
welfare also terminates its right to Medicaid, valued at several hundred 
dollars per family [89]. The negative tax rate is defined as the reduc­
tion in governmental benefits for each additional dollar earned. Even 
though individual programs have low negative tax rates, the integration of 
the various programs inevitably produces a high negative tax rate. The 
higher this tax rate, the greater the disincentive to work. For example, 
the AFDC program has a negative tax rate of 67 percent. For each dollar 
the recipient earns, she can expect a net gain of 33 cents. However the 
Food Stamp program, taking note of her 33 cent gain, will raise stamp 
prices 10 cents per extra dollar earned, and Public Housing will raise rent 
by 8 cents per extra dollar earned. Thus the negative tax rate rises to 
85 cents or a net gain of only 15 cents. Consequently, it is not reason­
able to expect persons to work for a small net gain, especially if it is 
unpleasant work [89]. 
Also within the current system, there are monetary incentives for 
families to break up. For example, in July 1974, a family head in North 
Dakota with three children earning $2.00 per hour could have earnings of 
$278 per month. With these earnings a family would be eligible for a $100 
Food Stamp bonus and no Medicaid payments. If the father left home, how­
ever, the mother and three children could receive $300 in AFDC benefits, 
$67 in Food Stamps, and $70 in Medicaid for a total of $437. With the 
additional $278 in earnings by the father, there would be a net gain of 
$337 in the separated family [89]. 
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Other problems also exist. The disparity between state benefit 
levels is large. For fatherless families, AFDC and Food Stamps range from 
a low of $197 per month in Mississippi to a high of $448 in New York and 
$463 in Alaska. Fraud, inefficient management, and duplicity between 
different government agencieo compound problems within the current system. 
One solution to the inadequacies of the current welfare system is an 
impersonal, mathematically determined benefit based on income, family 
size, and resource levels. This system has the distinct advantage of not 
categorizing any family by such conditions as employability, type and 
costs of housing, and medical payments. 
While several different kinds of formulas exist which include wage 
and earnings subsidies, this discussion will be limited to the negative 
income tax. The formula for this scheme is as follows: 
P a y m e n t  = G L - t x Y i f O < Y < ^  
= 0 if Y 2: Y 
= GL if Y ^ G 
where Y = income 
t = negative tax rate 
GL = guarantee level or the benefit level if income equals zero. 
Note that as income increases, the amount of benefit declines by the 
negative tax ot reduction rate. GL is usually a simple function of family 
size. As family size increases, GL increases, but at a decreasing rate. 
The additional benefit is smaller for the sixth child than the second 
child, and after the eighth or ninth child, the additional benefit might 
be zero. 
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Resource levels are usually incorporated into the formula in two 
ways. The first is that if resources are greater than some specified 
level, the family is ineligible. The second is that, after certain dollar 
level exclusions for home and business property, the resource level is 
multiplied by a low percentage, say 5 to 10 percent, and added to income. 
In this manner notch effects are avoided and incentives to change assets 
from one form to another form are minimized. The prime rationale for 
this tax on resources is that low income individuals should be encouraged 
to liquidate a portion of their assets to cover fluctuations in their 
current income stream [6]„ 
Plan of the thesis 
Chapter two presents some theoretical expectations of what the 
potential work effort response of farm operators will be to the negative 
income tax (NIT). It begins by reviewing some of the recent literature 
on labor supply and its application to the problem of work disincentives 
of government tax and transfer policies. A formal statement of the 
classical theory of work-leisure choice is extended to include that of 
self-employed individuals. Chapter three discusses several dependent 
variables used to measure labor supply, estimation methodology, and 
independent variables used in the study. Chapter four presents the 
results of the empirical investigation of what the labor supply respoxise 
of self-employed farm operators is to a negative income tax scheme. 
Chapter five is a digression where one problem, that of response errors, 
is investigated in detail. The differences between initial survey re­
sponses and an extensive editing procedure are discussed, and finally the 
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difference in results between the two different data sets are contrasted 
and evaluated. Chapter six concludes with a discussion of the policy im­
plications and shortcomings of the approach. 
Description of the data 
The data used were collected by University of Wisconsin personnel in 
conjunction with the rural negative income tax experiment. This major 
social experiment was launched in July 1969 by the Office of Economic 
Opportunity approximately eighteen months after its predecessor, the Urban 
experiment in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 
The sites for the rural experiment were Dauphin County, North 
Carolina, and Calhoun and Pocahontas Counties in Iowa. Selecting the poor 
from two geographic areas rather than using a nationwide sample eliminated 
the high administrative costs associated with the latter. The selection 
of these areas was based on the following four prerequisites: 
1) The area must have a reasonable degree of agricultural diversity 
rather than most farmers specializing in the production of one commodity. 
This would allow for observations of changes in enterprise mix and poten­
tial elimination of secondary activities (e.g., livestock feeding), 
2) Specific counties within the area should not be located within 
25 miles of a city with over 50,000 persons. 
3) Mountainous and swampy areas were to be avoided where the con­
sequent low population density would render the prospective sample popula­
tion too inaccessible. 
4) Areas containing a few counties with a moderately-sized city 
between them (about 10,000 persons) were given preference to those with no 
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nearby city at all. It was anticipated that the existence of some manu­
facturing and/or marketing activities within reasonable reach of the rural 
residents would offer the opportunity to observe potential changes in 
their employment patterns. 
The sample was chosen by a two-stage process. Initially, a short 
screening interview was administered to a random sample of all households 
in the three county area. From these, families whose income was less than 
1.6 times the poverty line were chosen and given a more extepsive baseline 
survey. On the basis of this information, a sample was selected whose 
income was less than 1.5 times the poverty line, where income was defined 
by the rules of operation. These families were then randomly assigned to 
either the control or experimental group and enrolled in the experiment. 
During enrollment, for those in the experimental group, the rules of 
operation were explained in laymen's terms, namely, that as income goes 
up, payments go down and vice versa; that as family size increases, pay­
ment level increases and vice versa; that the payment check could be 
spent in any way desired; and that the family must supply copies of its 
W2 form and file honest monthly reports of income and expenses. 
The experiment lasted three years and one month with an additional 
eight month follow-up period. During this time period, a quarterly inter­
view was administered every three months. It was from these surveys that 
the basic data for this study was obtained. 
Different types of information were collected at different intervals. 
For example income and expense data and family composition data were 
collected once every three months; asset data, inventories, and physical 
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units of production were collected once per year; and nutrition informa­
tion was collected twice during the experiment. The amount of data 
collected was immense and it covered almost every area of human endeavor. 
The payments process was administered separately from the quarterly 
surveys. Payments were based on the monthly income report form in the 
hope that information on quarterly surveys would not be tainted by report­
ing effects. Experimental payment families had an obvious incentive to 
report as many expenses and as little income as possible on these monthly 
income report forms. 
Almost all information was obtained directly from the respondent. 
Some outside information was also available, such as Internal Revenue 
Service (1RS) forms and Social Security records. The former were 
collected from the respondent, while the latter were obtained directly 
from the Social Security Office in Baltimore, Maryland. 
This describes the major features of the experiment and its data 
collection apparatus. For further details see [24]. See also Appendix A 
for a description of the sample and Appendix B for a description of data 
editing procedures. 
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CHAPTER II. LABOR SUPPLY 
Review of the Literature 
Early labor supply theory 
The beginning of modern day econometrics is often traced to the 
famous studies by Ernst Engel in estimating the effect of income on family 
expenditure patterns. Questions of what effect price had, or more 
specifically whether a tax on earnings, particularly a progressive tax, 
would have an effect on labor supply were soon raised. 
Lionel Robbins' classical article on labor supply provided the frame­
work for analyzing the effects a tax on income would have. By transform­
ing labor supply into a study of the demand for leisure, he was able to 
define an income and substitution effect, namely as the wage rate 
increased, the price of leisure increased, which ceteris paribus meant 
demand for leisure was lowered. However, at the same time, the amount of 
goods one could buy with a given expenditure of work increased. Thus with 
leisure being a normal good, this rise in income should increase the pur­
chase of leisure. Thus theoretically the answer was indeterminate. 
Nonexperimental empirical studies 
Proposals in the late I960's for alternative welfare systems have 
stimulated much work in estimating income and substitution effects. If 
the effect on labor supply of an income compensated wage rate change is 
small, very little attention need be devoted to selection of a correct 
tax rate. And, if the income effect of high guarantee rates is small, the 
selection of a correct guarantee can depend entirely upon considerations 
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of cost. On the other hand, if empirical work indicates differently, 
careful attention must be given to the choice of a proper tax and 
guarantee rate. 
The Greenberg-Koster's study reported in Cain and Watts [l6], was the 
first of many studies which were done on nonexperimental data to simulate 
the effects a nationwide program would have. Their basic labor-supply 
model is presented in terms of the economic theory of choice. Their study 
focuses on male headed families with income less than $15,000 based on the 
1967 Survey of Economic Opportunities' data base. 
A unique feature of their study is an attempt to control for differ­
ence in preference structures. They argue that persons with a relatively 
strong preference for asset accumulation will tend to work more, consume 
less, and have larger than average nonemployment income. This in turn 
will tend to depress labor supply through the income effect. On the other 
hand this is offset by the strong preference for asset accumulation. 
Consequently, the labor supply effect of a negative income tax program 
could be misstated if no attempt were made to control for these 
differences. 
A study by Hall, also reported in Cain and Watts [16], is charac­
terized by the development of a "potential wage" variable in the first 
stage estimation which is used as a price variable in further analysis. 
He also makes extensive use of "form-free" regression models that utilize 
binary variables. The former was developed primarily because of two 
problems: a) measurement error in wage rate and b) the fact that many 
housewives, etc., do not have an observation on wage rate. 
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Orley Ashenfelter and Janes Heckman [3] describe the formulation of 
the theoretical restrictions on the labor supply function of both the 
husband and wife simultaneously. These restrictions are that (1) own 
substitution effects must be positive, (2) cross substitution effects 
must be equal and (3) the husband's own substitution effect times the 
wife's own substitution effect must be greater than the multiplication of 
these cross substitution effects. These restrictions are tested and, when 
accepted, are imposed on the data, resulting in more consistent 
estimators. 
Experimental studies 
The forerunner to the Rural Income Maintenance Experiment (RIME) was 
the urban experiment conducted in four sites in New Jersey and Pennsyl­
vania [79, 95, 97, 23]. Utilizing four different guarantee levels and 
three different tax rates, payments were administered to a sample of 
approximately 600 experimentals for a period of three years. Information 
was collected on both the control and experimental group through the use 
of quarterly interviews. Using labor supply models based on the theory of 
economic choice and pooled regression analysis, estimates of the behav­
ioral response were made. These results were mixed, particularly with 
respect to race. For white male headed families, the overall results 
indicated a small insignificant effect on the labor supply of the male 
heads. As could be expected, the results for spouses and other secondary 
earners indicated a rather large (around 35 percent) significant dis­
incentive. The number of true observations upon which this conclusion was 
based is small. Many versions of the dependent variable were used. 
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including hours of work per week, number of earners in a family, wage 
income, and labor force participation status. All were generally con­
sistent. 
Several problems with the results exist. The major problem is the 
positive incentives, contrary to economic theory, which were indicated 
for the black male headed families. In addition, positive effects were 
found on wage rates for male heads. While this is plausible, given that 
experimental families can engage in longer job search activities because 
of the payments and consequently obtain a higher wage, there is no indi­
cation within the data that a longer job search was in fact undertaken. 
This provides little explanation for the high wage rate, unless it is 
connected with the intensity of job search activities. Several minor 
inconsistencies also exist in the behavioral response among different tax 
and guarantee rates. Occasionally lower disincentives are associated with 
higher tax and guarantee levels. 
Because this was the initial experiment of its kind, several problems 
were encountered in the data collection methodology. The experiment 
suffered from a high attrition rate and a large loss in use of usable ob­
servations. Furthermore, original data items were often inconsistent or 
changed on the basis of little information, with no apparent way existing 
to determine how these changes affected results. 
The Rural Income Maintenance Experiment was undertaken to determine 
the behavioral response to different tax and guarantee rates for the self-
employed. The analysis will differ from the urban experiment in several 
important ways which may affect the response. These differences can be 
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summarized as follows: 
1) As hours decline or increase, the value of the marginal product 
of labor is no longer constant. 
2) Self-employed, particularly farmers, may be able to change work 
effort more easily, i.e. there is no institutional restraint such as a 40 
hour work week. 
3) Elements of risk, cash flow, and investment, all enter the 
picture when capital is combined with labor in the productive process. 
Theory 
Several authors (Lee, 1965 [56]; Huffman, 1973 [43]) have attempted to 
explain the allocating of resources between farm and nonfarm use particu­
larly with respect to labor resources. However, with the exception of 
Meyer and Saupe (1970) [66], very little literature exists on the behavior 
of the self-employed under an income maintenance scheme. 
To explain the behavior of a farm family firm, the following model 
will be developed. Our farm family is presumed to behave as one individual 
maximizing a utility function, U, which is composed of income per time 
period, Y, and the number of hours of leisure, L. 
Income is generated by three different means, all of which involve an 
allocation of the individual's scarce time.^ These are crop growing enter­
prises, livestock growing enterprises, and wage work. Unearned income, 
^Overhead hours exist for self-employed enterprises. These involve 
such activities as bookkeeping, filling out tax forms, and trips to town. 
Conceptually it will be assumed that these hours can be divided between 
crop and livestock activities. Marginal decisions regarding the alloca­
tion of time are then handled straightforwardly by the model developed in 
the remainder of the chapter. 
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which appears in many labor supply models, is deleted from this analysis 
because of its small magnitude in the sample under study (see Appendix A). 
Income from the two farm enterprises will be defined as price per unit of 
output times a production function explaining the output. Each of these 
production functions will have four arguments. The first is a fixed 
amount of capital that is unlikely to change over the course of the 
experiment. This would include land, buildings, machinery or other such 
investments. The second argument is a variable amount of capital (inter­
mediate inputs) representing the decision a farmer must make each year on 
how much fertilizer to use, spray to apply, gasoline to buy, additional 
labor to hire, etc. The third argument represents the amount of time the 
farm operator devotes to the enterprise, and the fourth argument repre­
sents entrepreneurial skills. The latter is assumed to be constant 
throughout the duration of the experiment for any particular farmer. The 
opportunity cost of money invested in capital is defined as the cost or 
price of capital (r) multiplied by total capital. This opportunity cost 
plus the cost of the intermediate goods subtracted from price times output 
will yield labor income for each of the two farm enterprises. 
Our individual maximizes : 
U = U(Y, T - h^ - h^ - h^) (1) 
where : 
U = a utility function constrained by the availability of T 
(total time) 
Y = income (to be defined more fully shortly) 
h^ = hours employed in the nonfarm market at a fixed wage rate 
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= hours engaged in crop growing enterprises 
h^ = hours engaged in livestock growing enterprises 
T = total time available to an individual in a given time 
period. 
Income, Y, can be earned as follows: 
Y = K^, h^, E^) + P^G(K^, K^, h^, E^) 
+ wh^ - r(K^ + K^) - (1 + r) (K + K^) (2) 
P^, P^ = the average price of output from crop (livestock) 
growing enterprises 
F, G = a production function for crop (livestock) output, 
respectively 
K^, = fixed capital stock used in crop (livestock) enter­
prises, respectively 
K^, = the amount of variable capital used in growing crop 
(livestock) output 
= entrepreneurial and management skills used in raising 
crops (livestock) 
w = fixed wage rate received in a job outside the farming 
operation 
r = opportunity cost of capital. 
A few comments are necessary before proceeding. It is presumed the 
farmer is operating in a competitive industry and consequently P^, P^, and 
r are determined exogenously. The production functions, F and G, are 
assumed to behave normally in that all first-order partial derivatives are 
positive while the second-order partial derivatives are negative. This 
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reflects that while in the economic region of production, an increase in 
the amount of any input will increase output. However, further equal 
increases in the amount of inputs holding all other inputs constant, will 
not increase output as much, due to diminishing marginal returns. 
It will be assumed throughout this analysis that wage and farm work 
are equivalent with respect to nonpecuniary benefits. Aside from economic 
returns, there is no incentive to remain in one occupation versus the 
other o 
The time constraint facing a farmer is the following: 
L  =  T -  h  - h  - h ,  ( 3 )  
w c 1 
or the amount of leisure is equal to total time minus hours devoted to 
wage work, crop, and livestock growing enterprises, respectively. 
Equations 1, 2, and 3 can be combined to yield the following con­
strained utility maximizing equation: 
max U = U(Y, T - h^ - h^ - h^ + X[P^F(K^, K^, h^, E^) 
+ P^G(K^, K^, h^, E^) + wh^ - r (K^ + + K^) 
- (Kg + K^) - Y] (4) 
From the first-order utility maximizing conditions we can derive the 
determinants of total labor supply, the allocation of capital between 
livestock and crops, and the allocation of work hours between crop, live­
stock, and the outside labor market. 
- a (I - h""- h, - h ) + ° <=> 
c c 1 w c 
+ = 0 (6) 
a w - " , - " i - V  
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° - C"'•i - V ° ° 
ir = - xr - , = 0 (8) 
c c 
5U 
ÔK, = >^1% - Xr - X == 0 (9) 
3Y- " OT - ° " (10) 
|2 = P^F(K^, K^. h^, E^) + P^G(K^. Kj, h^. Ej) 
+ wh - r(K + K + K + K ) - (K + K ) - Y = 0 (11) 
O X JL C C X 
Assuming a "well-behaved" utility function so that the second-order 
conditions insure a utility maximum, the first-order conditions yield the 
following: 
C 1 
and 
1 (13) 
is the marginal rate of substitution of income for leisure 
while P^f^ and P^g^ are the value of the marginal product of labor in 
c 1 
crop and livestock enterprises, respectively. An individual will work as 
long as the value of his marginal product (VHP) or wage rate is greater 
than MRS^ The allocation of work between the three enterprises is based 
L« 1 
simply upon where the highest value for his labor can be obtained. In the 
economic region of production, the VMP, holding capital constant, in both 
crops and livestock enterprises will decline as labor is increased. 
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The following implications result directly from Equations 12 and 13 
above. If VMP^ (value of the marginal product of labor in crops)> w 
> VMPj^, this would imply an individual growing crops until VMP^ = 
If at this point w > additional hours would be added to the wage 
job and crop hours until w = VMP^ = Livestock enterprises 
would only be entered if there were difficulty in obtaining wage employ­
ment. 
If the VM^ from both crops and livestock is less than w for all levels 
of h^ and h^, an individual should leave farming and work at a job. The 
only exception to this would be if sufficient wage hours could not be 
obtained in off-farm work. In this case w > MRS. ^  ~ VMP = VMP.. 
L'Y c 1 
If VMP^ > VMPj > w, an individual would allocate additional time until 
VMP^ = VMP^. If at this point VMP^ > MRS^ .y, additional hours would be 
worked in both crop and livestock enterprises, thus maintaining their 
equality. Only if VMP^ = VMP^ = w > MRS^ would wage work be done. 
Enough wage hours would be worked until the equality in Equation 12 is 
reached. Also as more hours are worked, Y increases, and the rate of sub­
stitution between leisure and income decreases. Stated differently, for 
each additional hour worked, the rate at which one is willing to trade one 
hour of leisure for income increases. 
Equation 13 tells us that variable capital will be hired until the 
marginal product of capital in crop and livestock operations equals the 
cost of capital plus its opportunity cost, r. Note also the simultaneity 
between Equations 12 and 13. As more hours are devoted to crops, the 
marginal product of capital in crops increases and vice versa. 
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Introducing the negative income tax changes Equation 2 above. The 
payments formula is as follows: 
Payment = GL when Y < 0 
Payment = GL - t x Y when 0 ^  Y ^ GL/t, and 
Payment = 0 when Y > GL/t 
where : 
GL = guarantee level or amount of payment when Y = 0 and 
t = negative tax or reduction rate. 
Defining Y* = GL + (1-t) Y and replacing Y* for Y in the constrained 
utility maximizing Equation 4, the first-order conditions become: 
MRSl.y = (l-t)Vh " (l-t)Pi8h = (1-t) w (14) 
c 1 
and 
(l-t)P f = (l-t)P g„ = (l-t)(r+l) (15) 
^ c ^1 
The amount of adjustment is primarily determined by the slope of the 
marginal product curves. These are illustrated graphically in Figure 2.1 
for the economic region of production. 
Prior to the experiment, let the income-leisure trade-off be deter­
mined as MRS^^Y Utility is maximized by doing no wage work, working h^^ 
o 
hours in livestock enterprises and h hours in crop enterprises. After 
the experiment is enacted, letting t = .50 and remain unchanged, 
o 
Equation 14 becomes VMP^ = VMP^ = w = )» In this example. 
is determined by the tangency of the utility function or in-
o 
difference curve with the budget constraint. This budget constraint is an 
ordered (highest to lowest) VMP of an additional hour in one of the three 
different enterprises. Figure 2.1 is concerned primarily with showing the 
relative trade-offs between the various enterprises. 
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hours devoted to crops have decreased from h to h , and livestock hours 
% ®1 
declined to h. from h. . Thus original work effort has declined from 
1 o 
h + h- to h + h. . In our example, no wage work was done before or 
^o o ^1 1 
after the experiment because w was less than . 
o 
It should be noted that will become smaller as hours of 
leisure are substituted for income. Consequently, 2MRSj^ ^  will occur at 
a lower level than 2MRS^ . If MRS had occurred at a higher level, 
o 1 
the livestock operation may have been completely abandoned. Thus it is 
clear that the impact upon farm operators from the assumptions of this 
model will be to reduce hours worked. However, the amount of reduction, 
all else being equal, should be less than that of an urban wage earner. 
The amount of reduction and where it occurs is determined chiefly by the 
slope of the VMP curves. Because those are more steeply sloped than the 
VMP curve (i.e., wage rate) of the wage earner, the amount of reduction 
for the farmer should be less. 
Turning to Equation 15 briefly, which determines how variable capital 
is allocated, the fact that (1-t) multiplies each term will mean the 
experiment will have no effect on capital allocation, ceteris paribus. 
This may not be true if the stream of benefits and costs are not propor­
tioned equally between experimental and post experimental time periods. 
Equations 14 and 15 are really a simultaneous system with the level of 
variable capital expenditures determining the VMP curves for labor which 
influence the amount of labor which in turn influence the VMP curves for 
capital. 
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VMP, 
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h h h hours worked h 
Figure 2,1. The effect of a negative income tax on the allocation of work 
between livestock, crop and nonfarm activities 
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It should also be clear that as t increases, the amount of the 
reduction in hours worked increases. Dividing Equation 13 by (1-t) gives 
values of 1.42 MRS^ 2.0 MRS^ and 3.33 for t of .3, .5, and .7 
respectively, A quick examination of Figure 2.1 reveals that with down­
ward sloping VHP curves, the reductions will be greater with higher tax 
rates. 
Also, as GL increases, the amount of reduction should increase. This 
is true because the additional income should decrease the rate of substi­
tution between leisure and income, everything else constant. 
Given the limited duration of the experiment,^ two factors acting 
together will determine where the labor response will occur. These two 
factors are large, physical fixed capital stocks that are highly illiquid 
and inflexible and relatively fixed coefficient production functions. 
Response to the experimental stimulus will be negligible when both factors 
are present. In Iowa, for example, for a given set of farm machinery and 
managerial skills, the range of feasible labor amounts per corn acre in 
the relevant range of the production function is small. Essentially the 
cropland must be readied for seed, planted, and harvested. Any amount less 
than this will yield zero output. Harrowing the land ten times as opposed 
to once increases output very little. Some adjustment is possible in 
^Different expectations about the permanence of the program will imply 
differential behavioral response to the program. If all families view the 
program as a temporary phenomenon rather than a permanent program, the labor 
supply response will be biased downwards in comparison with the enact­
ment of a permanent nationwide NIT program. For a mathematical statement 
and estimation of this bias, the reader is referred to [23, Volume II, 
Chapter 3]. The arguments in this paragraph are advanced with the 
assumption that most families view the experiment as being temporary. 
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cultivating, spraying, or fertilizer applications. However, if the 
individual farmer perceives his labor VMP curve as steep or that it is 
extremely important that he cultivate three tines, he will behave as 
indicated. 
Basically, with fixed managerial skills, the farmer will apply fixed 
combinations of labor and variable capital to each unit of fixed capital. 
Units of this limited fixed capital will not go unused because of its cost 
and the fact that landlords would still expect a rental payment. The 
likelihood of temporarily leasing the land is reduced because of the small 
chance of re-obtaining the land after three years. 
However, if either one of the two factors is missing, the labor supply 
response to the experiment may be large. Small fixed capital enterprises 
can be abandoned without much monetary loss® Large enterprises with wide 
ranges of feasible labor inputs could also be affected by the experiment. 
This leads to the testable hypothesis that those enterprises with rela­
tively high fixed capital endowments and fixed coefficient production 
functions should have the least reduction in labor input. 
As the analysis proceeds from theory to empirical results, several 
assumptions should be highlighted. First, there is no difference between 
price expectations (i.e., and P^) on the part of control versus 
experimentals. Second, there is no difference in the cost of obtaining 
capital (i.e., that both groups face the same r), Third, there is no 
change during the experiment that influences F and G, and fourth, the 
fixed capital components remain fixed. 
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CHAPTER III. DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
Choice of Dependent Variable 
For the wage earner three different dependent variables, each with 
several variations, could be examined to determine the impact of a nega­
tive income tax program on work effort. These three variables are labor 
force participation, earnings, and hours worked. For the self-employed 
there are also many variables, and the results may differ between the 
variableso These variables are net farm income, gross farm income, and 
various measures of hours worked.^ In this section each variable will be 
carefully defined, followed by arguments citing the strengths and 
weaknesses of each variable. 
Net farm income 
Net income refers to gross income minus total expenses during a 
designated time period, usually a year. Gross income is defined as all 
income during a time period less the purchase amounts paid for cattle, 
hogs, or sheep which are sold during the designated time period. This 
income may occur from livestock sold, crops sold, acreage diversion pay­
ment, gas tax refunds, and all other sources of farm income. 
Most of these measures are concerned with the labor supplied by the 
entire farm family in the farming enterprise. This study has not focused 
on the substitution of operator labor for that of his spouse or depen­
dents. Many other factors besides the experiment are more important in 
determining this substitution. Substitution between hired labor and 
family labor is covered in this study. One other obvious and interesting 
question not addressed in this study is the change in off-farm hours in­
duced by the experiment. This area was investigated intensively by 
another member of the research team working on the RIME experiment [50]. 
Essentially this study showed a large negative wage work reduction for farm 
operators in the experimental group relative to the control group. The 
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Expenses include fertilizer, crop insurance, interest, depreciation, 
and other similar expense items. Farmers had the option of electing 
1 
straight line or accelerated depreciation, consistent with their report­
ing to the Internal Revenue Service (1RS). In all cases the net and gross 
2 farm incomes were to be on a cash basis as opposed to the accrual method. 
For the expenses to be deductible they had to be paid in the designated 
time period. For example, if the farmer just incurred the expenses by 
charging them at the local store and not paying for them, they presumably 
were not reported to us. The prepayment of expenses is immediately 
deductible even though the goods may be delivered at a much later date. 
Thus, net income refers to the amount of income received during the time 
period minus expenses paid during the same time period. 
For farmers renting on a cash basis, the rental payment would simply 
be an expense item. For farmers renting on a share basis, the definition 
of gross income does not include income paid to the landlord, nor are 
expenses paid by the landlord included in deriving net income. 
probability of the farm operator participating in the wage market was 
greater for the experimental group relative to the control group in Iowa. 
The reverse was true in North Carolina. The average number of hours 
worked for those farm operators who participated in the wage market de­
creased rather drastically in both regions. In the middle year of the ex­
periment, the percentage disincentives were 48 and 28 percent respectively 
for Iowa and North Carolina. The wives' wage work was mixed but also 
showed rather large decreases in Iowa. The measure of farm work used in 
this study was recall hours, and this variable showed rather large posi­
tive incentives for the experimental group relative to the control group. 
^Farmers were asked to report their depreciation expenses once a year 
on a special form. They were encouraged to report the same depreciation 
amount as given to the Internal Revenue Service. 
2 Theoretically the accrual method is a better measure of income be­
cause it includes the changes in inventory between the beginning and end 
of an accounting period. However for administrative reasons, the cash 
basis was chosen over accrual as the accounting method to be used in the 
experiment. 
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From a policy relevant viewpoint, net farm income may be the 
appropriate variable. This measures a family's ability to attain a 
decent standard of living, and if through the experiment this variable 
has a treatment effect,^ it would have substantial cost implications for 
a national negative income tax program. However, gross farm income and 
net farm income suffer due to timing implications. A farmer, to a large 
extent, controls the timing of income and expenses. An experimental 
farmer relative to a control farmer has a strong incentive to build 
inventories of grain and livestock and pay expenses immediately, while 
delaying the receipt of income. In this way his payment would be maxi­
mized. A farmer with access to credit would not have much difficulty in 
paying expenses immediately and delaying income and consequently would 
show a larger disincentive for income than what actually occurred. 
To the extent that control and experimental families have different 
sizes and kinds of farming operations, a change in the relative farm 
produce prices would affect the amount of income. Consequently, this 
would affect the amount of predicted incentive or disincentive. For 
example, if experimental families on the average had relatively more crop 
production and less livestock initially, a simple analysis might 
erroneously suggest a small incentive, given that crop prices rose more 
than livestock prices. A change induced by the experiment (i.e., a live­
stock reduction) might be muted. Or if an experimental farmer reduced 
livestock operations significantly and switched from corn to soybeans, 
^Treatment effect is the generic term for the experimental effects 
which occur because of the difference in tax rates and guarantee levels 
between the control and experimental (payment) families in the experiment. 
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net farm income may not be as drastically affected as the actual quantity 
of labor supplied. 
Reporting of income is probably affected by the experiment. The 
amount of payments the families received is a direct function of the 
amount of income that the respondent reports. Consequently, an experi­
mental individual has every incentive to report all the expenses he can. 
Furthermore, he may even change his behavior and incur expenses within 
the duration of the experiment that otherwise might be delayed. Examples 
of this would be major overhauls of tractors or building upkeep. Adjust­
ing the period of analysis would be an attempt to overcome this problem. 
A control family, in contrast, has a tendency to round numbers, 
devotes less time to reporting, and does not have a built-in incentive 
to report all expenses. Each quarter a question was asked regarding where 
farm information originated: 1) memory and/or 2) farm account records. 
There was a significant difference between control and experimentals with 
experimentals reporting more frequently from farm account records.^ 
The above problems are in addition to the normal data collection 
problems incurred by collecting information via personal interviews. 
These include timing (i.e., was the expense reported in the prior period, 
especially if it occurred close to the boundary between the two periods) 
and other forms of response errors. 
^For a more complete discussion of this point, the reader is 
referred to Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
27 
Gross farm income 
This variable has been defined previously and its advantages and 
disadvantages are similar to net farm income. To some extent, reporting 
problems may be less than those for net farm income. Income transactions 
are usually bigger, less frequent and consequently likely to be reported 
more accurately than expenses, resulting in a better measure of gross 
income than net income. Gross income is a poorer measure of cost impli­
cations, disposable income, or a standard of living from a policy stand­
point. 
Recall hours 
During the interviews which were conducted once every three months, 
a question was asked regarding the number of hours worked by the respon­
dent on his farm or business the previous week. This is entirely a recall 
question. No effort was made to have the respondents keep track of the 
number of hours worked on a day-to-day basis. By multiplying by 13 and 
summing over the four quarters in a year, a yearly estimate of hours 
worked could be made. 
The chief problem with this variable is the Hawthorne^ type effect. 
While a strict intrepretation of the Hawthorne effect is a change in 
behavior resulting from observation, this will be extended to include 
changes in reporting behavior upon which the analysis is based. For 
example, imagine that you have an eighth grade education and are receiving 
$1,500 a year from "heaven." On each opportunity that you see the 
^Hawthorne effect refers to the general effect where experimental 
groups alter their behavior because they realize they are being watched 
or monitored. 
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benefactor, there is probably a tendency to convey an image of a hard­
working and industrious farmer. There might even be a feeling that the 
payments are somehow tied to their work effort, despite statements from 
project administrators to the contrary.^ 
The control families, however, have no such incentives. They do not 
receive much financial reward (i.e., $100 per year for a family with a 
head and a spouse) and by the fourth or fifth interview there is an effort 
to get the interview over with quickly. Consequently, estimates of the 
response based upon this variable may be incorrect. 
The interviews were conducted during the months of March, June, 
September and December. Because of the seasonal nature of farming, multi­
plying these four one week snapshots by 13 may not give a correct yearly 
estimate of hours worked. 
Furthermore, inclement weather the week before or during the inter­
view may affect the number of hours worked. If one is willing to assume 
that these time effects are distributed randomly with respect to the 
treatment variable, they should not affect the resultant direction of the 
conclusion. Data from other studies for Similar farming operations could 
probably reduce the influence of these last two factors, but the Hawthorne 
effect problem would still exist. 
During August 1970, or approximately nine months after the study 
began, the respondents were tested on their knowledge of the rules of 
the experiment. At the time of enrollment and in this following test, 
the families were told how the check was calculated and that there were 
no strings attached on how this money could be used. See [25, Chapter 4] 
for a more complete analysis. 
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Budgeted hours 
Each year the respondents were asked the number of acres grown in 
each crop and the number of different kinds of livestock that were sold. 
By obtaining a coefficient from other published research and extension 
farm planning manuals (Acker, et al., 1968-69 [l]; James, 1968 [46], 
Missouri Farm Planning Handbook, 1972 [70]; Van Arsdale, 1962, 1965 [92]; 
Willet and Saupe, 1973 [98]), an estimate of the number of hours a partic­
ular farming enterprise required was constructed. The table below lists 
the coefficients used for each major enterprise (the same coefficients were 
used for both North Carolina and lowa).^ 
Crop 
Corn 
Wheat 
Tobacco 
Soybeans 
Oats 
Hay 
Beans/Peas 
Blueberries 
Hr/Acre 
5.5 
4.0 
292.0 
5.0 
5.5 
7.0 
45.0 
547.0 
Livestock 
Feeder pigs 
Market hogs 
(birth to market) 
Market hogs 
(40 lbs to market) 
Feeder calves 
(implies a stock 
cow herd) 
Fatten cattle 
(500 lbs to market) 
Chickens 
Sheep 
Hr/Animal 
.7 
2.5 
1.8  
13.0* 
# stock cows 
4.6 
.0125 
1.8 
This statement is misleading in that for those enterprises grown in 
both states such as corn, soybeans, and some livestock activities, the 
percentage of total labor hours these common activities constitute in North 
Carolina for this study is small. 
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Crop 
Pickles 
Sweet Potatoes 
Squash/Eggplant 
Peppers 
Mi lo/Sorghum 
Diverted Acres 
Watermelon 
Sunflowers 
Hr/Acre 
150.0 
102.0 
157.0 
138.0 
6.2 
1.0  
96.0 
4.0 
Livestock 
Eggs (Dozen) 
<4000 
24000 
Goats 
Contract pigs 
(respondent labor only) 
Hr/Animal 
.13/doz. 
.04/doz. 
2,0 
.25 
# of cows Total Hours 
Dairy cows 1 
2-20 
21-40 
Feeders 
(small calves to 
feeders) 
240 
240+85* cows 
840+55* cows 
5.0 
The chief advantage of using this particular variable is that it is 
less likely to be affected by the Hawthorne type effect. It also suffers 
least from other reporting problems. The variables required are numbers 
which farmers are more likely to remember; the number of acres of row 
crop or the number of cattle in the feed lot is a status symbol. Further­
more, it is these numbers that are basic to all farm management decisions. 
For example, the number of acres in corn and soybeans would serve as a 
guide to how much fertilizer and seed to buy. 
There are four distinct disadvantages in using budgeted hours. 
1. The main disadvantage in using this variable is that the per unit 
labor requirement is assumed to be the same for all farmers despite 
differences in amount and size of farm machinery, farming methods employed, 
and the level of farm operator skills. 
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2, There is farm overhead labor not directly related to any produc­
tive enterprise, such as yard, ground and buildings maintenance, repairs 
of unspecialized machinery (e.g., general purpose tractor), and gathering 
of marketing or technological information. This suggests that accurate 
recall will exceed accurate budgeted labor estimates, but they should be 
highly correlated. 
3, Some problems in constructing the coefficient for each operation 
were encountered. The categories for which budgeted hours were available 
from outside sources did not match categories from the interview. For 
example, from the interview the number of feeder pigs and market hogs 
sold, the dollar value of the sales, and the cost of any purchased animals 
are known. The labor coefficients that can be obtained from previous 
studies are for hog operations that a) raise pigs from birth to market, 
b) raise pigs from 40 pounds to market, or c) raise feeder pigs to 40 
pounds. 
Some assumptions are required to convert the information from the 
interview into the number of different pigs falling under each of the 
three categories for each farmer. For the most part, the assumptions seem 
realistic and are applied to both control and experimental families 
indiscriminately. 
4, Another criticism of using budgeted hours as a measure of operator 
labor is that it represents the labor required by the entire farm opera­
tion -- the operator, his family and hired labor. Consequently it would 
be possible for an experimental farmer to increase his production level 
slightly but substantially increase the amount of labor hired, thus having 
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the net effect of reducing his own labor input. This would then be 
erroneously misconstrued as an increase in labor input when it clearly 
was not. 
Scaled hours 
As noted above, budgeted hours suffers because the coefficients do 
not reflect differences in farm sizes or methods. Scaled hours does 
adjust for farm size by making the simplistic assumption that size of 
operation perfectly predicts farming methods employed. For example, if 
a farmer has 300 acres of corn, he probably has large tractors with a five 
to six bottom plow, while a farmer who farms only 60 acres of row crop 
probably has small tractors with a two to three bottom plow. 
The coefficients were constructed in the following manner. All 
livestock hour requirements were assumed to be explained by a second-
2 degree polynomial of the form ax + bx + c where x is the number of 
animals sold. Two end points which covered the range of livestock 
activities and one point in the center were chosen and hours from previous 
studies [l, 46, 70, 92, 98] assigned to these quantities. The values of 
a, b, and c were then computed. The values and function for each livestock 
operation are shown in Table 3.1. 
All other livestock operations were assumed to be linear and hence 
were the same as budgeted hours. 
For crop operations a question asked in the post interview about 
machinery size was used to determine which coefficients to use, while for 
tobacco a simple function of yield and acres determined the number of 
hours. Using information from the post experimental period interview 
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Table 3.1. Description of functions used in generating scaled hours 
Livestock 
Low Middle High 
Fat cattle 
Hrs/head 
Quantity 
Function 
Stock cows 
Hrs/head 
Quantity 
Function 
Dairy cows 
Hrs/head 
Quantity 
Function 
12 
1 
8 
60 
-.0116x + 8.64x + 3.37 
40 
1 
15 
22 
.1136% + 16.42% + 23.69 
240 
1 
115 
15 
-,3864x + 112.25% + 128.14 
4 
400 
10 
60 
100 
40 
Eggs 
Hrs/head 
Quantity 
Function 
100 
1,000 
1,120 
16,000 
4,375 
125,000 
-.000000308% + .0732% + 27.11 
Ewes 
Hrs/head 
Quantity 
Function 
Hogs (feeder pigs) 
Total hours 
Quantity 
Function 
Market hogs (birth to market) 
Total hours 
Quantity 
Function 
9 
1 
5 
35 
-.0273% + 5,865% + 3.1623 
13 
8 
200 
150 
-.0004% + 1.38% + 1.99 
45 
8 
529 
184 
-.001% + 2.94% + 21.54 
4 
70 
591 
500 
1,620 
720 
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could cause problems if the variables used had been affected by the treat­
ment. In this case, if investment in machinery were related to treatment 
parameters, an analysis of the hours variable could be misleading. How­
ever, as will be shown later, there is no evidence of this. The coeffi­
cients for the Iowa grain crops are shown below. 
Hours per acre 
Corn Soybeans Oats Hax Diverted acres 
4 Row 5.7 4.7 5.5 7.0 1.0 
6 Row 4.7 3.8 5.5 7.0 1.0 
8 Row 3.8 2.8 5.5 7.0 1.0 
While the scaled hours variable may be an improvement over straight 
budgeted hours, it makes some very arbitrary assumptions which should not 
be overlooked. For example, if a farmer has a reasonably large farm and 
then makes a reduction in farm size, the method would understate the amount 
of work reduction. This is true primarily because the method and capital 
employed would still be the same, and yet in making a reduction in the 
number of animals, scaled hours automatically presumes an increase in per 
unit labor requirements. On the other hand, the amount of hours is under­
stated when a farm increases its level of production without changing 
method or amount of farm capital employed. 
For both budgeted and scaled hours, it was possible to construct crop 
and livestock hour variables. Also by making assumptions about wage rates 
and the amount of labor connected with machine hire and custom work, a 
measure of scaled hours can be constructed which represents total farm 
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family labor. Results will be presented for each of the major classes 
of dependent variables described above. 
Estimation Methodology 
Because the study was conducted over a three year period, a natural 
problem of pooling time series and cross section data arose. Consequently 
the prime tool for these analyses was a time series - cross section pooling 
regression program developed from the procedures in Nerlove (1971)[73].^ 
The sample used was for farm families with a male head less than or equal 
to 69 years of age at the beginning of the experiment, who farmed each 
year, had constant marital status, and had at least 400 hours of work in 
one of the years between 1969 and 1972. Eight cases were eliminated 
because of missing information and faulty data. 
If the experiment induced many individuals to leave farming, the 
above subpopulation definition would bias the treatment effect upward. 
However, if a few individuals left farming for reasons other than the 
experiment, and these were concentrated slightly in the experimental group, 
and no variable represented the reasons, then the treatment effect would be 
biased downward. The latter is the primary reason for the population 
chosen. Separate analysis is needed to study movements in and out of 
farming. 
Because of different production functions and methods of production, 
the Iowa and North Carolina samples were split. Tobacco growing is 
^During most of the preliminary work on this chapter, ordinary least 
squares were used. There is little difference in overall results between 
the two estimation techniques. 
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primarily a labor intensive operation while corn-growing in Iowa is a 
highly capital intensive operation. This is reflected readily in the 
tables in Appendix A which illustrate sample averages for a number of 
important variables by year and treatment in both Iowa and North Carolina. 
Each year of the experiment for each farmer constitutes one observa­
tion. This has the advantage of increasing degrees of freedom and allow­
ing the behavioral response to the program over time to be traced. The 
number of individual farmers by site is shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Number of farmers by plan by region 
Tax Rate 30 50 50 50 70 Total Control Total 
% Guarantee 75 50 75 100 75 Exp. 
Iowa 13 9 13 10 5 50 54 104 
North Carolina 9 11 15 11 6 52 42 94 
One of the methods for analyzing the experimental effect would be to 
construct a demand-supply model. A properly constructed model could 
estimate correctly the treatment coefficients taking into account the 
simultaneity problems inherent in Equations 14 and 15. Such a model, 
however, needs adequate measures of the VMP of labor and capital, respec­
tively in crop and livestock operations. Given the income data, the ex 
post nature of the data, and poor measures of capital, no attempt was made 
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to estimate the structural equations. The prime focus of the study is 
to estimate accurately the treatment parameters in a reduced form model. 
The following is a description of the major independent variables used in 
the analysis. 
Major Independent Variables 
These variables fall naturally into four groups - control, experimen­
tal, interaction between control and experimental variables, and measure­
ment variables. Control variables are included to insure that differences 
between the control and experimental samples, which occurred as a by­
product or accident of random sampling, are not included in the coeffi­
cients on the treatment variables. They are needed to yield consistent 
experimental coefficients given the stratified design of the sample. Also, 
these variables are often important determinants of the dependent vari­
ables. Without their inclusion, the equations would suffer from specifi­
cation error resulting in biased experimental variable coefficients. 
Experimental variables are the different formulations of the tax and 
guarantee parameters. Interactions are needed between the two groups of 
variables to test for differences between subpopulations (e.g., race) or 
as further refinements to determine where the treatment response took 
place. Measurement variables alleviate misinterpreting results when major 
explanatory and dependent variables are measured with error. The follow­
ing is a description of the major independent variables used in the 
analysis, discussed in order by group. 
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Control variables 
Pre-farm size These variables are the 1969 values for some 
variant (total, crop, livestock) of scaled or budgeted hours. They have 
been entered as linear, quadratic, or spline functions. Their primary 
role is to control for pre-experimental work effort, motivation, family 
needs, and size and kind of farming operation. 
When scaled or budgeted hours is the dependent variable, these 
variables are a pseudo lagged dependent^ variable and essentially convert 
everything into a "change" model. Consequently, when age or family size 
are entered into the equation, their interpretation must be to explain the 
change between 1969 and the other years. This lagged dependent variable 
should reflect the variation in hours worked in 1969 due to age, family 
size, and other such demographic variables. In the linear model, the 
coefficient should be 1.0 or slightly smaller and be highly significant. 
Age Age is entered primarily as a control variable for the stage 
in life cycle. Theoretical expectations and evidence from other studies 
indicate that work effort is related to age. 
This variable has been entered in several forms including the 
following: 
1. Age 
2 2. Age, Age 
^The word pseudo is used because the lagged dependent variable is 
always the 1969 variable even when the observation pertains to calendar 
year 1971 or 1972. A true lagged dependent variable would associate 1970 
with 1971 and 1971 with 1972. 
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3. Age, 1 if over 55 
4. Age 
(ag"i/ >'L) 
Wage Throughout the farm analysis, participation in the wage 
labor market is assumed to be an exogenous variable,^ The purpose behind 
entering this variable into the farm analysis is to control for changes 
in the level of participation in this other market. Changes in wage work 
probably affect the amount of farm work. Consequently, omitting the 
variable could lead to biased and inefficient treatment coefficients 
(i.e., standard problems associated with incorrect specification). 
An interaction with the experimental variable is avoided so incorrect 
inferences will not be made. The purpose of this study is to estimate 
farm work response to the experiment» Thus, forcing the effect of a 
change in off-farm work on farm work to be identical for control and 
experimental families simplifies the resulting analysis. For example, 
assume a reduction in wage and farm work occurs for the experimental 
group. A wage-treatment interaction would capture some of the reduction 
in farm work thus making an interpretation of the other treatment vari­
ables more difficult. 
Several formulations of this variable have also been tried, includ­
ing the following: 
1) Current year's head's wage and business recall hours 
^For an analysis where this assumption is relaxed, the reader is 
referred to [50], 
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2) Change in head's wage and business recall hours. The change is 
calculated as deviation from 1969 head's wage and business recall hours. 
3) 1 and 2 combined. 
Education This variable is included as a proxy for a 
farmer's management ability. The variables used are the number of 
years of formal education completed and the Ammons and Ammons Quick 
Test.^ 
The effect of education on work effort or income is indeterminate. 
A higher education or management level might be associated with a greater 
ability to manipulate the payments system. For example, a greater ability 
to time income and expense streams so as to maximize payments would show 
a greater income disincentive and a smaller work disincentive. One could 
also argue that more education would result in a higher degree of farm 
mechanization. Consequently, an operator would have to work less for a 
similarly sized farm operation. In other words, a higher education may 
provide a way for the farm operator to become more efficient. On the 
other hand, education may serve as a proxy for an incentive variable. 
Those individuals with higher education might have more incentive to farm 
bigger operations. If there is no other control for degree of management, 
education would probably have a positive influence on hours worked. How­
ever, given the change model, there seems little justification for an 
education variable except as a control for the random selection process. 
^The Ammons and Ammons quick test score is based on a word recogni­
tion test. The scale range is 0-50. 
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Family composition and size As family size increases, it is 
expected that the number of hours that the family works will increase. 
The larger the family, the greater is the need for a larger income. 
However, dependents aged 14 and above may supply labor to the farm and, 
hence, the head may be able to reduce his work effort. Again given the 
"change" model, there seems little justification for a family unit size 
variable. 
Family composition is assumed to be exogeneous and given the impor­
tance and amount of labor needed to grow tobacco, several variables 
representing size and composition were added to the model in North 
Carolina to insure treatment coefficients were not drastically affected. 
These variables included the number of members in given age groups and 
a dummy variable for whether a spouse is present. 
1969 normal income This variable was constructed by the field 
staff from the screening and pre-enrollment interviews. This variable 
was the basic stratification variable in assigning the family to a cell. 
Farm asset variables In the models presented here, the role of 
assets is difficult to define. There are several aspects that enter into 
the picture. Total farm debt divided by total assets reflects a farmer's 
ability to obtain credit. One can argue that as this ratio increases, 
the farmer has a certain inflexibility about reducing his work effort. 
Many authors have pointed out that for wage earners, the 40 hour work 
week reduces freedom of choice involving the number of hours worked. 
This lack of substitutability will reduce the impact of a short-run 
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experimental program. Similarly, large debts will reduce the flexibility 
of altering work patterns for a farm operator. 
The amount and number of assets also reflects a farmer's past work 
behavior or incentive along with several other phenomena including 
inheritances. Consequently, the major role played by assets is as a 
control variable. If by accident of random sampling the number of assets 
were unevenly distributed between control and experimental, the 
coefficients on the experimental variables could be distorted. 
Treatment variables As noted earlier in the labor supply 
chapter, increasing the tax or guarantee level should result in a larger 
reduction of hours worked. Consequently, besides a simple control-
experimental dummy (C/E), other variables such as tax rate or guarantee 
percentage may be important in explaining the experimental response. 
Entering one variable for tax rate (4 values: 0, 30, 50, 70) or one 
variable for the guarantee percentage (4 values: 0, 50, 75, 100) places 
a linear restriction on the response. In essence it restricts or forces 
the middle plan (i.e., 50 percent tax rate, 75 percent guarantee) to 
lie between and equidistant from the other two plans. A more unre­
stricted formulation is to enter each plan as a separate dummy variable. 
However, even this is a highly restricted model. It presumes that 
the treatment effect should be constant for all levels of farm size, 
debt ratios, or age. These interactions, which may be important 
explanatory variables of where the experimental response took place, are 
described below. 
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Treatment interactions To remove the restriction that the 
treatment response be identical for all levels of farm size, an inter­
action between farm size and C/E is required. Economic theory sheds 
little light on whether there should be a differential effect or 
what direction it would go with respect to farm size. Quadratic and 
spline interactions were also tried. The former was chosen over the 
latter because the adjustment process is forced to be continuous, and 
it forestalls justifying arbitrary spline functions. 
Because of institutional reasons alluded to earlier, the amount 
of debt could limit a farm operator's choice. This was empirically 
investigated by including a C/E interaction with the debt ratio. 
The expected sign is positive, i.e., as the debt ratio increases, 
the amount of work effort should increase. Or if there is a dis­
incentive, the amount of the disincentive should be less. 
The last primary interaction concerns age. Stage in life cycle 
could alter response. In particular, as one approaches retirement 
age, the response might be greater. This was investigated by 
including one of the following formulations: 
1) Age X C/E 
2) Age if over 54 x C/E, 
otherwise 0 
3) 1 and 2 combined 
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Measurement error variables These variables probably are poorly 
named, but hopefully will explain some of the variation in the experi­
mental group response. A simple look at the distribution of scaled 
hours worked for 1970-1972 versus 1969 hours worked for the experimental 
group shows a considerable variation. Some experimental families 
increased their hours substantially while other families' hours declined 
substantially. There are several possible explanations, some of which 
fall under the general heading of measurement error problems. For 
example, as argued earlier, experimental farmers who can alter timing 
of income and expenses are not affected in the same way as farmers who 
cannot alter their timing. The following four subtopics fall under 
this generic classification. 
The first subtopic involves incorrect selection of several high-income 
farmers. From the pre-enrollment interview, an estimate of normal income 
determined eligibility. If errors were made in this determination, how­
ever, and a large percentage of the farmers had normal incomes well above 
the breakeven level, the experiment probably would have little or no effect 
upon work effort. Thus the average treatment effect would be biased 
(probably downward), if inference were made to a population of low income 
farmers. This selection problem was particularly acute in Iowa where, for 
example, several well-to-do and highly efficient farmers became eligible 
because of hail damage in 1969 which temporarily reduced their cash income. 
A variable which indicated whether a farrily was over the breakeven level 
in 1969 based on ex post information rather than expectations in August to 
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October of 1969 on the pre-enrollment interview was added to the model to 
partially correct for these measurement problems. 
A second subtopic relates to the timing of income and expenses. 
Particularly in year three, farmers who could control the timing of their 
income and expenses could have substantial payments without any reduction 
in work effort. Consequently, their marginal tax rate has been altered and 
their behavioral response will be different. An attempt is made to capture 
this effect in several ways. The amount of net equity and the ratio of 
total debt to total assets reflects the amount of credit a farmer has. 
This, in turn, reflects a farmer's ability to change the timing of income 
and expenses. A farmer with a good line of credit does not have a need to 
sell in a certain time period and also can incur expenses before receiving 
receipts. An effort was made to classify income which could be delayed. 
Milk and livestock sales are more inflexible than crop sales. However, 
the use of this variable was rejected because of simultaneity problems. 
A third subtopic is the reporting behavior of farmers. Farmers who 
intentionally or unintentionally misreport income to the payments process 
via their monthly income report forms might behave differently. Upon the 
edited estimates of quarterly^ income, an estimate of the amount of 
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payments farms should receive can be estimated. Based upon this, some 
^For a complete description of data editing methods see Appendix B. 
For a discussion of changes which arose throughout the analysis, the 
reader is referred to Chapter 5. 
2 The same mathematical formula as was used in the actual payments was 
applied to information collected by the surveys. All components of income 
and expenses were included. The survey's estimate can also differ because 
of the accounting period. Actual payments used a one or three month 
averaging period with a 12 month carryover procedure. Surveys did not 
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farmers received one thousand dollars more in payments than they should 
have received.^ 
Theoretically, these experimental farmers are facing a different 
marginal tax rate than their assigned tax rate. A change in their true 
income does not affect their payment as the subscribed mathematical 
formula underlying the NIT transfer scheme would indicate. Consequently, 
their behavioral response will be altered as compared to other farmers in 
the experimental group. The income effect would still be present, but the 
substitution effect would dissipate. The strength of the substitution 
effect is determined primarily by the amount of misreporting and closeness 
to the breakeven level. Other studies, mentioned in the introduction, 
have differed upon the relative weight of income versus substitution 
effects. If we assume these weights are approximately 1/3 and 2/3, 
respectively, and if there is an average disincentive of 9 percent, 
farmers whose assigned tax rate was completely altered (i.e., became zero 
or like control) would have only a 3 percent effect. Furthermore if this 
income were viewed as completely transitory, the effect would be zero. 
As a partial control for this phenomenon, a variable (PN) was added which 
is actual minus predicted payment s divided by the mean of the two vari­
ables. Since it is hypothesized that income level and work effort do not 
collect information monthly, so the accounting period was simply a year 
with no carryover scheme. This could not have, particularly in the last 
two years of the experiment, accounted for some of the huge differences 
in actual versus predicted payments, 
^Predicted payments were on the average $845 less in North Carolina 
and $676 less than actual payments in Iowa. The standard deviation of 
the differences was $845 and $1030 respectively. 
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explain the misreporting behavior, this variable should not be correlated 
with the error terms, and its corresponding undesirable effects upon the 
estimaters from a multiple regression analysis should not be present.^ 
A fourth subtopic is the often weak connection between a farmer's 
income and his work effort. Farmers experiencing damage from hail or 
livestock disease problems may alter their behavior in response to 
these stimuli. Because these events may not be randomly distributed 
between control and experimental groups, and because of the small sample 
size, they might give a distorted view of what is happening. 
Each quarter a farmer was asked in an open ended question if he 
were satisfied with the production of each crop and livestock activity. 
If not, he was asked why not. Reasons indicating random weather or 
disease effects were noted and coded as dummy variables. 
The correlation coefficients of the dependent variables with PN were 
always less than 0.20. Attempts to explain the variation in PN with a 
variety of variables always netted an less than .25. 
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CHAPTER IV. RESULTS 
To stanmarize the results takes ingenuity and perseverance. Advan­
tages of using a reduced form estimation procedure are the relative 
straightforwardness of interpreting the regression results and the use of 
a similar model for all dependent variables. Without sacrificing any 
distinctly different results, only findings related to net and gross farm 
income and scaled crop, scaled livestock, total scaled, adjusted scaled, 
head and total recall hours will be presented. Budgeted hours results 
are practically identical to scaled hours results. Adjusted scaled hours 
are total scaled hours minus hired labor expense divided by two minus 
hired machine expense divided by ten plus custom work done divided by ten. 
The divisions convert dollar amounts into hours. Total recall hours is a 
summation of head hours plus .9 times spouse recall hours plus .8 times 
dependent recall hours.^ 
The results for each region will be presented separately. After a 
basic model is described, several simple parameterizations of the results 
will be presented. From these simple models a flavor of the overall 
results can be obtained, A selected complex model will be presented along 
with partial F-tests for classes of independent variables and predicted 
incentives between control and experimental groups will be estimated. 
^These numbers were deemed reasonable by farm extension specialists 
at Iowa State University, 
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Iowa 
The basic model chosen for presentation was estimated by the time 
series-cross section pooling regression program in the following form; 
Dep = b + b, HR69 + b. AGE + b_ AGE55 + b, EDUC + b. DR 
*^ 0 1 2 3 4 5 
+ bg FE + b^ AHDWBH + bg D71 + b^ D72 
where the variables are defined in the following way: 
HR69 - 1969 total scaled hours. When the dependent variable is 
scaled crop or scaled livestock hours, the associated in­
dependent variable is 1969 scaled crop or scaled livestock 
hours respectively. 
AGE - age of the farm operator 
AGE55 - age of the farm operator if greater than 54; otherwise 
zero 
EDUC - number of years of formal schooling of the farm operator 
DR - total farm debts/total farm assets 
FE - net farm equity 
AHDWBH - the change in amount of off-farm work done by the farm 
operator 
D71 - 1 if 1971; 0 otherwise 
D72 - 1 if 1972; 0 otherwise 
In Table 4.1, several models representing simple treatment parame-
terizations are presented. Model I adds to the basic model a simple 
dummy variable (C/E) where one represents experimental and zero represents 
control. The coefficient represents an average difference between control 
and experimental groups controlling for the variables in the basic model. 
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If the coefficient is negative, the experimental group declined relative 
to the control group for the dependent variable in question. The F-va lue 
determines if this difference is statistically significant. The reverse 
is true for a positive coefficient. 
Model II is slightly more complicated in that both C/E and C/E inter­
acted with 1969 total scaled hours are added to the basic model. This 
removes the restriction that the difference between the control and 
experimental groups must be equal for all levels of the 1969 scaled hours 
variable. It allows the treatment effect to be different between large 
and small sized farms. For example, if the treatment effect is always a 
ten percent reduction with respect to 1969 total scaled hours, the inter­
action would allow this percentage to be estimated. Model I only allows 
a constant absolute difference in hours worked or income earned. The F-
value represents whether the two treatment variables jointly and signifi­
cantly add to the explanation of the dependent variables. The C/E 
coefficient and interaction may now be of different signs and it may no 
longer be readily apparent what the percentage incentive or disincentive 
is. One estimate of the percentage can be ascertained by evaluating the 
model at different levels of the HR69 variable. In Table 4.1 this per­
centage incentive has been calculated for the mean value of HR69. 
Model III is again slightly more complicated than Model II. Two 
2 
variables, HR69 and HR69 interacted with C/E have been added to Model II. 
Essentially, the response can be curvilinear rather than the linear 
restriction imposed by Model II. The sign on the treatment variables may 
be different so the direction of the effect can not be directly seen. 
Table 4.1. Iowa treatment coefficient estimates, F-values and predicted incentives for models with 
simple treatment parameterizations for selected dependent variables 
Dependent Variables 
Net Gross Head Total Total Adjusted Scaled Scaled 
Farm Farm Recall Recall Scaled Scaled Crop Livestock 
Income Income Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours 
Model I 
C/E -381 1389 23 97 -158 -222 -23 -150 
F .40 .95 .29 .39 6.37* 7.84 .41 5.35* 
Model II 
C/E 1772 1088 246 263 9.08 -31.6 94 -131 
C/E*HR69 .70 -1.25 -.11 -.08 -.089 -'10. -.11 -.021 
F .78 .81 .31 .32 4.01* 4.60* .99 2.71^ 
7o Incentive -8.8 -7.0 1.0 3.9 -8.0 -11.5 -2.1 -15.8 
Model III 
C/E 4761 6561 351 314 136 -165 -125 -70 
C/E*HR69 3.88 -6.51 -.18 -.10 -.21 .048 .24 -.191 
C/E*HR69 -.00066 .00110 .00001 .00000 .00002 -.00003 -.00011 .00006 
F 1.07 .70 .28 .32 2.52^ 2.94* .28 2.02^ 
7o Incentive 7.5 -10.3 1.8 4.9 -8.5 -9.7 .1 -19.7 
^Significant at the 5 percent level. 
^Significant at the 1 percent level. 
^Significant at the 10 percent level. 
^Significant at the 20 percent level. 
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This is resolved by evaluating the model at several levels of HR69. Only 
the mean value of HR69 is reported in Table 4,1 along with the overall 
F-value on the three treatment variables. 
Examining the treatment coefficients of Model I as presented in 
Table 4.1, net farm income, gross farm income, head recall, total recall, 
and scaled crop hours are all insignificant. Scaled livestock hours is 
negative and significant which in turn makes total scaled and adjusted 
scaled hours negative and significant. The average experimental effect 
was -152 for scaled livestock hours, -173 for total scaled hours, and 
-230 for adjusted scaled hours. Since adjusted scaled hours is more 
negative than total scaled hours, it indicates experimentals hired more 
labor or did less custom work. 
In Model I, both income variables are negative but insignificant. 
This agrees with expectations in that the least profitable enterprise 
should be curtailed. This will lead to an hours reduction but less of an 
income disincentive. 
These basic results hold up in Models II and III. Scaled livestock 
hours continues to be negative and significant making the measures of 
total scaled hours negative and significant. The income variables are 
insignificant although the percentage incentives are sometimes positive, 
indicating that experimental families are earning relatively more than 
control families with similar characteristics. This is somewhat surpris­
ing given that experimental families have a built-in incentive to under-
report income, cverreport expenses and consequently show less net farm 
income than their control counterparts. This, however, is not true for 
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all levels of HR69; it is not significant, and therefore can be dis­
counted. 
The percentage incentives are calculated by subtracting the control 
A A 
group y-hat (C) from the experimental group y-hat (P), dividing by C and 
multiplying by 100. This percentage can be interpreted as the average 
percentage amount the experimental changes relative to the control group 
holding all other variables constant. As previously mentioned the y-hats 
are calculated by using the mean values for all independent values. In 
Models II and III these percentages are -16.6 and -20.4 percent for 
scaled livestock hours, -8.3 and -8.9 percent for total scaled hours, and 
-12.3 and -10.7 percent for adjusted scaled hours respectively. 
Both measures of recall hours (total and head) are positive and 
insignificant. This is contradictory to the results obtained from scaled 
hours and raises the question of which variable is to be believed. 
Proving unequivocally which variable is correct is a highly elusive 
goal. A measurement of hours worked for the farmer is the intersection 
between his labor demand and labor supply curves. It cannot be argued 
that recall hours represents the supply curve, and budgeted hours 
represents a labor demand curve. Both variables are attempts to measure 
the intersection of the two curves by different methods. To establish 
which is the better variable, one must determine which measurement tech­
nique is best. To argue that economic theory should determine which is 
correct because one agrees better with the theory is not an independent 
test of the theory and not a particularly useful way of doing empirical 
research. The variable which is judged best by independent criteria, 
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statistical methodology, or whatever, will hopefully correspond best to 
theoretical predictions. 
It probably is a valid criticism to argue that budgeted hours does 
not measure the same thing as recall hours. Budgeted hours contains no 
measurement of overhead hours. It only measures time spent in direct 
productive activities. Overhead activities include time spent bookkeep­
ing, maintaining buildings, repairing fences and machinery, and driving 
to town on errands. If it is assumed that these activities are propor­
tional to productive hours, then the estimate of scaled hours understates 
rather than overstates the amount of the disincentive. 
Remember that recall hours are based solely upon a respondent's 
declaration of the number of hours worked the previous week, while scaled 
hours depends directly upon numbers of acres of corn, acres of soybeans, 
hogs sold, cattle sold, etc. These numbers are more likely to be 
remembered because they influence all subsequent management decisions. 
This is not to say that there were no errors in the reporting of year end 
numbers; but if and when corrections to these quantities were needed, the 
changes could be documented.^  
A further argument can be advanced. Presume that one has a number of 
different productive activities which need to be summarized as one. One 
immediately thinks of constructing a linear combination of these different 
F^or a more complete discussion of this point, the reader is referred 
to Chapter V of this dissertation. 
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activities. It is contended here that those weights should represent 
labor coefficients from other studies. However, because individually 
most productive enterprises decrease in quantity with respect to treatment 
variables, all reasonable coefficient sets would show a negative treatment 
effect. Consequently, if recall hours and budgeted hours are to be 
reconciled, three possibilities arise: 
1) A Hawthorne effect does exist and is responsible for the 
difference. 
2) While the experimental families have reduced their farm work 
effort in terms of growing corn or raising pigs, they have increased the 
number of overhead hours. While this may be true, it certainly is not 
policy relevant that the farmer must now take five trips to town instead 
of the previous two to accomplish the same mission. 
3) An accident of random sampling resulted in experimental families 
using more labor intensive techniques of production. This hypothesis is 
essentially negated, however, when various functional forms of HR69 are 
entered in the model. 
Furthermore, evidence from the quarterly interviews would indicate 
similar investments in machinery and equipment. Table 4.2 shows for 
experimental and control groups respectively the overall means of initial 
machinery and equipment stock plus the amount of investment each year. 
The simple test of means is not significant for either the initial stock 
of machinery or equipment or the subsequent investment by year in 
machinery and equipment. 
Thus, depending upon the context within which the treatment effects 
are evaluated, differing conclusions can be reached. However, the result 
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which seems policy relevant in terms of farm goods produced would indicate 
a disincentive of approximately 8 to 12 percent. 
Table 4.2. Overall means of initial machinery and equipment stock and 
investment by year, treatment, and region 
Initial Gross Gross Gross 
Machinery Investment Investment Investment 
Equipment Stock 1970 1971 1972 
North Carolina 
Control 564 244 408 620 
Experimental 554 134 143 449 
t-value .04 1.24 1.65 .52 
Iowa 
Control 10,199 1,473 993 2,615 
Experimental 10,943 1,157 1,404 2,102 
t-value -.74 .66 -1.10 ,79 
d 
All simple t-values are insignificant. 
These initial results can be expanded by determining if the treatment 
effect is related to age, to guarantee or tax rates, to measurement 
variables that were previously discussed, to year or to amount of farm 
debt. To test these hypotheses, partial F-values were calculated and are 
presented in Table 4.3. Two equations from which some of the F-values 
were derived are shown in Tables C.l and C.2 in Appendix C for each 
dependent variable. 
The results in Table 4.3 will be discussed line by line. To the 
basic model, five treatment variables are added and the joint F-statistics 
calculated. Similar to the simple models previously discussed, the 
Table 4.3. Iowa partial F-statistics for selected dependent and independent variables 
Dependant Variables 
Groups of Net Gross Head Total Total Adjusted Scaled Scaled 
Independent Farm Fami Recall Recall Scaled Scaled Crop Livestock 
Variables Income Income Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours 
Due to HR69*C/E 
HR69 *C/E 
D70*C/E, D71*C/E, u 
D72*C/E .79. .58 .57 1.08 1.81* 2.20 .30 1.69* 
PN 28.73 2I.25C .44 .81 1.85* 
4.45^  
2.22* .03 2.22* 
DR*C/E .0009 2.82^  .006 .07 .36 8.94C .64 
AGE*C/E, 
AGE55*C/E 2.49b 2.37b 3.81^  4.85C 2.51» .81 2.52» .97 
All of above 
1.50* except PN 2.16^  1.71 1.34 1.93b 2.26^  1.77 1.53® 
HR69*C/E, 
HR69^ *C/E, 
C/E 1.03 .70 .28 .32 2.52» 2.94^  .28 2.02* 
D71*C/E. 
D72*C/E* .42 .38 1.02 2.22* .75 1.09 .34 1.19 
T30, T70 f .52 3.98. .14 .08 .19 .22 .54 .08 
G50, GlOO .56 2.80 .56 .52 1.35 1.29 1.39 1.25 
T30,T70, G50, 
GlOO .21 4.08^  .76 .87 .98 .91 2.04» .78 
Family Comp. U 
Variables® .71 1.01 1.24 1.30 2.04» 2.21^  3.34C .80 
S^ignificant at the 20 percent level. 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
S^ignificant at the 1 percent level. 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
®D70*C/E, D71*C/E and D72*C/E are year dummies interacted with the simple treatment variable C/E. 
T30, T70, G50, GlOO are all simple dummy variables representing each of the different experi­
mental plans. The 50% tax and 75% guarantee plan has been excluded. 
SSee footnote on page 61. 
58 
treatment variables are significant in the scaled livestock, total scaled, 
and adjusted scaled equations. 
While the main treatment variables were not significant for net and 
gross farm income in Iowa, a "measurement" variable (PN) is highly signifi­
cant. Recall that this variable is constructed by subtracting predicted 
negative income tax payments from survey data from actual negative income 
tax payments and dividing by the mean of the two variables in the numera­
tor. PN has a mean of .72 and a standard derivation of 1.07 for Iowa 
experimentalSo As expected, the sign is positive in all equations where 
the variable is significant. If the family received overpayments, the 
effect of the negative income tax transfer scheme was less (more incentive, 
less disincentive) when compared to other experimentals with similar 
characteristics. This variable was significant in all equations except 
the measures of recall hours and scaled crop hours. 
When the debt ratio interacted with treatment was added to the model, 
it was negative and significant in the gross farm and total scaled hours 
equations. This is contrary to expectations in that experimental farmers 
with high debt ratios would be expected to have less flexibility in re­
ducing their work effort. However, relative to their control counterparts 
they are better off because of the payments, and consequently the result 
is plausible. 
When AGE and AGE55 are interacted with treatment, the partial F is 
significant in five out of the eight equations. Yet, the results are 
mixed in that the signs are often different between the variables. However, 
with the exception of gross farm income, AGE*T is always negative in the 
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five equations and larger than AGE55 if the latter is of opposite sign. 
Therefore, the conclusion that the experiment affected disincentives more 
as age increased should probably be accepted. 
The next line is the partial F-statistic on all treatment variables 
represented by the lines above with the exception of the measurement 
variable (PN) which is included in the basic set of variables. The treat­
ment variables are significant in six out of the eight equations. 
A new equation is represented by the next line. The basic model is 
identical to that of line one. The only difference is that treatment is 
entered as one variable rather than as three variables, each being a 
different year dummy, interacted with treatment. Consequently these 
results are almost identical to the first line, except generally showing 
a higher significance level. 
The test of the hypothesis that each year was similar is shown by 
the partial F-test on the next line in Table 4.3. The alternative 
hypothesis is that the treatment effect was different in one of the years 
of the experiment. The latter actually has much appeal. One could argue 
convincingly that because the experiment started in late 1969, the farm­
ing operation for 1970 was already decided. Furthermore decisions 
probably would not be changed immediately until the payment checks came 
for several months as promised. The data do not support this view, how­
ever. Given that the major reduction is in the livestock operation and 
that this adjustment can be made easily and quickly, the overall effect is 
the same for the three years. It is quite possible that some families 
overreacted, cut their livestock production drastically the first year. 
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found they had too much time on their hands, and thus increased their 
production in subsequent years. This was balanced by some farmers who 
cut production slowly every year. 
The treatment parameters, tax rate and percentage guarantee, were 
insignificant in almost all formulations except gross farm income and 
scaled crop hours, and were often of incorrect sign. Theoretically, the 
higher the tax rate the larger the reduction in hours, holding everything 
else constant. Consequently when the tax parameter is unconstrained, the 
coefficient on the 70 percent plan should be more negative than the 50 
percent which in turn is more negative than the 30 percent plan. Part of 
the time these expectations held, but often they did not. The prime 
rationale is the small sample. As shown in Table 3.2, the number of 
observations in each cell is quite small. Near the bottom of Table 4.3, 
the partial F-tests are shown for the addition of the four plan dummies 
to the basic model and the five treatment variables. In addition the F-
statistic is shcijn for the addition of tax dummies when the guarantee 
dummies have been added to the above model and vice versa. 
The major variable influenced by plan effects is gross farm income. 
The coefficients [see Table C,2 in Appendix C] on the guarantee dummies 
are -126 and -6183 respectively for G50 and GlOO, while they are -1099 
and 8400 for T30 and T70. Only GlOO and T70 are significant. The sign 
on GlOO agrees with expectations while that on T70 is of the wrong size 
and quite large. However, this coefficient is essentially determined by 
only five observations, thus making it almost impossible to make any con­
clusions about plan effects. 
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The family composition^  variables were significant in the scaled 
hours equations and were for the most part of the correct sign. 
Other variables described earlier such as 1969 normal income and other 
"measurement" variables had little influence upon the significance and 
estimates of the treatment coefficients presented above. 
Because of the many interactions with treatment variables, it is 
difficult to determine the net or overall treatment effect from the 
selected models in Tables C.l and C.2 in Appendix C. These results have 
been summarized in Table 4.4 by estimating a predicted y-hat for 1971 for 
both control and expérimentais at selected values of HR69o In calculating 
the y-hats all other variables' overall means were used. By subtracting 
the control group, a percentage point estimate of the disincentive is 
obtained. Algebraically this may be represented as (P - C)/C*100. 
One must use caution in interpreting and using these statistics. 
Values of 1000 and 2600 are a long distance from the mean and the variance 
of those estimates is extremely large. They should not be interpreted as 
average results but only a prediction for families with selected charac­
teristics. 
The following highlights from Table 4.4 deserve special mention. 
First, net and gross farm income are generally positive but go from nega­
tive to positive in a rather drastic fashion as PN increases. 
T^he family composition variables are: 
# of males, ages 13-15 
# of females, ages 13-15 
# of males, ages 16-20 
# of females, ages 16-20 
# of males ages 21-60 
# of females, ages 21-60 
1 if spouse present, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4.4. Iowa predicted incentives for selected dependent variables 
from the model in Table C.l. 
Selected HR69 Values 
1000 1400 1800 2200 2600 
Net Farm Income 
Control 3538 3944 4248 4450 4550 
Experimental (PN=0) 1955 2993 3781 4320 4610 
7o Incentive -44.7 -24.1 -16.0 -2.9 1.3 
Experimental (PN=.72) 3151 4189 4978 5517 5807 
% Incentive -10.9 6.2 17.2 24.0 27.6 
Experimental (PN=1.79) 4929 5967 6756 7295 7585 
% Incentive 39.3 51.3 59.0 63.9 66.7 
Gross Farm Income 
Control 10860 15165 18812 21802 
Experimental (FN=0) 13823 16204 18306 20129 
7o Incentive 27.3 6.9 -2.7 -7.7 
Experimental (PN=.72) 15489 17871 19972 21795 
% Incentive 42.6 17.8 6.2 .03 
Experimental (PN=1.79) 17966 20347 22448 24271 
% Incentive 65.4 34.2 19.3 11.3 
24133 
21672 
-10.2 
23338 
-3.3 
25814 
7.0 
Scaled Adjusted Hours 
Control 1131 1479 1817 2147 2467 
Experimental (PN=0) 956 1268 1567 1852 2125 
°/o Incentive -15.5 -14,3 -13,8 -13.7 -13,9 
Experimental (PN=.72) 988 
7o Incent ive -12.6 
Experimental (PN=1.79) 1036 
% Incentive -8.4 
1300 
-12.1 
1348 
-8.9 
1599 
-12.0 
1646 
-9.4 
1884 
-12.2 
1932 
-10.0 
2156 
-12.6 
2204 
-10.7 
Scaled Hours 
Control 1141 1559 1956 2330 2684 
Experimental (PN=0) 1142 1472 1793 2105 2408 
7o Incentive .1 -5.6 -8.3 -9.7 -10.3 
Experimental (PN=.72) 1170 1501 1822 2134 2437 
7o Incentive 2.5 -3.7 -6.9 -8.4 -9.2 
Experimental (PN-1.79) 1213 1543 1864 2176 2479 
7o Incentive 6.3 -1.0 -4.7 -6.6 -7.6 
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Table 4.4. Continued 
Selected HR69 Values 
1000 1400 1800 2200 2600 
Total Recall Hours 
Control 1956 2299 2587 2823 3005 
Experimental (PN=.72) 2024 2266 2479 2665 2823 
% Incentive 3.5 -1.4 -4.2 -5.6 -6.1 
Head Recall Hours 
Control 1726 2071 2359 2589 2761 
Experimental (PN=.72) 1872 2087 2273 2429 2554 
% Incentive 8.5 .8 -3.6 -6.2 -7.5 
600 800 1000 1200 1400 
Scaled Crop Hours 
Control 623 843 1050 1245 1426 
Experimental (PN=0) 703 907 1100 1281 1452 
% Incentive 12.8 7.6 4.8 2.9 1.8 
Experimental (PN=.72) 705 909 1102 1284 1454 
7o Incentive 13.2 7,8 5.0 3.1 2.0 
Experimental (PN=1.79) 709 913 1106 1287 1458 
% Incentive 13.8 8.3 5.3 3.4 2.2 
200 600 1000 1400 
Scaled Livestock Hours 
Control 375 739 1090 1428 
Experimental (PN=0) 188 481 789 1110 
% Incentive -49. 9 -34. 9 -27.6 -22.3 
Experimental (PN=.34) 217 510 818 1138 
% Incentive -42. 1 -31. 0 -25.0 -20.3 
Experimental (PN=1.17) 259 553 861 1181 
7o Incentive -30. 9 -25. 2 -21.0 -17.3 
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For example, using a value of 1800 for HR69, when PN = 0 there is an 
11 percent disincentive in net farm income; this becomes 17.2 percent when 
PN = .72 and 59 percent when PN = 1.79, Zero and 1.79 are approximately 
one standard deviation away from the mean of .72. The same phenomenon 
holds true for gross farm income. At PN = 0, the percentage disincentive 
is -2.7 percent; at PN = .72 it is 6.2 percent, and at PN = 1.79 the 
percentage is 19.3. 
Second, the livestock hours variable is negative on the order of 20 
to 40 percent and crop hours is positive, approximately 5 to 14 percent, 
thus making total scaled hours negative around 4 to 8 percent. Scaled 
adjusted hours is slightly more negative again due to the increased use 
of hired help by the experimental farmers. 
Third, the percentage incentive increases as PN increases for scaled 
adjusted, total scaled, and scaled livestock hours, and also slightly for 
scaled crop hours. For example, at PN = 0, scaled hours exhibits -8.3 
percent disincentive when HR69 = 1800. This becomes -6.9 percent at 
PN = .72 and -4.7 percent at PN = 1.79. 
North Carolina 
In many respects, the results between the two regions are quite 
similar. The results for North Carolina will be discussed in a similar 
fashion to that of Iowa, However, the results for scaled livestock hours 
will not be discussed except through total and adjusted scaled hours vari­
ables. Livestock hours are a very minor enterprise in North Carolina and 
the analysis is dominated by a few observations.^  The basic model for 
T^he average number of scaled livestock hours in North Carolina is 
only 152 hours. Only 12 farmers had over 500 livestock hours. 
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North Carolina is identical to that of Iowa except for the addition of a 
RA.CE variable. 
The simple parameterizations of the treatment variables is shown in 
Table 4,5, For Model I, the coefficients are all negative except recall 
hours. This result is identical to that of Iowa. The variables which 
have been significantly affected have changed however. The treatment 
coefficient is now significant in the gross farm income and scaled crop 
hours equations, continues to be significant for total scaled hours, and 
is no longer significant for adjusted scaled hours. The latter is 
puzzling and will be discussed at length shortly. 
From Model I, the average disincentive for scaled crop hours is 290 
hours, 83 hours for adjusted scaled hours, and 266 hours for total scaled 
hours. Head and total recall hours show a positive incentive of 141 and 
148 hours respectively. The income variables are -181 for net farm income 
and -1425 for gross farm income. 
The results from Model I are essentially identical to Models II and 
III. The partial F-values retain their same level of significance, and 
a point estimate of treatment effect reverses sign only in Model III for 
the adjusted scaled hours variable where the treatment variables are 
insignificant anyway. These point estimates, as previously discussed, are 
constructed by calculating predictions based on sample means. 
The results for adjusted scaled hours are inconsistent with total 
scaled hours. This results primarily because the controls purchased 
relatively more hired labor than experimental individuals. This is even 
more unusual when you consider that the experimental farmer was essentially 
Table 4.5. North Carolina treatment coefficient estimates, F-values and predicted incentives for 
models with simple treatment parameterizations for selected dependent variables 
Model I 
C/E 
F 
Model II 
C/E 
HR69*C/E 
F 
% Incentive 
Model III 
C/E 
C/E*HR69 
C/E*HR692 
F 
% Incentive 
Net Gross Head Total Total Adjusted Scaled 
Farm Farm Recall Recall Scaled Scaled Crop 
Income Income Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours 
189 -1425 141 148 -266 -83 -290 , 
.32 3,17 1.12 .83 3.76 .72 4.84^  
591 588 238 117 -13 -139 65 
.26 -1.32 -.06 .02 -.17 .04 -.25 
.47 2.97* .67 .42 2.62* .43 4.32" 
-7.4 -13.8 9.0 7.2 -12.7 -5.9 -15.1 
398 -1104 353 129 -686 -454 -295 
.033 1.10 -.22 .015 .80 .49 .33 
.00005 -.00060 .00004 -.0 -.00024 -.00011 -.00016 
.28 2.37* .51 .29 3.91= 1.11 4.16= 
-6.7 -8.1 6.5 7.1 -1.3 2.2 -6.9 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
S^ignificant at the 1 percent level. 
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being subsidized for this hired labor and had every reason to report the 
amount paid fully. 
The only rationale that could explain the inconsistency in results 
are the following: 
a) On similar government forms (1RS), many families report paying 
money to teenage children for work done on the farm. Through a process of 
trial and error, the experimental families learned that when filling out 
the monthly income and expense forms upon which the payment is based, 
hired labor expenses for dependents should not be reported. Thus their 
added knowledge from the payments process, relative to control, essen­
tially made them report hired labor expense for teenagers less frequently 
on the quarterly interviews, 
b) Several unidentifiable "outliers" are responsible for the 
inconsistency, 
c) Reporting of hired labor expense was notoriously poorer for 
control than for experimentals. During the editing process, a wrong fudge 
factor was used in correcting the misreporting of hired labor expense, 
which led to the above erroneous results.^  
All of these explanations are plausible and upon investigation would 
tend to remove the inconsistency, but not without being very arbitrary. 
In the final analysis, the outcome should depend upon which variable is 
most likely to have been reported accurately. On this basis, it seems 
hard to refute the evidence offered by the consistency of scaled crop 
with net and gross farm income. 
T^his was mostly corrected in the data used for this analysis. 
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Building upon the models discussed above, more complicated models 
were estimated similar to that in Iowa. The coefficients from two selec­
ted models are shown in Tables C,,3 and C.4 in Appendix C. Partial F-
statistics from these equations are shown in Table 4,6, 
The five treatment variables shown on Che first line made a signifi­
cant difference in explaining the variance of the dependent variable in 
five of the seven equations, namely, gross farm income, total recall, head 
recall, total scaled, and scaled crop hours equations. In comparison to 
Models I to III above, the treatment variables have increased in signifi­
cance in all equations except the gross farm income equation. 
The "measurement" variable (FN) plays a highly significant role in 
all equations except recall hours. It is always positive when significant 
and, as will be seen shortly, influences disincentive predictions greatly. 
The debt ratio interacted with treatment is negative and weakly 
significant in five out of the seven equations. Although this was un­
expected, it agrees with the Iowa results. 
The age variables interacted with treatment are insignificant in all 
equations as shown by the partial F-statistic on the next line. Race 
interacted with treatment was also insignificant in all equations except 
scaled crop hours, and then only weakly significant. Black families 
showed less of a disincentive for scaled crop hours than white families 
in comparison with control families of similar characteristics and of the 
same race. 
The next line shows the joint significance of all treatment variables 
and treatment interactions except FN which was included in the reduced 
modèle The treatment variables were significant in the gross farm income, 
Table 4.6, North Carolina partial F-statistics for selected dependent and independent variables 
Dependent Variables 
Group of Net Gross Total Head Adjusted Total Scaled 
Independent Farm Farm Recall Recall Scaled Scaled Crop 
Variables Inccsne Income Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours 
HR69*C/E, HR69 x C/E 
D70*C/E, D71*C/E, 
D72*C/E .43 
PN 19.53^  
DR*C/E .17 
AGE*C/E, AGE55*C/E .89 
RACE*C/E .23 
All of the above except 
PN 2 .96 
HR69*C/E, HR69 *C/E, C/E .28 
D71*C/E, D72*C/E® .66 
T30, T70% 1.69* 
G50, GlOO 3.28% 
T30, T70, G50, GlOO 2.21 
Family Comp. Variables .78 
1.49* 1.53* 1.76* 
3.80° .18 .64 
.0004 1.99 1.77* 
1.06 .08 .11 
.59 .07 .81 
1.49* 1.10 1.34 
2.37 .29, .51. 
.18. 3.38: 3.62* 
3.951 2.61* 3.35^  
2.90* 1.71* 1.63* 
2.56" 1.84* 1.86* 
.46 1.31 1.22 
.82, 
2.36^  
1.77* 
2.38% 
6.50% 
2.04 
2.43 
6.3% 
3.42^  
.95 .22 .36 
.29 .48 1.69* 
1.12 2.12^  2.59= 
1.11 3.91= 4.01= 
.39 .09, .06, 
6.11^  
7.45= 
4.66 
6.81= 
3.43% 
5.01= 
6.16= 
1.46* 
4.79= 3.33* 
1.15 1.11 
*Significant at the 20 percent level. 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
S^ignificant at the 1 percent level. 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
7^0*G/E, D71*C/E and D72*C/E are year dummies interacted with the simple treatment variable C/E. 
x30, T70, G50 and GlOO are all simple dummy variables representing each of the different 
experimental plans. The 50 percent tax and 75 percent guarantee plans have been excluded. 
®See footnote on page 61. 
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total scaled, and scaled crop equations. This is entirely consistent with 
the results from Models I to III and those shown by the next line, namely 
HR69*C/E, HR69^ *C/E and C/E. 
A test to determine if the treatment effect differed between years 
is shown on the next line. As in Iowa, the null hypothesis was accepted 
for all equations except recall hours, meaning that the experiment 
probably did not have a differential impact with respect to year. 
The next three lines show the significance of the tax and guarantee 
effects. A joint F-test to determine if at least one of the five plans 
is different from the mean treatment effect is performed. The reduced 
model includes the variables in the basic model plus those represented 
by line one. The reduced model for the F-test on tax variables includes 
the guarantee dummies and vice versa for the F-test on the guarantee 
variables. The results here are vastly different from Iowa's results. 
The variables are significant, often at the one and five percent level, 
in every equation. 
As previously discussed, the G50 and T30 coefficients should be 
positive and the GlOO and T70 coefficients should be negative. For the 
28 coefficients (7 equations x 4 variables), 18 are of the wrong sign and 
most of these are significant as shown below. 
Significance Level 
Total 
Sign >20% 10-20% 5-10% 1-5% 1% 
Correct 7 2 0 1 0 10 
Incorrect 4 0 3 4 7 18 
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Furthermore only one of the ten correct signs is less than the ten 
percent level of significance, while fourteen of the eighteen incorrect 
signs are significant at the ten percent level or less. The inclusion of 
the measurement variable PN only alters the above table slightly. 
Explaining these results is difficult. To conclude that theory is 
incorrect is also to contradict a large wealth of empirical evidence which 
supports that theory, A more plausible approach is to argue that the 
number of observations is too small, that the link between income and hours 
is indirect for self-employed families, that other measurement errors are 
present, and that therefore, tax and guarantee effects are inconclusive. 
Family composition variables were insignificant in all equations but 
one. Other measurement variables mentioned earlier were insignificant and 
had little effect upon the treatment coefficients. 
Again, similar to Table 4,4 for Iowa, a predicted disincentive table 
has been constructed for North Carolina for a family with selected 
characteristics at different values of HR69, These are shown in Table 4,7, 
Net farm income moves from negative values (disincentives) to posi­
tive values (incentives) as PN increases. For example, when HR69 equals 
1400: at PN = 0, the predictived incentive is -15,5 percent ; at PN = ,91 
it becomes 9,8 percent and at PN = 1.79, it is 34,3 percent. Because the 
coefficient on BSI is positive in all equations, this same phenomenon holds 
true for all dependent variables. 
Consistently evaluating the response at HR69 equalling 1400: at 
PN = 0, gross farm income has a predicted incentive of -17 percent which 
increases tc -1,5 percent at PN = 1,79; adjusted scaled hours increases 
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Table 4.7. North Carolina predicted incentives for selected dependent 
variables from the model in Table C.3. 
Selected HR69 Values 
600 1000 1400 1800 2200 
Net Farm Income 
Control 1531 2093 2550 2903 3152 
Experimental (PN=0) 1305 1757 2155 2500 2792 
% Incentive -14.8 -16.1 -15.5 -13.9 -11.4 
Experimental (PN=.91) 1951 2402 2800 3145 3437 
% Incentive 27.4 14.8 9.8 8.3 9.0 
Experimental (PN=1.79) 2575 3026 3424 3769 4061 
7o Incentive 68.2 44.6 34.3 30.0 28.8 
Gross Farm Income 
Control 7288 8530 
Experimental (PN=0) 5823 7062 
7o Incentive -20.1 -17.2 
Experimental (PN=,91) 6600 7839 
7o Incentive -9.4 -8.1 
Experimental (PN=1.79) 7351 8590 
7o Incentive .9 ,7 
9858 
8181 
-17.0 
8957 
-9.1 
9708 
-1.5 
11271 
9178 
-18.6 
9954 
-11.7 
10705 
-5.0 
12768 
10054 
-21.3 
10831 
-15.2 
11582 
-9.3 
Adjusted Scaled Hours 
Control 1017 1192 1362 1528 1690 
Experimental (PN=0) 789 1075 1329 1553 1746 
7o Incentive -22.4 9.8 -2.4 1.6 3.3 
Experimental (PN=.91) 895 1181 1435 1659 1852 
7o Incentive -12.0 -.9 5.4 8.6 9.6 
Experimental (PN=1.79) 998 1283 1538 1761 1954 
7o Incentive -1.9 7.6 12.9 15.2 15.6 
Total Scaled Hours 
Control 1338 1651 1969 2293 
Experimental (PN=0) 904 1379 1797 2158 
7o Incentive -32.4 -16.5 -8.7 -5.9 
Experimental (PN=.91) 1051 1526 1944 2305 
7o Incentive -21.4 -7.6 -1.3 .5 
Experimental (PN=1.79) 1194 1668 2086 2448 
7o Incentive -10.8 1.0 5.9 6.8 
2621 
2462 
-6 .1  
2610 
-.4 
2752 
5.0 
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Table 4.7, Continued 
Selected HR69 Values 
600 1000 1400 1800 2200 
Total Recall Hours 
Control 1764 2009 2209 2365 2476 
Experimental (PN=.91) 1721 1936 2132 2310 2469 
% Incentive -2,4 -3,6 -3,5 -2,3 -,3 
Head Recall Hours 
Control 1213 1451 1651 1812 1935 
Experimental (PN=.91) 1464 1586 1706 1823 1938 
% Incentive 20.7 9,3 3,3 .6 .2 
Scaled Crop Hours 
Control 1196 1584 1956 2314 2655 
Experimental (PN=0) 894 1305 1674 2000 2285 
% Incentive -25.3 -17.6 -14,4 -13,6 -13,9 
Experimental (PN=,91) 1042 1453 1821 2148 2432 
% Incentive -12,9 -8,3 -6,9 -7,2 -8,4 
Experimental (PN=1,79) 1184 1595 1964 2291 2575 
% Incentive -1.0 ,7 ,4 -1,0 -3,0 
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from -2.4 to 12.9 percent; total scaled hours grows from -8.7 to 5.9 
percent; and scaled crop hours goes from -14.4 to .4 percent. 
As argued earlier, the coefficient on PN should be positive; namely, 
as PN increases, the substitution effect is eroded but the income effect 
remained, implying that there should still be disincentive on hours and 
income, but that it should be less than when PN = 0» What explains the 
large positive incentives as PN increases? 
Temporarily assume that payments information is more accurate than 
survey information, or, to understand the argument more clearly, assume 
that payments information is perfectly accurate. Then, when survey 
income is greater than payment information, PN will be positive. Under 
this assumption, PN primarily reflects editing and response errors in the 
survey information. Almost by definition when income is added incorrectly, 
the response will be positive for those families. This is a possible 
explanation for the sign and significance of PN, 
On the other hand, if survey information is more accurate (e.g., 
because it is less likely to be affected by reporting effects of the 
experiment), the following is true. PN identifies characteristics of 
experimental families which are associated with a high variability of 
income within a year and an ability for families to effectively use the 
payments system to their advantage. Presumably these same characteristics 
exist within the control families. However, it is impossible to identify 
these families, and consequently all of the treatment comparisons with 
respect to PN are made to an average control family. Thus, the amount of 
incentive is overstated when PN is high and understated when PN is low. 
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It could be that if the comparisons between the correct experimental and 
control families were made, the incentive would be negative throughout, 
but significantly less negative when PN is large. 
For total scaled and scaled crop hours the disincentives are primarily-
negative, but the estimates exhibit much variance among the different 
levels of HR69. 
Conclusion 
The hypotheses introduced in the theory section have been tested with 
mixed results. The operations with small amounts of fixed capital and 
relatively fixed coefficient production functions have experienced the 
least disincentive. Observe the performance of livestock operations in 
Iowa and crop operations in North Carolina versus that of the capital 
intensive crop operations in Iowa. In terms of scaled hours, the former 
had significant disincentives of 5 to 30 percent while the latter had 
small insignificant positive incentives. 
The major hypothesis advanced is that work effort should decline with 
an introduction of a negative income tax scheme. The answer to this 
hypothesis unfortunately depends upon the variable being analyzed. If 
recall hours are chosen, one would conclude that the experiment had no 
effect upon hours worked. On the other hand if scaled hours or some 
weighted combination of acres and livestock sold is used, the evidence is 
quite strong that the treatment did affect hours of work in a significant 
negative direction. Probably the weakest aspect of this evidence is the 
inconsistency in North Carolina between adjusted scaled hours (removing 
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the effect of machine hire, hired labor, and addign custom work) and total 
scaled hours. These inconsistencies must be evaluated carefully, and 
their resolution is chiefly dependent upon the data collection accuracy 
of the variables in question» Upon these grounds, this author concludes 
that scaled hours is a "better" measure of work effort and thus the 
experiment induced a decline in work effort. 
These results are roughly consistent with net and gross farm income. 
Particularly this is true when a measurement variable (actual negative 
income payments minus predicted negative income tax payments based upon 
edited quarterly data) is added to the model. Those families where actual 
payments exceeded predicted payments by a large amount are affected less 
by the program parameters (tax and guarantee rates) than families where 
actual payments equals predicted payments. Consequently there is more 
disincentive in families where the latter occurred in terms of hours and 
income. 
The results on the program parameters are disappointing and incon­
clusive. In the few cases where the plan dummies significantly improved 
the regression relationship, the parameters were often of the wrong sign 
and internally inconsistent. Probably the chief reason for this incon­
clus ivene s s is the lack of observations. 
With respect to year effects, one must always accept the conclusion 
that the effect in each year was identical. While a strong argument can 
be made for the effect to have grown over time, the data lend very little 
evidence to support that contention. Recall that the response of the 
experimental families was varied. Some families experienced no reduction 
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in hours, some experienced increases, some experienced a large decline 
in all three years, versus others where there was a decline in only one 
of the three. 
The race variable was insignificant in North Carolina, and most of 
the other results (i.e. effect of age and education) agreed with a priori 
expectations. 
While there remain several disturbing aspects of the data, it seems 
clear that farmers reduced their crop hours significantly in North 
Carolina and livestock hours in Iowa. In each of these cases, the 
overall effect on total hours is negative, significant, and on the order 
of 4 to 10 percent. 
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CHAPTER V. IMPACT OF DATA ERRORS UPON TREATMENT 
ESTIMATES OF THE FARM POPULATION 
Introduction 
A survey operation must attempt to insure that data collected are 
accurate and provide unbiased answers to the major objectives of the 
study. In the Rural Income Maintenance Experiment (RIME), this implies 
that the data collection process should not be biased^  with respect to 
the treatment variables (tax rate, guarantee level, or being in the 
experimental group versus the control group). Furthermore the data 
gathered on farm income, expenses, assets, inventory, and physical 
production should be free from large errors so the precision of treatment 
estimates will be enhanced. 
A brief outline of the farm data would include the following: 
a) Cash income and expenses'-obtained by item (e.g. swine sales, 
fertilizer expenses, machinery repair expenses) every three months on 
the quarterly interview. 
b) Income and expen8es--as itemized on the Internal Revenue Service 
(1RS) Schedule F. While this is available for a majority of farmers, 
nearly all farmers reported a nonitemized total of gross and net income 
as given to 1RS. 
The effect of biases can enter at several states during the experi­
ment. These would include biases arising from refusing the screening 
interview, the pre-enrollment interview, enrollment, or by attriting 
sometime during the experiment. None of the above are examined in this 
chapter. Only the bias arising from response errors is discussed. 
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c) Assets, inventory, and related debts—by category (e.g., land 
and buildings, machinery, equipment, livestock by type, unsold grain) were 
obtained once a year. New purchases and sale of assets were also obtained. 
Some information on assets is also available from the depreciation 
schedules provided by many farmers on their 1RS Schedule F. In addition, 
a questionnaire section on the use of credit facilities provides yet 
another source of information. 
d) Hours worked on the farm--every three months the farmer was 
asked to recall the number of hours he spent working on the farm during 
each of the previous seven days. 
e) Physical production—at the end of each year the farmer was asked 
to indicate total acreage planted in each different crop, yield for each 
crop, livestock sales by type of animal, and milk and egg production. 
f) Miscellaneous—each year the farmer's landlord-tenant contractual 
relationships were noted. Also, a continuous off-farm wage work record 
was obtained for the farmer and all other members of his household over 
fifteen. 
Reports from the field (interviewers) indicated several difficulties 
in data collection. They included the following: 
1. Complex income flows, especially in Iowa. The average farmer had 
about twenty different transactions to be recalled every three months. 
The omission or double-counting of a particular transaction was common. 
2. Low literacy and no record keeping, especially in North Carolina. 
Data collection problems were especially severe when the farmer was a 
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sharecropper whose landlord handled the books (if the landlord himself 
kept any). 
3. A quite hazy distinction between farm activity where output was 
destined for home consumption versus purely commercial activity. This 
problem was common in North Carolina. 
4. Murky patterns of asset ownership—just who in the family had 
what legal title to what portion of the land--and uninformed estimates 
by the farmers of their assets' current market value. 
5o A time slice problem--due to the decision to collect information 
on a three month basis, all transactions which occurred near the artifi­
cial three month boundaries were likely to be double reported or not 
reported at all. Consequently, a load of 25 cattle, which is relatively 
small by Iowa standards, sold around the first of March and not reported 
in either quarter could have resulted in a $7500 underestimate of net 
farm income. For a particular family these transactions would not 
balance. Perhaps for the entire population the treatment parameter may 
not be affected.^  
A glance at the data often revealed glaring inconsistencies such as 
feed expenditures exceeding livestock sales with no appreciable increase 
in inventory value. It should be noted that many apparent inconsistencies 
occurred and were not necessarily the result of response errors. For 
example, feed expenditures without livestock sales might be perfectly 
I^f income is the dependent variable, if no measurement problems 
exist in the independent variables, and if no correlation exists between 
the treatment parameter and measurement error, the treatment parameter 
should be unbiased. If income is an independent variable, the coefficient 
will be based towards zero. 
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reasonable for someone who had just entered the livestock business or had 
retired from it with carryover feed bills. 
Given the wealth and detail of information collected, the availa­
bility of outside information and the possibility of reporting incorrect 
conclusions, an intensive editing of the data was undertaken. Essentially 
two data bases were created. The original (ORIG) data base was informa­
tion as reported on the quarterly interview with "obvious" errors and 
most of the data processing errors corrected. For example, if a corn 
yield of 1000 bushels per acre were reported, 100 was assumed or the value 
replaced by standard statistical techniques for eliminating missing data. 
No corrections were made to data that were reasonable in a univariate 
framework. These data may contain obvious inconsistencies between data 
items. This data base compares favorably with procedures and editing 
techniques used on national surveys like the Current Population Survey 
(CPS). 
An edited (EDIT) data base was created by removing a large percentage 
of inconsistencies. Out of a class of all possible data changes, the 
change requiring the fewest updates which made the entire picture 
"consistent" was typically chosen. Outside information, e.g., farm budget 
and extension bulletins, farm practices from previous years, and value 
judgments concerning the quality and direction of the different data 
sources, were all used in arriving at what data was to be changed on the 
edited data base.^  An example of the latter would be that income informa­
tion as reported to 1RS is more often understated than overstated. 
S^ee Appendix B for a complete discussion of the distinction between 
the original and edited data bases. 
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With the goal of defining the approximate magnitude of data errors 
and their impact upon treatment estimates, the following topics will be 
examined in sequence. 
a) A theoretical discussion of the impact of data errors upon treat­
ment coefficients. 
b) A test of the hypothesis that the data collection apparatus was 
unbiased with respect to control/experimentals. 
c) A description of the changes between the original and edited 
data baseso 
d) A rationale for accepting the edited data base as most accurate. 
e) An attempted explanation of the changes between the original and 
edited data bases. 
f) The effect of the changes on results. 
The population analyzed is defined as all farm families with constant 
marital status, with the head less than 69 years of age at the beginning 
of the experiment, with positive budgeted hours of farm work in each of 
the years 1969 to 1972, and with a total of 400 budgeted farm hours in at 
least one of those years. Budgeted farm hours, a constructed variable, 
is a weighted combination of crop acres and of livestock production. The 
weights, derived from State Extension Surveys, are the average number of 
hours per year required to tend an acre of a particular crop or raise a 
particular type of livestock on a farm with average mechanization. 
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Theory 
This section traces the effect data errors will have on treatment 
estimates beginning with a simple two variable model. Assuming that y 
and X are related by 
y = 0? + Bx + e 
where 
y is a dependent variable of interest, particularly income 
or hours 
X is an independent variable which controls for nonrandom 
sampling present in the experimental design and 
e is a random disturbance term. 
While this may not be an interesting model for this analysis because 
it ignores the treatment effect, it can be highly instructional. This 
theory is well-known and has been derived many times before. Consider Y 
and X the observed variables where both are measured with error. Let 
small X, y denote the true values of the variables. Then 
X = X + u 
Y = y + V 
If the true values are related by the relationship 
y = a + 0x + e then by substitution 
Y - V = y 
X - u = X 
and 
Y - V = Of + B(X-u) + e 
Y  =  a  +  8 X  -  u + v + e  
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or 
Y = a + BX + w 
Where w = v -gu. 
Since w is not independent of X because it includes the term -gu, 
ordinary least squares will produce biased estimates of a and P even if 
the sample is infinite and even if the mean values of the errors are 
zero. The estimates of gn for a sample of size n based on the observed 
variables is 
n _ 
Z (X, - %) (Y, - Y) 
^ 
E (X. - X)^  
i=l  ^
If the errors terms are introduced and rearranged the following 
expression is obtained: 
= 2l(x + u - (x + Û)) (v +  V  -  Cv + v)) 
Z(x + u - (x + û))2 
Letting x = x - x 
y' = y - y 
u ' = u - û 
V ' = v - V 
The expression is 
y x ' y ' +  u ' y  '  +  l i v ' x '  +  T v ' u '  
0n = ;— 5 
Tx'^  + 2ru'x' + u'^  
Vv'v' 
The true P is simply —7^ 0 Thus the bias in the estimated g as 
Fx 
compared to the true 0 depends upon the following: 
2 1, u' - if u has a large variance (not unusual considering some 
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empirical evidence to be presented later), gn will be biased downward. 
2. Su'x' - if u is positively correlated with X, e.g., in the 
case when high asset families report assets less accurately while low 
income families report assets more accurately, 0n will be biased down­
ward. 
If u is negatively correlated with X, e.g., when high income 
people report income accurately because of records while low income 
individuals do not report accurately, 3n will be biased upward. 
3. IXi'v' - if u and v are positively correlated, e.g., when X is 
the 1969 value of the dependent variable y, 0n will be biased upward. 
This is true in cases where respondents consistently overestimate or 
underestimate income for consecutive years. If the converse is true then 
pn will be biased downward. 
4. Sv'x' and Su'v' - this will cause the coefficient to be biased 
if the true value of one variable is correlated with the error term in 
the other. Again this may be likely to occur when x is a lagged indepen­
dent variable of y. 
Consequently, if one can do validity studies to predict the compo­
nents of the above expression, then one could accurately predict Pn. 
For similar reasons, Var(@) is also distorted indeterminately by the 
different components of error. 
Turning to a more interesting model, 
Y =  o; +  0X+ y t+e 
Y, X are previously defined with both containing measurement error, 
while t is a treatment variable measured without error. Let the 
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experimental group be represented by a one and the control group with a 
zero. 
An unbiased estimate of v is required to accurately estimate the 
effect of the experiment. Letting 
t ' = t - t 
y ' = y - y 
X ' = X - X 
V ' = V - V 
u = u - û 
Then 
V (without errors) = 
(Sx'f) -
V (with errors) = (Sy'x' + Ex'v' + Ily'u' + Tu'v') 
(Sx't' + Ft'u') - (y't' + r v't') 
(Tx'^  + 2ru'x' + ru'2)/(zx't')2 
+ 2 rt'u zt'x' + (z t'u')2 - rt'^  
+2 pu'x' + ru'^ ). 
If the following assumptions are made 
1. X is measured without error 
2. Y and X are independent 
3. Y and t are negatively correlated, (i.e., experimental families 
tend to understate income) 
then the intuitive notion that the treatment coefficient is overstated 
is readily shown. 
87 
Other assumptions about the behavior of u and v can be traced without 
much difficulty in this three variable world. In a multiple variate 
world the expressions become complicated very quickly. One must resort 
to matrix algebra and strict assumptions to gain any further insights 
into the problem. 
Because these assumptions were hard to meet, and because in many 
cases using a priori information it seemed possible to identify where 
errors existed in the data, the edited data base was created in accordance 
with the following criteria: 
1. Where inconsistencies were noted among the six different sources 
of farm data listed previously, preference would be given to data 
generated from written sources. Thus if a farmer gave a yield estimate 
for his soybeans that was at wide variance with his sales as recorded from 
his books, the latter probably would be accepted and the yield estimate 
edited to make it consistent. 
2. If no information were from written sources, preference was given 
to the remembered acres and yield estimates over remembered cash sales. 
3c It was assumed that omission of income was a more likely error 
than the false inclusion of income. Therefore, if four of the six sources 
failed to mention hog sales, but one of the four included a mention of, 
say, a feeder pig inventory, or feed purchase, it was assumed that the 
farmer probably had some swine sales, and the highest reasonable estimate 
for those sales was edited in. 
4. Most additions of income or expenses to the verbatum record of 
the farmer had to have evidence for their existence in at least two 
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different sources. Thus, in the above example, if mention of swine had 
been made only once, it may have been edited out rather than editing it 
in on all the other sources. 
Magnitude of Data Collection System Bias 
Three approaches are possible for testing the data collection system. 
First, a direct measure of certain data quality variables may be possible. 
One of the variables that exemplifies this technique is recording how 
respondents answer the various income and asset questions. If the 
information comes from records or other written documentation, the in­
formation may be of a different quality than that coming from recall. 
Many respondents kept a monthly index of receipts, or did all transac­
tions by check; or in one case, an accounting system kept track of all 
farm business dealings. These records do not completely eliminate 
mistakes but are much better than recall responses. 
A second approach is to verify the information being collected on 
interviews with an outside source such as Internal Revenue Service (1RS) 
data. Although information from 1RS forms was not obtained directly from 
the agency, interviewers were able to make copies of the forms sent to 
1RS by obtaining them from the families. This does allow the possibility 
that the forms given to RIME were different than the actual ones sub­
mitted to 1RS. However, the probability of this seems small. 
1RS information undoubtably is also biased in the sense that income 
probably is underreported and expenses overreported. However, one has to 
assume perfect information on the part of respondents to argue that the 
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introduction of the negative income tax alters the reporting behavior of 
experimentals vis-a-vis control to the 1RS. Actually the smart individual 
would have overreported income to 1RS and underreported income to RIME. 
By filing amended returns to 1RS at the end of the experiment, he could 
have recouped his additional tax payments from both RIME and 1RS. 
A more valid criticism of this technique is the refusal bias problem. 
The families which did not volunteer their 1RS forms may be the families 
with the highest or lowest level of misreporting. No easy method is 
available for circumventing this problem. 
Approximately the same percentage of control and experimental 
families let interviewers peruse their 1RS information. In Table 5.1 the 
number of families who volunteered their itemized schedule F's as well as 
the number who reported just their total gross income, depreciation, 
interest, and net farm income is shown. This information is significant 
because of the use of 1RS information in the formation of the second data 
base. It is gratifying to note that no significant control/experimental 
differential in reporting behavior is present in either Iowa or North 
Carolina,^  
A third approach is to estimate a relationship between variables that 
is known a priori and which is not subject to a treatment effect. One has 
to proceed carefully here. Some relationships, which on first glance are 
not suspected of containing a treatment effect, in fact might. For 
example, gross farm income in Iowa can be predicted by number of acres of 
corn, soybeans, oats, and hay, diverted acres, and number of market hogs, 
T^he chi square test of independence yielded insignificant values of 
1,15 and 1.70 for Iowa and North Carolina respectively. 
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Table 5.1. Number of 
are less 
and farm 
• farmers for whom tax information is available who 
than 69 years of age, have constant marital status, 
in each of the years from 1969 to 1972 
Iowa North Carolina 
Control Experimentals Control Experimentals 
Itemized Schedule 132 127 67 81 
Percent (81.5) (84.7) (50.8) (49.1) 
Abbreviated Schedule 10 10 19 33 
Percent (6.2) (6.6) (14.4) (20.0) 
No Tax Information 
Available 20 13 46 51 
Percent (12.3) (8.7) (34.8) (30.9) 
other hogs, market steers, other cattle, and other livestock sold, with 
an appropriate adjustment for tenure status. The above question is not 
interesting to an economist, for it is practically an accounting equa­
tion. One could argue that a control/experimental dummy inserted into 
the above relationship should carry a coefficient not significantly 
different from zero. Another more preferred way of testing for a control/ 
experimental difference would be to estimate the relationship separately 
for control and experimentals, then perform a Chow test to determine if 
the two sets of coefficients are significantly different from each other. 
However, a counter argument exists which suggests that the experi­
mental group may hold grain inventories for a longer period, obtain a 
higher price, and consequently might make the coefficient on number of 
acres different between the two. Furthermore, because of a reduction in 
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labor supplied to the farm firm due to the treatment effect, animals 
might be sold earlier at lighter weights. This again would cause the 
coefficients between control and experimentals to be theoretically 
different. All three methods will be explained further beginning with a 
direct measure of the data collection system. 
Reporting from records 
During each quarter after the initial quarterly interview, the 
interviewer recorded whether information about farm income and expenses 
came from written documentation (scored as one) or memory (scored as 
zero). These were aggregated for each year into a score from zero to 
four with zero representing all information coming from memory and four 
meaning all information came from records. 
A similar variable was created by taking into account the average 
amount of income and expenses reported each quarter by region. Therefore, 
rather than taking equal weights for each quarter, the 0, 1 variable was 
weighted by the combined amount of income and expenses typically reported 
that quarter relative to the total amount of income and expenses for the 
entire year. In North Carolina, for example, most of the farm income 
and expenses occurred during the third and fourth quarters. Consequently, 
if these quarters came from records and the other two did not, then the 
latter variable properly accounts for that distribution of the use of 
records being less serious than if reporting from records were randomly 
distributed throughout the year. 
Table 5.2 shows the distribution of the raw unweighted reporting 
scores by region. It also shows the means for both the raw and weighted 
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reporting scores. Each farmer is represented in the table three times, 
once for each year. Two facts are immediately obvious from the table. 
One is the amount of difference between Iowa and North Carolina. The 
North Carolina means range from .86 to 2.22 while in Iowa the range is 
3.20 to 3.91. This means that in North Carolina the average farmer used 
records one or two times out of four for each year while in Iowa the 
average farmer used records more than three out of four times he was 
interviewed» This difference is highly significant and probably can be 
attributed to a lower level of education in North Carolina and a much 
smaller farming enterprise. 
The second obvious fact in the table is the difference between control 
and experimentals in each region. For both measures the difference is 
slightly over one in North Carolina and slightly under one in Iowa. This 
implies that on the average, experimental families used records approxi­
mately one additional quarter each year compared to control families. 
The simple chi square test of independence which tests the null 
hypothesis that the distribution of raw reporting scores is identical 
between the North Carolina control group and the North Carolina payment 
group had to be rejected at the one percent level. The same was true for 
the Iowa population. 
Using the weighted score as the dependent variable, regression 
equations were estimated to determine whether the control/experimental 
difference was related to other variables like time or income. Variables 
were also introduced into the relationship to control for initial sampling 
differences between control and experimentals. These variables were 
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Table 5.2. Raw reporting scores for farmers who are less than 69 years of 
age, have constant marital status, and fairm in each of the 
years from 1969 to 1972* 
Mean 
Weighted 
Raw Score 
Mean 
Raw 
Score 0 1 
Raw Score 
2 3 4 Total 
North Carolina 1.00 .86 70 33 15 6 8 132 
Control (53) (25) (11) (5) (6) (100) 
North Carolina 2.22 1.95 37 41 19 29 39 165 
Experimentals (22) (25) (11) (18) (24) (100) 
Iowa Control 3.24 3.20 7 14 20 20 101 162 
(4) (9) (12) (12) (63) (100) 
Iowa 3.91 3.91 0 0 2 10 138 150 
Experimentals (0) (0) (1) (7) (92) (100) 
h^e number in parentheses indicates the percentage each raw score 
is of the total. 
expected to increase the explanatory power of the equation. A brief 
description of the major independent variables and their expected signs 
is presented below: 
Year dummies - because of a learning curve and a concerted effort 
by project administrators, both experimental and 
control scores should increase over time. 
Year * treatment (C/E) dummies - these variables test for the 
difference by year between control and experimentals. 
The field staff reported that they were noticing 
increased payment cooperation relative to control in 
using records. This is quite believable because of 
the negative income tax payments being given to the 
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experimental group. Consequently our expectation is 
for a positive sign, hopefully not significant. 
Spouse present dummy - in many farm families the wife is responsible 
for record keeping, and bachelors are notoriously poor 
recordkeepers, as well as housekeepers. Although 
there are not many single males in the sample, having 
a wife probably will result in more information coming 
from records. 
Farm size, age, education and quick test score^  - these reflect the 
management ability of the farm operator. Consequently 
the better the manager, the higher will be the 
probability of the farmer using, and consequently 
reporting from, records. Farm size reflects or is an 
output of past management decisions while age, educa­
tion, and quick test represent current management 
skill and human capital endowment. 
Race and the race * treatment interaction were added to the equation 
for North Carolina to test for black-white reporting 
differences. To the extent that race for a given 
educational attainment represents less management 
skills (because of poorer schooling and less chance 
to learn from experience and agricultural extension 
services), a negative coefficient is expected to occur. 
The sign of the race-treatment interaction is not 
T^he Ammons and Ammons quick test score is based on a word recogni­
tion test. The scale range is 0-50. 
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known a priori. If negative, it implies a smaller 
difference between black experimental and black control 
families than between white experimental and white 
control families. If positive, the opposite result 
is indicated. 
Pre-experimental net farm income was included to control for initial 
income differences between experimental and control. 
The higher the income, the more likely the farmer is a 
good manager and consequently keeps good records. 
The regression equations as reported in Table 5,3 were estimated by 
ordinary least squares. With the exception of the North Carolina 1972 
year dummy variable, all of the coefficients had the expected sign and 
nearly all were significant. 
Income and farm size were positively correlated with reporting 
behavior. Also education, age, and quick test as measures or proxies for 
management skills were positively and significantly associated with report­
ing behavior. 
All the treatment variables except the one for 1972 in Iowa were 
significant at the one percent level. In 1970 the Iowa experimental 
families reported from records 1.27 quarters more than their control 
counterparts. As shown by the year treatment interactions, this differ­
ence declined to .24 in 1972. In North Carolina, the 1970 difference 
between control and experimentals is 1.60 quarters for white families and 
.98 for black families. However in both 1971 and 1972 the difference grew 
rather than declined. 
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Table 5.3. Regression equations of reporting scores for farmers who are 
less than 69 years of age, have constant marital status, and 
farm in each of the years from 1969-1970 
Dependent Variable: Weighted Reporting Score 
Iowa North Carolina 
Variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant .03 .04 -2.59 -3.18* 
1971 Dum .848 5.63* .126 .457 
1972 Dum 1.10 7.06* -.0456 -.165 
1970 Dum * C/E 1.27 8.25* 1.60 5.23* 
1971 Dum * C/E .562 3.66* 1.63 5.35* 
1972 Dum * C/E .241 1.56 1.71 5.60* 
Sp Près Dum .323 1.14 .740 1.65^  
Ave Frm Size Spline'^  .000203 3.21* .000148 1.34 
Lrg Frm Size Spline^  .000123 3.22* .000130 1.90^  
Educ .0619 1.95^  .0706 2.31® 
Age .0130 2.23® .0388 4.17* 
Quick Test .0147 1.16 .00924 1.13 
Net Frm Inc .0000158 1.46 .0000684 1.78^  
Race -.544 -2.21® 
Race * TR -.620 -2.00® 
R^  = .31 R^  = .34 
N = 312 N = 297 
S^ignificant at the 1 percent level. 
S^ignificant at the 10 percent level. 
E^qual to total scaled hours for farms between 1600-2199 hours in 
1969, 0 otherwise. Total scaled hours are similar to total budgeted 
hours in that there are weighted combinations of physical units of pro­
ductions. The coefficients have been arbitrarily adjusted for mechani­
zation. See Chapter IV for a complete description. 
'^ Equal to total scaled hours for farms greater than 2199 hours in 
1969, 0 otherwise. 
S^ignificant at the 5 percent level. 
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While these results are not conclusive proof that the data have a 
treatment bias, the possibility that this happened is enhanced. This 
evidence provides no answers to what the nature of the bias is, i.e., do 
experimental families report more accurately or less accurately, and what 
is the ultimate effect upon labor supply predictions. 
Comparison with 1RS 
The second method of verifying the data collection process is 
comparison with an outside source that is less biased with respect to 
the treatment parameters, A detailed comparison with 1RS is possible for 
the 407 observations who gave RIME their itemized schedule F (see Table 
5.1). A simple regression equation can be estimated for each income/ 
expense category. The quarterly interview value is regressed on a 
similarly defined 1RS value, a control/payment dummy (C/E) and the control/ 
experimental dummy interacted with the 1RS value (C/E * 1RS). If there 
is no treatment bias in collecting information and no data errors, all 
coefficients on the 1RS variable should equal 1.0, and variables involving 
the control/experimental dummy should not be significantly different from 
zeroo 
In Table 5.4, simple means and the results of the regressions 
described above are presented by income and expense category. In column 
1, the original data base mean is shown along with the standard deviation. 
The 1RS mean and standard deviation are shown in column 2. Column 3 con­
tains the coefficient on the 1RS variable along with the standard error of 
estimate for the simple relationship between 1RS and the original data 
base value. Column 4 contains statistics obtained from estimating original 
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Table 5,4. Regression equations of itemized income and expenditures on 
the original data base for farmers who are less than 69 years 
of age, have constant marital status, and farm in each of the 
years from 1969 to 1973^  
Orig. 1RS 1RS Coeff. Diff. 
Variable Mean Mean (S.E, of Est, )(F Value) 
Tobacco Sales 2270 2323 .98 -57.75 , 
(4149) (4149) (909) (7.64)" 
Grain Sales 5581 5951 .93 -114.23 
(6656) (6850) (1814) (4.34)C 
Acreage Diverted Payments 880 953 .87 -60.19 . 
(981) (998) (463) (7.94)" 
Other Crop Sales 105 37.7 .80 3.46 
(396) (259) (338) (.03) 
Cattle Sales 1555 1599 .94 -48.85 
(3486) (3201) (1754) (.94) 
Hog Sales 3646 4180 .80 274.26 , 
(5960) (6953) (2085) (27.43)" 
All Other Income 1183 1381 .81 -119.37 , 
(2109) (2328) (951) (10.38)" 
Labor Expense 747 809 .90 52.48 
(1129) (1130) (495) (1.02) 
Fertilizer, Seed, Herbicide 1605 1653 .89 23.68 , 
(1769) (1672) (968) (9.62)" 
Machinery Repair, Supplies 1067 1198 .75 79.91 
(1263) (925) (1055) (.96) 
Feed, Vet, Breeding Fees 2767 2975 .92 59.97 
(4645) (4915) (1106) (5.43)" 
Gas, Fuel, Utilities 1227 1260 .78 -2.73 
(726) (730) (450) (.02) 
All Other Expenses 1856 2747 .68 417.75 
(2276) (3340) (1614) (12.33) 
Total Gross Income 15219 16426 .87 -143.06 
(10655) (11460) (3647) (.18) 
Total Gross Expenses 9269 10642 .87 703.68 . 
(7895) (8443) (2911) (6.79)" 
Net Farm Income 5950 5784 .84 -849.70 , 
(5083) (4589) (3315) (4.98)" 
O^ne observation was deleted because of data problems. 
Significant at the 1 percent level 
S^ignificant at the 5 percent level. 
99 
data base values as a function of 1RS, C/E, C/E * 1RS. The top number is 
the predicted difference by which experimentals exceeds control evaluated 
at the 1RS mean, A negative number would indicate that control exceeds 
experimentals. The number in parentheses is the partial F-value testing 
the significance of the treatment variables. 
Notice, first, that the original mean is lower than the 1RS mean in 
fourteen out of the sixteen categories.^  Only in the variables other 
crop sales and net farm income, are the original means higher than the 
1RS mean. This implies that transactions are typically forgotten rather 
than incorrectly reported. This rationale could also explain why net 
farm income is higher on the original data base. Since relatively more 
transactions are made on the expense ledger, and assuming the errors of 
omission are inversely related to size of the transaction, gross expenses 
would be biased downward more than gross income, leading to a net income 
overstatement. 
The second observation is that the standard errors of estimates in 
column 3 are relatively high. They typically are 25 to 50 percent of the 
standard deviation of the dependent variable and in one case 83 percent. 
For identically defined variables, this seems unusually high. While 
categorization errors still exist, the categories were chosen to minimize 
this kind of error. For example, fertilizer, seed, and herbicide were 
put together, as well as machinery repair and supplies. In most cases 
the categories are well delimited. 
The third observation is that all the coefficients on the 1RS vari­
able are less than one. This agrees with statistical theory which says 
T^his is slightly misleading in that three of the sixteen categories 
are a function of the other thirteen categories. 
100 
that if two variables are measured with error, the coefficient will be 
biased downward from the true coefficient, which in this case should be 
1.0. Furthermore, the amount of bias, given certain assumptions about 
the measurement errors, is related to the size of the measurement error 
in the independent variable, which in this case is the 1RS variable, A 
priori expectations about the difficulty of measuring the different 
categories are borne out in most cases. For example, all other expenses 
is furthest from 1.0 while tobacco sales, a big item with few transactions 
is closest to 1.0. However, this does not explain why the coefficient 
on acreage diverted payments should be lower than the coefficient on grain 
or cattle sales. 
The final point is that income items tend to have negative signs for 
the predicted difference, while expense categories tend to have positive 
signs. Recall that a positive sign implies that the experimental group 
exceeds the control group, while the reverse is true for a negative sign. 
Overall gross income is $143 less for the experimental than for the 
control group, while expenses are $704 more for the same level of the 1RS 
variable. This leads to net farm income being $850 more for the control 
group. There is no good explanation for this result other than a treat­
ment bias in reporting. Obviously the predicted difference between 
control and experimentals should be zero and insignificant rather than 
negative and significantly related to treatment. 
If 1RS is assumed to be correct and all the farmers are below break­
even, the reporting of income via the quarterly interview would cost 
taxpayers $425 per year with a 50 percent tax rate. The effect reporting 
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of income has on the costs of a national NIT program could be sub­
stantial. 
Accounting equations 
Another method of determining the adequacy of the data collection 
system is estimating accounting equations. These equations should be 
identical for control and experimentals, but must be carefully constructed 
to avoid including an inadvertant treatment effect. The equations should 
2 have a high r , and more importantly the treatment variables should not 
be significantly different from zero. 
Essentially no treatment effect was found in the accounting relation­
ships on the original data base, and consequently the equations will not 
be reported here. However, a typical simple accounting relationship will 
be described. In North Carolina, tobacco sales are estimated as a function 
of the following: 
TOBLB - Number of tobacco acres grown by respondent times his 
reported yield times a tenure adjustment. The tenure 
adjustment is based on each parcel of land and is one 
if the land is owned or rented for cash. If land is 
rented on a share basis, the adjustment is equal to the 
percent of income which the respondent receives. This 
adjustment is necessary because the tobacco sales re­
ported on the quarterly interviews are sales which the 
respondent receives. By definition, he should not be 
reporting the amount of sales his landlord receives on a 
share basis. 
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C/E - This variable was entered as a dummy with one represent­
ing the treatment group. 
TOBLB*C/E - Again this variable should not be significantly different 
from zero. 
For Iowa the entire grain sales amount is predicted. The primary 
difference between the two regions is the relative importance of several 
crops in Iowa versus just one in North Carolina, the importance of live­
stock production and the subsequent feeding of these animals with home 
grown feedstuffs. Consequently, the equation was changed to reflect these 
basic differences. 
Equations estimating livestock sales for the two regions were 
estimated in a similar way. 
Magnitude of Differences Between Original 
and Edited Data Bases 
The magnitude of changes between the data bases was immense. In 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 for North Carolina and Iowa, respectively, the means 
and standard deviations of the important analytic variables are presented 
for the original data base (ORIG) and the edited data base (EDIT). 
Several other variable means and standard deviations are also presented. 
These include the following: 
a) Edited minus original data base (Diff), 
b) Absolute value of (a) (ABS). The number of changes could cancel 
each other out so that Diff equals zero. ABS presents a truer measure 
of the changes which took place. 
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c) Original data base divided by the edited data base (RATIO). The 
variable was constrained to be between -2.00 and 2.00. Presenting an 
unconstrained mean and having a change of net farm income from, say, -10 
to 1,830 would present misleading statistics. 
These tables demonstrate vividly that the changes between the 
original and edited data bases were enormous. In Iowa, for example, 
(Table 5.6), total family income has an average difference of 849 with a 
standard deviation of 4,640. The absolute value of these differences is 
2,633 with a standard deviation of 3,921. This means net farm income 
was changed by a total of $821,496 for the 104 Iowa farmers over the three 
year period. This does not count changes to the data base which offset 
each other in a summary variable like net farm income. 
The changes were most dramatic in income measures. This probably is 
due to two reasons. One is that income tended to have many cross-checks 
whereas asset values and debts did not. Adjustments were not made to the 
edited data base unless there were inconsistencies and an indication of 
where the inconsistency lay. Consequently, income tended to be changed 
often relative to asset data. The second reason is that compared to 
number of acres of corn or number of cattle sold, income and expense 
transactions happened frequently and probably were more often forgotten. 
The physical production numbers (acres grown of each crop or number 
of livestock sold) which were asked near the end of each year did not 
change much. Probably this is true because the size of an individual 
operation is a status symbol and is a basis for most operational decisions 
made by the farmer. Consequently the hours variables which are construc­
ted from these production numbers did not change substantially. 
Table 5.5. Important analytical variable means for original and edited data bases in North Carolina 
Variable Mean 
ORIG 
St. Dev. Mean 
EDIT 
St. DeV. Mean 
DIFF 
St. Dev. Mean 
ABS 
S t. Dev. Mean 
RATIO 
St. Dev. 
TOT FAM INC^  4390 4045 4915 3759 524 2094 1312 1712 .91 .58 
GROSS FARM INC^  7564 6863 8559 7100 995 2008 1157 1919 
00 
.22 
NET FARM INC^  2109 2881 2587 2213 478 2063 1261 1700 .80 .77 
CROP SCAL^  1673 1367 1709 1382 36 361 88 352 .95 .24 
LIV SCAL^  189 555 249 644 60 283 71 280 .46 .51 
TOT SCAL^  1862 1425 1957 1451 96 455 156 438 .95 .21 
TOT FARM VAL® 11324 12155 11573 11860 249 4094 1804 3682 .91 .35 
FARM DEBT^  3218 5196 3325 5066 107 1475 438 1412 .58 .58 
NET EQUITY,^  
LAND AND BUILD­
INGS 7772 8907 7790 8168 16. 8 3856 1751 3434 .91 .51 
l^otal family income including unearned income, net farm and business income, plus wage income 
of all family members older than 15 years of age. 
G^ross farm income--total amount of sales of farm produce, commodity loan payments, crop insur­
ance proceeds less the amount paid for animals purchased that were sold during the year. 
N^et farm income--gross farm income minus gross farm expenses including interest and deprecia­
tion. 
Scaled crop hours--weighted combination of acres raised. Previously defined in Chapter IV. 
S^caled livestock hours--weighted combination of animals and produce sold. Previously defined 
in Chapter IV. 
T^otal scaled hours—scaled crop plus scaled livestock hours. 
STotal farm value--respondent's estimate of the total market value of his farm assets including 
land, machinery and equipment, livestock on hand, plus inventories of feed and gasoline. 
T^otal farm debt--total indebtedness of the farm operator on his farm operation. 
Net equity--total market (respondent estimated) value of farm land and buildings minus debt. 
Table 5.6. Important analytical variable means for original and edited data bases in Iowa* 
ORIG EDIT DIFF ABS RATIO 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
TOT FAM INC 5126 5863 6020 5373 894 4640 2633 3921 .83 00
 
GROSS FARM INC 19013 11420 20860 12131 1846 4946 2576 4607 .92 .17 
NET FARM INC 3808 5175 4649 4522 861 4629 2618 3911 .74 .90 
CROP SCAL 1111 432 1112 432 2 16 2 16 1.00 .02 
LIV SCAL 744 714 835 760 91 333 122 323 00
 
o
 
.37 
TOT SCAL 1855 849 1947 889 93 334 124 323 .96 .11 
TOT FARM VAL 32079 29695 34280 29604 2201 5292 3401 4611 .91 .19 
FARM DEBT 11484 17813 11534 17563 50 3981 1029 3845 .85 .44 
NET EQUITY, 
lAND AND BUILD­
INGS 13399 13336 14689 13474 1290 3909 1867 3668 .85 .90^  
*See Table 5.5 for a definition of the variables. 
T^his high value is caused by the fact that many ratios are defined to be zero. 
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While absolute value differences are typically smaller for North 
Carolina than for Iowa, the percentage change is not much different. The 
reason Iowa's differences are higher probably is because the scale of 
operation in North Carolina is smaller and revolves around one major 
commodity--tobacco. Iowa is more diversified with large crop and live­
stock operationso Also it is common for an Iowa farmer to have several 
crop and several livestock operations. 
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 contain a frequency distribution of the changes 
between the edited and original data bases for the variable, total family 
income, differentiated by year and control/experimentals. Even though 
the distribution is roughly centered, a large number (45 in Iowa, 10 in 
North Carolina) had changes greater than $5000. Also note that distribu­
tions between control and experimentals are different. In Iowa, for 
example, 51 families, or 31 percent of the control families, had changes 
of less than a -$1,000 compared to 17 percent for experimental families. 
However, the number of changes above 1000 were 27 percent for controls 
as compared to 37 percent for experimentals» Correspondingly, for 
North Carolina the percentage of control families with changes less than 
-1,000 was 19 percent versus 12 for experimental families, while the 
percentage of families above 1,000 was identical at 25 percent. 
In Iowa the simple chi square test yielded a value of 18.11 which 
is significant at the one percent level. This implies that the distribu­
tion is different. In North Carolina the chi square value is 5.33 which 
is insignificant. 
T^he categories < -5000 and -4900 to -2501 were added together prior 
to doing the chi square test. 
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Table 5.7. Frequency distribution of differences between original and 
edited data base for total family income in North Carolina 
Edited - Original 
<-5000 
-4900 
to 
-2501 
2500 
to 
1000 
-999 
to 
+999 
1000 
to 
2500 
2501 
to 
5000 >5000 Total 
CONTROL 
1970 1 1 6 19 8 6 3 44 
1971 1 3 4 24 8 3 1 44 
1972 2 2 7 21 11 3 0 44 
TOTAL 4 6 17 64 27 12 k 132 
EXPERIMENTAL 
1970 0 1 3 35 11 5 0 55 
1971 0 3 4 39 6 2 1 55 
1972 0 0 8 30 12 2 3 55 
TOTAL 0 4 15 104 29 9 4 165 
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Table 5.8, Frequency distribution of differences between original and 
edited data base for total family income in Iowa 
Edited - Original 
-4900 -2500 -999 1000 2501 
to to to to to 
<-5000 -2501 -1000 +999 2500 5000 >5000 Total 
CONTROL 
1970 2 7 12 20 7 1 5 54 
1971 4 7 8 20 3 4 8 54 
1972 4 7 10 17 9 1 6 54 
TOTAL 10 21 30 57 19 6 19 162 
CPERIMENTAL 
1970 1 2 7 24 3 10 3 50 
1971 0 2 4 27 5 6 6 50 
1972 0 1 8 29 3 3 6 50 
TOTAL 1 5 19 70 11 29 15 150 
109 
One may wonder if the extent of changes does not nullify any result­
ing analysis using edited data. The reader must ultimately pass judgment 
on this issue, but before doing this he should read Volume I, particularly 
Chapters 7 to 9 of the Final Rural Income Maintenance Report [24]. Field 
staff were carefully selected and trained, all interviews were pretested, 
and generally the methodology used in this data collection operation was 
the latest and best in terms of conventional practice. 
The reasons for these differences have been alluded to in the intro­
duction. Other surveys have encountered similar difficulties. For 
example, welfare income typically has been understated by 40 percent where 
population totals are estimated from stratified samples. The 1966-67 
Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO), when compared by researchers at the 
Urban Institute with the actual annualized caseload count, produced a 
43 percent undercount. Approximately 1,527,000 AFDC cases were actually 
present in the sample universe while only 877,000 cases were identified 
as such by the SEO data [63]. 
A government sponsored survey in 1970 produced a 41 percent under­
count of the state's actual welfare count. A weighted 2125 ANFC families 
were identified in the survey, as opposed to the actual total of 3590 
cases on the rolls as of September 5, 1970 [63]. 
The current Population Survey (CPS) for 1972 produced a 34.5 percent 
undercount of welfare benefits [59]. 
The information available on the reporting of self employed income 
is similar. Some recent comparisons between Internal Revenue Service and 
USDA estimates of farm income have been made with wide differences. While 
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conceptual differences in the definition of USDA. and 1RS farm income do 
exist, these do not appear to explain the differences [81]. 
For farm income in 1972, the CPS produced an undercount of 42.3 
percent, while for nonfarm seIf-employment the undercount was 13.0 per­
cent. These undercount percentages were derived by comparing CPS with 
benchmark income statistics from other sources [59]. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that the wide differences did 
occur in the rural negative income tax sample. These data problems under­
score what will be the major conclusion of this chapter, that the account­
ing and reporting system used by any future income maintenance program 
will have more serious cost implications than corresponding labor supply 
effects. One must not only consider the overpayments resulting from 
families who understate their income, but also the underpayments resulting 
from low income families overstating their income, which is equally as 
serious given the legislative mandate of any income maintenance program. 
Determining Which Data Base is Best 
This section is modeled closely after the second section. Determin­
ing which data base is best can only be done by a comparison with outside 
sources or the estimation of known data relationships. An objective 
evaluation of which data base is best is practically impossible. If the 
known data relationships or the outside sources were used in creating the 
edited data base, the edited data base should always be better than the 
original data base when using these two criteria for evaluation purposes. 
Such is the situation here. A third source of data or known data 
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relationships not used in the editing process may provide a somewhat 
objective evaluation. However these do not exist; and even if they did, 
one might question why they would not be used as well in the editing 
process. 
In the actual editing process, conflicts arose between the different 
data sources. Furthermore changes were not made to strictly conform to 
Internal Revenue Service data or with accounting relationships. Conse­
quently this section primarily explores the remaining differences between 
the edited data base and 1RS data. The primary justification or rationale 
for accepting the edited data base as best is the methodology or pro­
cedure under which the edited data base was created. This is described 
further in Appendix B. The best data base is one which provides an 
unbiased and efficient estimator of the treatment coefficients. 
The table presented earlier for the original data base (Table 5.4) 
is presented for the edited data base in Table 5.9. The edited means are 
higher than the 1RS means in eight out of sixteen categories as compared 
with the previous fourteen out of sixteen. Gross income is now $300 
higher than the 1RS mean as compared to $1,200 lower on the original data 
base. Expenses are less by $600 as contrasted to the original data base 
being $1,400 less. Net income is $900 more than 1RS on the edited data 
base. One of the prime reasons net income is above and expenses below 1RS 
is the refusal to allow certain car expenses. 
The coefficient on the 1RS variable increased in all sixteen cate­
gories and moved closer to 1.0 in fifteen categories. The lone exception 
was tobacco sales. The standard error of estimates declined in fourteen 
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Table 5.9. Regression equations of itemized Income and expenditures on 
the edited data base for farmers who are less than 69 years 
of age, have constant marital status, and farm in each of the 
years from 1969 to 1973^  
Edited 1RS 1RS Coeff. Diff. 
Variable Mean Mean (S.E. of Est.) (F Value) 
Tobacco Sales 2430 2323 1.03 -49.44 
(4330) (4149) (576) (2.98) 
Grain Sales 6143 5951 1.02 112.93 
(7241) (6850) (2007) (1.46) 
Acreage Diverted 920 953 .97 6.20 
Payments (994) (998) (239) (.30) 
Other Crop Sales 126 37.7 1.06 12.95 
(456) (259) (364) (.49) 
Cattle Sales 1710 1599 .99 75.02 . 
(3379) (3201) (1143) (5.00) 
Hog Sales 4045 4180 .92 230.06 . 
(6694) (6953) (1865) (12.49) 
All Other Income 1376 1381 .96 -63.64 
(2366) (2328) (769) (.80) 
Labor Expense 784 809 .95 31.09 
(1107) (1130) (293) (1.34) 
Fertilizer, Seed, 1754 1653 .93 -155.86 
Herbicide (1747) (1672) (794) (2.12) 
Machinery Repair, 1131 1198 .81 -20.38 
Supplies (958) (925) (601) (.47) 
Feed, Vet, Breeding 2977 2975 .97 -17.92 
Fees (4830) (4915) (609) (1.21) 
Gas, Fuel, Utilities 1232 1260 .86 3.50 
(697) (730) (307) (1.95) 
All Other Expenses 2184 2747 .72 313.29 
(2817) (3340) (1446) (19.98) 
Total Gross Income 16749 16426 .97 318.30 
(11482) (11460) (2949) (4.89) 
Total Gross Expenses 10061 10642 .93 249.03 
(8166) (8443) (2113) (1.21) 
Net Farm Income 6688 5784 .95 -36.94 
(5016) (4589) (2470) (8.60) 
y One observation was deleted due to data problems. 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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equations, went up slightly in one, and increased substantially in only 
one equation. In some cases the decline was large, particularly in 
expense categories. 
In Table 5.4, ten equations had a significant treatment effect. On 
the edited data base this declined to five equations. More importantly 
the $850 control/experimental differential for net farm income declined 
to $37. This suggests that if 1RS is unbiased with respect to treatment, 
the edited data base has been adjusted correctly for income and expenses 
and is less prone to contain a bias between control and experimentals. 
Another method of determining which data base is best is estimating 
accounting relationships which should be identical for control and 
experimentals. As alluded to in the introduction, the equation must be 
carefully constructed to avoid including an inadvertant treatment effect. 
Further evidence of which data base is best can be obtained by looking at 
the total variation explained by the accounting equation and by having 
zero treatment coefficients. Removing outliers, as was done in the 
transition from the original to the edited data base, should increase the 
explanatory power of any accounting relationship. 
The same accounting relations as described previously in section 3 
2 
were re-estimated for the edited data base. In all equations, the R 
increased and no treatment effects were encountered. This evidence com­
bined with the procedure used to create the edited data base suggests that 
the edited data base is preferred to the original data base. 
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An Explanation of the Changes Between the 
Original and Edited Data Bases 
The primary purpose of this section is to determine if the changes 
between the original and edited data bases were systematically related 
to any family or farm characteristics, particularly treatment variables. 
The effect of reporting from records was found to have a profound impact 
on the extent of changes between the two data bases. 
There is scant previous literature on what variables should explain 
nonresponse errors or what families are most likely to report inconsis­
tencies in the data. 
As an economist, one might turn first to a benefit/cost approach. 
In this case, there is no benefit or loss from reporting inaccurately on 
the interview. The survey operation and payment operation were entirely 
independent. Each month the respondent filled out a form upon which 
payments were based. Information that was reported to the payments 
department was not adjusted or made to conform with information on the 
interview. Even in cases of wide discrepancy between the two sources of 
information, no audits were performed. Probably, however, experimental 
families did not realize the distinction, and if they had something to 
hide, they may have reported Identically to both payment and survey 
departments. 
One can postulate the following hypotheses to explain the incidence 
and magnitude of errors : 
a) Errors would be related to an individual's ability to report 
accurately. This could be measured by an Individual's education, quick 
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test score,^  management ability, and age. Higher management abilities, 
education levels, etc., would be associated with lower error levels, 
b) Errors should be related to the difficulty of reporting for a 
particular farm operation. For example, holding everything else constant, 
the farm operation having no share or tenancy arrangements should report 
better than a farm operation with several tenancy arrangements. Other 
ways of measuring this concept are number of different crop operations, 
number of different livestock operations, percent of cropping operation 
in corn and soybeans (tobacco in North Carolina), percent of livestock 
operation in one enterprise, number of different landlords, and 1.0 minus 
the fraction of land rented on a share basis. The farmer who has several 
landlords but rents all land on a cash basis has only one or two simple 
transactions to remember, while those renting on a share basis have many 
transactions to recall. The higher the percentage in the major crop or 
livestock operation, the more accurate the reporting should be. 
c) The effect of farm size upon reporting accuracy is probably 
indeterminate. Controlling for everything else, e.g., management ability, 
the farmer with the higher level of business activity would be more likely 
to have a greater error level. However, size of farm may also serve as 
a proxy for management ability. The fact that a farmer has a larger than 
average business activity may also indicate a higher management ability. 
Thus if management ability is inappropriately measured, size of farm 
could have a negative sign. 
T^he Ammons and Ammons quick test score is based on a word recogni 
tion test. The scale range is 0-50. 
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d) Error level should be related to whether information comes from 
records. As the number of quarters for which records were used increases, 
the accuracy of reporting should increase. 
e) The level of error should decrease with time. As the respon­
dents learn what is expected of them, they respond (perhaps by using 
records) by reporting more accurately. 
f) The treatment effect on accuracy of reporting is indeterminate. 
Because experimental families on the average were receiving $1400 per year 
from the experiment, their degree of cooperation or willingness to 
provide information probably would enhance that fact alone. Evidence 
presented earlier showing experimentals reporting more frequently from 
records supports this viewpoint. 
On the other hand, one could argue that experimental families may 
have attempted to maximize the size of their payment check and reported 
the same information to both payments and surveys. Relative to the 
control group, this might result in less income and more expenses being 
reported. 
Separating or disentangling these two effects will be achieved in 
the following manner. Essentially the model will be estimated in two 
forms. One form is the simple difference between the edited and original 
data bases. This variable presumes the errors are intentional. As 
explained in section 2 the level of reporting is related to the treatment 
parameters. If the treatment parameter is significant, after controlling 
for the level of reporting, it suggests that some experimental families 
manipulated the payment system to their advantage. 
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The other form of the model is the absolute difference between the 
edited and original data bases» If the treatment variables are significant 
and negative, this suggests that being in the experimental group reduced 
the error level or amount of changes between the two data bases. If most 
survey response errors are unintentional, the test of hypotheses a through 
e above should be stronger or more evident by the use of this model. 
In Table 5.10 for North Carolina and in Table 5.11 for Iowa, the 
partial F-statistics are shown for testing hypotheses a through f above 
on two selected independent variables. These variables are total family 
income and scaled crop hours in North Carolina and total family income and 
scaled livestock hours in Iowa. These two variables were chosen to be 
representative for a large number of dependent variables. One variable 
was chosen from income and one from hours with the hours variable which 
was most sensitive to the treatment being the prime candidate.^  This was 
done to determine if the editing procedure had an impact upon disincentive 
predictions. The full equations are reported in Appendix D. 
In North Carolina, with scaled crop hours primarily a function of 
acres, the only variable which explains any portion of the change between 
the data bases is farm size. However, for total family income, several 
things are evident. Difficulty of reporting and measures of an 
M^any important analytical variables in several forms (ABS, DIFF, 
RATIO) were estimated as a simple function of treatment parameters. From 
these equations, the selected variables (total family income, scaled crop 
hours in North Carolina and scaled livestock hours in Iowa) were chosen. 
In the other variables, the differences in the data bases seemed 
insensitive to treatment parameters. More work would need to be done 
before that could be concluded definitely, however. 
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individual's ability to report are significant at the one percent level 
for the absolute error model and are insignificant for the difference 
model. This result follows directly if one assumes the errors are 
unintentional. 
Table 5.10. North Caroline partial F-statistics for determining the 
significance of various groups of independent variables for 
explaining the changes between the original and edited data 
bases^  
Dependent Variables 
Diff 
Total 
Family 
Income 
ABS 
Total 
Family 
Income 
Diff 
Scaled 
Crop 
Hours 
ABS 
Scaled 
Crop 
Hours 
1 Due to Individual's 
Reporting Ability .58 5.21^  .24 .49 
2 Difficulty of Farm 
Enterprise 2.07 4.35^  .38 1.29 
3 Farm Size 7.34^  11.46^  5.30^  4.50^  
4 Reporting from Records 7.98^  10.38^  .81 .05 
5 Time 2.49 .86 .81 1.50 
6 Treatment 1.83 .23 .90 1.88 
7 Time * C/E .63 2.97 1.14 2.97 
8 DIS, DIS * C/E 5.00^  7.22^  .43 3.37^  
h^e numbers in front of each line refer to the variables which 
comprise each group. These variables are described in Appendix D. Each 
group of variables was entered into the equation in the order shown 
above. 
S^ignificant at the 1 percent level. 
S^ignificant at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 5.11. Iowa partial F-statistics for determining the significance of 
various groups of independent variables for explaining the 
changes between the original and edited data bases* 
Dependent Variables 
Diff 
Total 
Family 
Income 
ABS 
Total 
Family 
Income 
Diff 
Scaled 
Crop 
Hours 
ABS 
Scaled 
Crop 
Hours 
1 Due to Individual's 
Reporting Ability .71 2.42^  2.03 2.03 
2 Difficulty of Farm 
Enterprise .64 2.52^  3.38f 4.17" 
3 Farm Size 20.81^  21.74^  13.84^  25.79= 
4 Reporting from Records .66 4.96^  .45 8.11= 
5 Time .70 1.22 .73 .56 
6 Treatment 9.56^  8.68^  7.62^  6.16= 
7 Time * C/E .10 .58 .46 .39 
8 DIS, DIS * C/E 4.83^  3.07^  4.oof 3.38^  
®The numbers in front of each line refer to the variables which 
comprise each group. These variables are described in Appendix D. Each 
group of variables was entered into the equation in the order shown above, 
S^ignificant at the 5 percent level. 
S^ignificant at the 1 percent level. 
There is no evidence of a learning curve or a treatment effect. 
Reporting from records is highly significant in both equations and the 
sign (shown in Appendix D, Table D.l) indicates that errors are reduced 
when records are used in reporting. Errors increase with the level of 
farm size, holding everything else constant. The farm size variable is 
highly significant in both models. It probably reflects a number of 
phenomena, one being that the degree of cooperation from respondents 
typically fell if much effort was expended in reporting information. 
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Size of farm is also an indicator of the number of transactions and, with 
more transactions, the higher probability of an error. 
For Iowa, some results are similar and some are quite different. 
Because livestock operations are more varied and complex than crop 
operations in North Carolina, the differences between the data bases are 
significantly related to several variables as opposed to just one in 
North Carolina. Along with farm size, the complexity of the farming 
enterprise, reporting from records, and the treatment variable are 
significant. More will be explained about the treatment effect later. 
As in North Carolina, for total family income, difficulty of report­
ing and measures of an individual's ability to report are significant for 
the absolute error model but are insignificant for the difference model. 
The difference between regions is that treatment is significant while 
reporting from records is insignificant in the difference model. 
The significance of the treatment effect needs to be analyzed care­
fully. Ideally one would hope that any changes to the data would not be 
related to treatment variables, for that raises the question of which 
data base to believe. One could argue that if errors were being elimina­
ted, primarily the precision of the results would be affected and not the 
level of the predicted incentive or disincentive. 
In Iowa this ideal obviously did not happen. However, if the 
original data collection system was biased with respect to the treatment 
parameters particularly in the reporting of income, then corrections to 
the system will be correlated with treatment parameters. This is the 
prime rationale for the significant treatment effects. It also implies 
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that experimental fanners were intentionally underreporting to the 
quarterly interviews in concordance with their reporting on the payments 
system. This question is addressed elsewhere.^  
Thus far, the last line of Tables 5.10 and 5.11 has been conspicu­
ously avoided. DIS measures total scaled hours for each year minus 1969 
total scaled hours. A negative sign would indicate a decline in farm 
hours from the 1969 level. As an afterthought, a measure of the change 
in labor supply was inserted into the equation explaining the difference 
in total family income. This variable was insignificant, but when 
interacted with the control/experimental variable it was significant 
in seven of the eight equations. This phenomenon, although not origin­
ally hypothesized, was so strongly related to treatment parameters, that 
it could not be ignored. The explanation is subtle but should give the 
reader an insight into the editing process. DIS is based upon physical 
units of production, i.e., acres of corn, number of cattle sold, etc. 
Consequently, whenever an inconsistency arose, for example between number 
of cattle sold, cattle sales data, 1RS sales, inventory numbers, or feed 
expenditures, all data were consulted. When control families were 
Involved, more often than not the inconsistency did not lie in the first 
two values but in the overall relationship between the five different 
pieces of data. Consequently, the consistency was most often resolved 
(if changes in income or hours were to occur at all) by changing number 
of cattle sold and cattle sales in the same direction--either Increasing 
or decreasing both values, 
S^ee [2â for a more complete discussion of the differences between 
payments data and data from the quarterly interviews. 
122 
However, when experimental families were involved, the inconsistency 
frequently did lie between the first two numbers. Consequently, the 
discrepancy only could be resolved by changing either one of the two 
variables or by changing both in opposite directions. This explains the 
sign and significance of the DIS and DIS * C/E variables in Tables 5.10 
and 5.11. 
A careful analysis of the models without one variable, number of 
times records were used, reveals an interesting paradox for Iowa. For 
the difference model, the treatment variable is positive and large 
suggesting that the average difference for experimentals is larger than 
that for controls. However, the absolute model indicates that the average 
control change was larger than the average experimental change. This 
apparent contradiction can be explained quite easily. The average 
experimental change was typically small (relative to control) but usually 
in one direction; the changes to the control families were large but in 
both directions, making the difference lie closer to zero. 
The changes between the data bases are explainable by some family 
and farm characteristics. Reporting from records reduced the number of 
changes. There was no evidence of a learning curve, but there was 
evidence of treatment effects in Iowa. This undoubtedly will have 
implications for the next section which examines the effect editing had 
upon treatment coefficients. 
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The Effect of the Changes Upon Results 
The main purpose of this excercise is to determine the effect which 
editing had upon experimental results. While all the point estimates of 
the various treatment effects are changed, none are changed drastically 
with the exception of the Iowa net farm and gross farm income equations 
and the North Carolina net farm income equation. This was expected given 
the results of the previous section, namely, that the changes between 
the original and edited data bases in Iowa were related primarily to 
treatment and predominately for income variables. In addition the treat­
ment variable in the North Carolina adjusted scaled hours equation became 
significant. 
The following is a brief summary of the major independent variables 
and the reason for their inclusion in the model,^  Algebraically the 
models estimated for Iowa can be expressed as follows : 
Y = bp + b^ (HR69) + b2(HR69^ ) + b^ (AGE) + b^ (EDUC) + 
+ b^ (NET EQUITYgg) + bg(DEBT RATIOgg) + b^ (AGE55) + bg(YR) 
+ bg( A OFF-FARM HOURS) 
bg, b^ , bg, b^ , and bg are allowed to be different between control and 
experimentals. The other coefficients are constrained to be identical 
between control and experimental families. 
For a further detailed discussion of these variables, the reader 
is referred to Chapter IV. While the model is slightly different than 
the one in Chapter IV, the difference does not affect the analysis of 
this chapter or its conclusions. 
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A brief description of the variables follows: 
HR69 - Total scaled hours in 1969 which controls for initial 
differences between the control and experimental 
groups. When the dependent variable is crop or live­
stock scaled hours, this variable is the 1969 version 
of crop and livestock scaled hours respectively. 
2 
HR69 - Allows the growth in income or hours between 1969 and 
the current year to be curvilinear. 
AGE, EDUC, - these variables control for sampling variation and also 
NET allow growth in the dependent variable to vary linearly 
EQUITYgg, 
with different levels of the variables in question. 
DEBT 
RATIOgg The debt ratio is the amount of total farm debt divided 
by the total asset level. 
AGE55 - A spline function for age which is assumed to have a 
kink at age 55. This variable is zero for all ages 
less than 55 and is equal to the age of the respondent 
for all years above 54. Taking the age variables as 
a set, the t in the dependent variable is assumed to be 
linearly related to age, with a different linear 
function for those under and over age 55. However the 
formulation restricts the overall function to be 
continuous at age 55. The treatment is presumed to 
affect those in the over age 55 group differentially 
with respect to age. 
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YR - composed of two dummy variables, one for 1971 and one 
for 1972. 
t OFF-FARM - defined to be the level of wage and business hours for 
HOURS 
each year minus the 1969 level of wage and business 
hours,^  This variable is assumed to be exogenously 
determined. 
The model for North Carolina is slightly different. It includes 
a race variable plus six variables representing family composition. The 
latter are included because of the importance of labor, especially unpaid 
family labor, in the growing of tobacco. The race coefficient is allowed 
to be different between control and experimentals while the other 
coefficients are constrained to be Identical. 
The population is identical to that of earlier sections in this 
chapter with the exception of five families being eliminated from the 
North Carolina sample. The reduced form is used to derive treatment 
coefficient estimates. 
The full regression equations are presented in Appendix D, Tables 
D.3 and D.4. It is interesting to note the difference in disincentives 
predictions that the two data bases generate based upon the above model. 
This is clearly shown in Table 5.12 for North Carolina and Table 5.13 for 
Iowa. 
Business hours for 1969 was not asked in the interview. Conse­
quently 1970 business hours was used for both 1969 and 1970. This fudge 
affects few observations. 
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Table 5,12, North Carolina predicted Incentives for the original and 
edited data bases for selected dependent variables from the 
regression models in Appendix D, Table D,3. 
Selected Values 
Dependent Variable 800 1200 1600 2000 2400 2800 
Total Scaled Hours 
EDIT DB -25.8 -11,1 -5.1 -4.6 -7.6 -12.8 
ORIG DB -32.8 -18.6 -11.6 -9.2 -9.7 -12.1 
DIFF 7.0 7.5 6,5 4.6 2.1 -.7 
Scaled Adjusted Hours 
EDIT DB -17.0 -4,0 2.8 5.1 4.4 1.4 
ORIG DB -11.2 ,6 7.3 10.5 11.2 10.2 
DIFF -5.8 -3,4 -4.5 -5.4 -6.8 -8.8 
Net Farm 
EDIT DB 3.0 „7 .3 .8 2.0 4.0 
(RIG DE 3.5 15.7 20,7 22.5 22.4 20.7 
DIFF -.5 -15,0 -20,4 -21,7 -20,4 -16.7 
Gross Farm 
EDIT DB -7.2 -8.1 -10.1 -12.8 -15.8 -19.0 
ORIG DB -10.3 -9.5 -10.8 -13.4 -16.8 -20.8 
DIFF 3.1 1,4 .7 .6 1.0 1.8 
400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400 
Crop 
EDIT DB -35.6 -18.9 -12.7 -11,6 -13,1 -16,2 
ORIG DB -40,4 -25,4 -18.9 -15.9 -16.8 -18.6 
DIFF 4.8 6.5 6.2 4.3 3.7 2.4 
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Table 5.13. Iowa predicted incentives for the original and edited data 
bases for selected dependent variables from the regression 
models in Appendix D, Table D.4. 
Selected Ygg Values 
Dependent Variable 800 1200 1600 2000 2400 2800 
Total Scaled Hours 
EDIT DB 
ORIG DB 
DIFF 
Net Farm 
EDIT DB 
miG DB 
DIFF 
Gross Farm 
EDIT DB 
ORIG DB 
DIFF 
Crop 
EDIT DB 
ORIG DB 
DIFF 
3.2 
-9.3 
12.5 
-5.0 
•7.0 
2.0 
-8.6 
-6.9 
-1.7 
•10.2 
-7.8 
-2.4 
•10.7 
-9.3 
-1.4 
•10.7 
•11.2 
.5 
•28.7 
-49.2 
20.5 
-4.7 
-9.7 
5.0 
11.2 
15.6 
-4.4 
21.7 
21.9 
- . 2  
28.1 
11.5 
16.6 
31.0 
-9.7 
21.3 
54.7 
74.7 
20,0 
18.5 
23.4 
-4.9 
2.9 
2.0 
.9 
-4.9 
-9.1 
4.2 
-8.8 
•15.3 
6.5 
•10.4 
18.7 
8.3 
4C0 800 1200 1600 2000 2400 
6.1 4.1 
8.0 4.8 
-1.9 -.7 
1.6 -1.1 
1.6 -1.7 
0 .6 
-4.0 -7.0 
-5.1 -8.6 
1.1 1.6 
Livestock 
200 400 600 800 1000 
EDIT DB -70.3 -44.8 -35.7 -30.5 -26.9 -24.1 
GRIG DB -71.1 -46.0 -34.8 -28.8 -25.4 -23.3 
DIFF .8 1.2 -.9 -1.7 -1.5 -.8 
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For each of the five variables^  for which editing was done, a pre­
dicted incentive percentage is presented for both the original and edited 
data bases for various levels of 1969 total scaled hours. This incentive 
percentage is defined as (P-C)/C * 100,0. A negative sign indicates a 
disincentive. The original data base percentage incentive is subtracted 
from the edited data base percentage incentive to obtain a difference in 
predictions between the two data bases. A positive sign indicates that 
the edited data base is predicting a higher incentive, while a negative 
sign indicates a lower incentive or higher disincentive. 
Turning to North Carolina first, Table 5.12, several things are 
immediately noticeable. The edited data base predicts a higher incentive 
for crop hours which in turn influences or leads to a higher incentive 
for total scaled hours. However, the edited data base predicts a lower 
disincentive for net farm income. Why this inconsistency? If one 
inspects the results from the original data base, some highly unusual 
results abound. For example, there is a fairly large incentive for net 
farm income and yet experimental farmers are working fewer hours. This 
is even harder to explain in light of the substantial gross farm income 
disincentive. The edited data base does much to dispel these inconsis­
tencies because the net farm income incentives were reduced to small 
2 
percentages, while the hours incentives were increased. 
l^owa scaled adjusted hours and total scaled hours yield identical 
results so results for the former are not presented. Livestock hours is 
dominated by just a few operators in North Carolina and consequently the 
results are not presented. 
W^hile doing the editing process, it was not known whether the family 
was control or experimental and no thought was given to whether the 
changes would be easier or harder to justify. 
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The last inconsistency is between scaled adjusted hours and total 
scaled hours. The former is an adjustment to total scaled hours based on 
hired labor, machine hire, and custom work done. Because of the experi­
ment, one would theoretically expect a larger disincentive with scaled 
adjusted hours than with total scaled hours alone. Such was not the case 
however. Original scaled adjusted hours shews a positive incentive while 
original scaled hours shows a substantial disincentive with a difference 
between the two variables of around 20 percent. While not completely 
reconciling the two measures, the inconsistency is reduced to around 10 
percent in the edited data base. The basic pattern of results for North 
Carolina is the same between the two data bases. 
In Iowa, this is even more true. For all hour variables, for all 
percentages except one (lowest level of total scaled hours), the changes 
are small and are all less than 2.5 percent. The income variables have 
changed somewhat, however. For gross farm income, the original income 
incentive went from 75 percent to -19 percent. This has been scaled down 
to a range from 55 percent to -10 percent. Net income underwent a 
similar change. The original percentages were negative for low values of 
1969 total scaled hours, became positive, snd then returned to negative 
at high levels of 1969 total scaled hours. The edited data base has 
changed this pattern. At low levels the incentive percentages begin at 
negative values and then become increasingly more positive. 
There is one other aspect of the results between the edited and 
original data bases which deserves mention. That is the effect upon 
precision or accuracy of the results. These are shown for North Carolina 
in Table 5.14 and for Iowa in Table 5.15. 
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Table 5.14. North Carolina partial F-statistics and related regression 
statistics for the original and edited data bases from the 
regression equations in Appendix D, Table D.3. 
Dependent Variables 
Adjusted 
Net Gross Total Total Scaled 
Farm Farm Scaled Scaled Crop 
Income Income Hours Hours Hours 
Orig Eq. S.E.* 2738 5255 810 646 786 
Edit Eq. S.E.* 1938 5052 778 563 754 
Treatment Variables 
ORIG .95 3.10^  3.72^  1.32, 3.66^  
EDIT .83 3.91^  9.28^  2.78 8.85^  
Year * TRT 
ORIG .48 2.1 .52 .41 .55 
EDIT .36 .09 .04 .26 .04 
Age * TRT 
miG 1.36 3.10 .04 .62 .10 
EDIT 4.44b 4.39b .73 3.15 .61 
Race * TRT 
0R.1G .96 1.49 3.71 .13 2.64 
EDIT .62 .97 1.98 1.45 1.68 
Overall R^  
ORIG .17 .44 .61 .47 .62 
EDIT .28 .50 .66 .56 .68 
S^tandard error of estimate. 
S^ignificant at the 5 percent level. 
S^ignificant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 5,15. Iowa partial F-statistics and related regression statistics 
for the original and edited data bases from the regression 
equations in Appendix D, Table D.4. 
Dependent Variables 
Net Gross Total Scaled Scaled 
F ara Farm Scaled Crop Livestock 
Income Income Hours Hours Hours 
Orig, Eq, S.E,* 4865 8471 494 207 468 
Edit Eq. S.E.* 4152 8217 416 203 398 
Treatment Variables 
ORIG 6.59^  5.06^  6.38% .94 7.35% 
EDIT 1.58 1.48 4.82^  .64 3.99b 
Year * TRT 
ORIG 1.40 .50 .24 .17 .17 
EDIT .33 .12 .41 .15 .59 
Aee * TRT 
CRIG 1.42 2.89 1.90 6.49^  .15 
EDIT 2.41 4.98^  3.08 5.67^  .13 
Overall R^  
ORIG .21 .50 .69 .79 .61 
EDIT .21 .57 .80 .79 .75 
S^tandard error of estimate. 
S^ignificant at the 1 percent level. 
S^ignificant at the 5 percent level. 
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Turning to Iowa first, three important distinctions between the two 
data bases should be noted. As expected, the explanatory power ôf the 
equation without treatment variables increased for the edited data base 
in all equations. This is evidenced by the lower standard error of 
2 
estimate as shown in line 1 of Table 5.15. Also the R of all models has 
increased or stayed the same when comparing the edited data base with the 
original. 
The second observation is that one would have concluded that the 
treatment influenced income variables if only results from the first data 
base were available. This is rejected for the edited data base. The 
earlier result was significant at the one percent level, while the edited 
version has a very low significance level. 
The third result is that the precision of results with respect to 
year and age are roughly equivalent between the two data bases. Age 
became a slightly more significant determinant in the gross farm income 
equation. Overall, the significance of the treatment variables typically 
declined from the original to the edited data base. 
In Table 5.14 the reader will notice two similarities and one 
dissimilarity between the North Carolina and the Iowa results. As in 
Iowa, the standard error of estimates declined in all equations and the 
2 
R increased when comparing the edited data base with the original data 
base. Also as for Iowa, the year interacted with treatment and age 
interacted with treatment variables were roughly equivalent. As in Iowa 
the significance of age interacted with treatment increased. 
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The basic difference between the regions is that the significance 
level of the treatment variables increased in North Carolina while the 
significance level declined in Iowa, 
Conclusion 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the evidence presented in this 
chapter. The major result is that an income maintenance scheme which 
must administer a program to the self-employed will entail more cost from 
income reporting problems than cost from disincentives in labor supply. 
For example the program may have induced a $900 income under-reporting 
problem in Iowa which translates approximately into an average $300 over­
payment. This assumes some families are over the breakeven level. How­
ever, an average estimate of net farm income disincentive is at most 
$100 (from Chapter IV), which translates roughly into $50 of extra cost. 
The second major conclusion is that the changes between the data 
bases were large. This entire analysis raises doubts about any survey's 
ability to correctly recall or construct income in a detailed, disaggre­
gated manner. The profession ought to tackle with diligence the problems 
of measurement, especially in the areas of income and asset information. 
While that is hardly a new conclusion, one cannot help but wonder about 
the validity of our current income statistics from the census and the CPS. 
Another conclusion is that the direction and magnitude of predicted 
incentive percentages were not significantly changed for hours variables. 
Income results were changed, particularly in Iowa. Based on the original 
data base, a treatment effect for income would have resulted. The edited 
data base contains no such effect. 
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This raises the question of whether the entire edited data base 
concept was worthwhile. The answer is unequivocally yes. Without the 
edited data base, researchers would have compared 1RS information with 
the original data base, and also could have shown by the analysis in 
section two of this chapter that the data collection system was poten­
tially biased with respect to the treatment parameters. This would have 
produced some very nagging questions and one would have continually 
wondered about the validity of the experiment's results. While the edited 
data base does not erase all those questions, it does lend considerable 
credibility and validity to the study. The cost of this effort was small 
(less than two percent) compared to the cost of the entire study. 
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION 
Summary 
The prime focus of this analysis has been to estimate the farm work 
response of farm operators. Several dependent variables were defined, 
each with different policy implications. Income reflects a family's 
ability tc earn income and obtain a decent standard of living. With this 
variable, one should be able to estimate program costs. It is expected 
that a farm operator would reduce the enterprises where the marginal value 
of his time is the lowest. Theoretically it would be possible to have a 
15 to 20 percent decrease in labor supply which would have only a small 
impact upon income and the cost implications of a nationwide income main­
tenance program. 
The measurement of labor supply was undertaken in two directions. 
The first was to have the farmer recall his hours of farm work for one 
week at four different points throughout a year. The second was to con­
struct a linear combination of crops grown and livestock and produce sold 
where the coefficients are obtained from outside sources. They reflect 
the number of hours required to grow one unit of the enterprise in ques­
tion on a farm with average mechanization. This assumption was relaxed by 
assuming the scale of operation perfectly predicts farming methods 
employed. 
Using reduced form equations, a time series - cross section estima­
tion routine based upon Nerlove [73], and controlling for important farm 
variables in the pre-enrollment year, treatment coefficients were estima­
ted. The two formulations of hours worked produced different results. 
136 
The recall hours variable was usually positive and statistically 
insignificant while constructed hours was primarily negative and statis­
tically significant. This was due to adjustments to livestock operations 
in Iowa and crop operations in North Carolina. These operations are 
flexible, require short planning periods and can be adjusted easily. 
This is contrasted with crop operations in Iowa where no reduction in 
hours occurred, since institutionally land tenure arrangements do not 
allow for much flexibility. 
For North Carolina, in Model II the treatment is parameterized as 
a simple dummy variable, and this dumiry is interacted with hours worked 
in 1969, the pre-experimental year. The constructed hours has a dis­
incentive of 10 to 15 percent, net farm income a disincentive of 7 per­
cent, gross farm income a disincentive of 14 percent, and recall hours 
an incentive of 7 to 9 percent. 
In Iowa the constructed hours has a disincentive of 8 to 17 percent, 
net farm income a disincentive of 10 percent, gross farm income a disin­
centive of 7 percent, while recall hours is positive from 1 to 4 percent. 
The resolution of what hours variable should be used primarily depends 
upon the underlying data collection methodology. Since acres and number 
of livestock are more accurately reported than number of hours worked the 
previous week, this author favors the results from constructed hours. 
These results are generally consistent with theoretical predictions. 
However, the effect of tax and guarantee rates upon labor supply are mixed, 
often significant, and of the wrong sign. The primary reason for this is 
a lack of observations and a possible misspecification of the model. 
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During the data collection phase, much Information about the farmer 
was accumulated. This Included inventories of livestock at the begin­
ning and end of each year, detailed itemization of income and expenses, 
acres devoted to each cropping enterprise, number of livestock sold, plus 
the schedule F as reported to the Internal Revenue Service. It soon 
became evident that there were many discrepancies in responses. These 
were highlighted by the inconsistency with an outside source (Schedule F) 
as well as internal inconsistencies within the interview (e.g., cattle 
in the beginning inventory, no record of sales or death, and no cattle 
in the ending inventory). Furthermore, it was noted that there was a 
correlation between treatment parameters and whether the family used 
records in giving information to the Interviewer. Therefore an intensive 
data editing task was initiated. 
Employing a priori information, making judgments about the quality 
and direction of the various data sources, and changing as few responses 
as possible, an internally consistent picture of the farm was generated. 
The original Information, devoid of processing errors, was also retained 
for comparison purposes and insurance. The changes between the data 
bases were fairly drastic. Net farm income was changed by an average 
of $1261 in North Carolina and $2618 in Iowa. The overall consistency 
with the outside source was Improved. More importantly, relatively little 
change was detected in the significance and value of treatment coeffi­
cients. The major exceptions to this are the income variables in Iowa. 
From the original data base one would have concluded that net farm Income 
was significantly reduced for the experimental group relative to the 
138 
control families. While the edited data base is still negative, the 
significance level is very lowi Generally most other point estimates of 
disincentives were smaller in the edited data base relative to the 
original data base. 
Explaining the variation in differences between the data baseu as a 
function of family or farm characteristics was generally poor in terms 
2 
of R , It was easier to explain the absolute difference rather than the 
simple difference between the two data bases. Generally farm size, 
reporting from records, difficulty of farm enterprise, and an individual's 
ability to report were significant in explaining the changes. No learn­
ing curve was detected in either site. In Iowa, the treatment parameters 
were significant in explaining the changes. Furthermore there is some 
evidence which indicates experimental families attempted to maximize their 
payments through inaccurate reporting, particularly during the final year 
of the experiment. 
Consequently, families who intentionally or unintentionally mis-
reported income had a different marginal tax than that assigned by the 
experiment. Their behavior is different from other experimental families 
who did not misreport and can be partially explained by inclusion of a 
variable named PN. This variable is constructed as actual payments minus 
predicted payments divided by their average. As expected, when PN is 
large, disincentive effects are less. 
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Issues and problems for further research 
The analysis has been concerned primarily with estimating labor 
response of farm operators in two areas. These results should be extended 
and a simulation study undertaken to analyze the impact of these results 
upon the supply and prices of the entire agricultural market. By esti­
mating which farmers are eligible, determining their current impact upon 
the total market, and using the information from this study (i.e., a 
presumed reduction in livestock operations in Iowa and tobacco in North 
Carolina), the change in consumer prices could be estimated. While it 
may be apparent that the short run impact would be to raise prices, it is 
not clear that this is necessarily the long run effect. Perhaps resources 
freed up by low-income farmers would be used more efficiently by higher 
income individuals, resulting in a different long run effect. 
The farm model developed here was essentially static and did not 
fully take into account the simultaneous decision-making aspects of the 
farmer in his farm enterprises. For example, the farmer simultaneously 
makes an investment/consumption decision at each point in time, a work/ 
leisure decision, as well as numerous decisions about the use of inter­
mediate goods and the hiring of farm labor. Perhaps the data in this 
experiment can be used to model the entire family farm firm. 
The three year design of the experiment and the effect this has upon 
labor supply predictions under a permanent national program should be 
carefully investigated. The theory would suggest that farm operators 
should have less labor supply effects than their urban wage earner 
counterparts working in an environment where the marginal worth of their 
time is equal to their wage rate. However, the empirical results from the 
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income maintenance experiments do not suggest this. As shown by this 
analysis, greater disincentives were uncovered in enterprises where the 
farmer has flexibility in changing the scale of operation and his labor 
input quickly. Thus the discrepancy between these results can be resolved 
by (1) suggesting that farmers and wage earners are entirely different 
entities because basic motivational patterns are dissimilar; (2) arguing 
that previous wage analysis has incorrectly modeled the institutional 
constraints of a 40 hour work week (i.e., changing labor supply implies 
changing jobs or reducing work hours to zero); or (3) believing that 
recall hours is a more accurate measure than constructed hours. 
This analysis has highlighted the differences between different 
sources of data and the extent and variance of misreporting. If a 
national program were instituted, careful attention should be given to the 
proper method of collecting income data. Given the cost implications of 
misreporting, administrative experimentation should be undertaken to 
determine how income questions should be formulated, the frequency of 
reporting, and the extent and magnitude of audits. 
Direct comparison of survey income data and payments data should be 
done. This could provide more direct evidence as to the extent of mis­
reporting and with which farm and family characteristics misreporting 
occurred. This analysis suggests that the misreporting was large and that 
it affected the behavior of farm families. Response errors in the survey 
data were analyzed but not the differences between the payment and survey 
data. 
The analysis would also suggest that the prime consideration for 
determining actual tax and guarantee rates should not be based upon labor 
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supply implications but upon cost implications. Evidence from other 
income maintenance experiments probably should be consulted before this 
conclusion is entirely accepted, given the paucity of observation in 
certain plans in this analysis. 
Policy recommendations 
The implications regarding the labor supply response are not new. 
Essentially they suggest a disincentive or a reduction in hours worked of 
from 5 to 15 percent for a tax rate of 50 percent and a guarantee rate of 
75 percent. This should not constitute a reason for failure to enact a 
national income maintenance program. Presumably there are less labor 
supply effects under this program than under the current welfare system, 
where tax rates can exceed 100 percent. 
The prime policy recommendation of this study for a national program 
is that misreporting has more serious cost implications than does work dis­
incentives. For example, the program may have induced a $900 average in­
come under-reporting problem in Iowa, which translates approximately into 
an average $300 over-payment. However, an average estimate of net farm 
income is at most $100, which translates into roughly $50 of extra cost. 
It also casts considerable doubt on the validity of poverty statis­
tics based upon one time surveys. The difference between the original 
versus the edited information was substantial. This also may be reflected 
in the low participation rates for Food Stamps. The number of families 
that truly are below a certain income cut-off may be lower than what these 
statistics would indicate, which automatically would lower the participa­
tion rates. 
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APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
Table A.l. Iowa sample averages for selected characteristics of farms included in the rural income 
maintenance experiment by year 
Expérimentais Controls 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Sources of income: 
Wage income 443 879 750 972 521 757 940 1095 
Net business income 6 46 60 28 110 11 235 195 
Net farm income - surveys 2573 3185 3945 6188 2564 3531 3984 7131 
Net farm income - 1RS 4590 2774 2879 4933 4245 2725 3134 6214 
Unearned incomg 
Unusual income 
70 -582 -602 -649 8 -554 -579 -502 
0 73 537 648 0 32 299 452 
Total income 3092 3601 4690 7187 3202 3777 4880 8372 
NIT payments - actual N.A. 1397 1552 1652 N.A. 0 0 0 
NIT payments - predicted N.A. 1024 957 593 N.A. 0 0 0 
% with wage income 0.42 0.68 0.72 0.72 0.46 0.69 0.76 0.76 
arm summary: 
Total tillable acres 217 229 228 217 202 213 216 207 
Diverted acres 28.3 25. ,4 47.6 35. 8 25. 9 24. 6 44.3 36 
°L with diverted acres 0.88 0. ,84 0.94 0. 96 0. 85 0. 85 0.98 1 
Total crop sales N.A. 8346 10097 11914 N.A. 6846 8960 9369 
Total livestock sales N.A. 7223 6934 9047 N.A. 11269 10661 15224 
Fertilizer, sod. 
insecticide N.A. 2082 2328 2455 N.A. 2006 2099 2245 
Fuel, repair, machine 
hire N.A. 2787 2682 3041 N.A. 2573 2795 2936 
Feed, vet., breeding 
fees N.A. 361 442 439 N.A. 306 326 334 
^Includes welfare income, income from assets, and retirement benefits minus childcare, alimony, 
child support, and medical expenses. 
^Includes one-time, lump sum payments (e.g., large gifts, inheritances, and windfall income). 
Table A.l, Continued 
Expérimentais 
1969 1970 1971 1972 
Assets : 
Farm land and bldg. -
value 5460 5500 5558 5490 
Farm land and bldg.-debt 2043 1963 1931 1951 
% owning land 0.12 0.12 0.14 0 
Farm machinery and eqt. -
value 10727 11209 12015 11889 
Farm machinery and eqt.--
debt 2936 3203 3601 2720 
Other farm assets - value ; 8764 10966 11144 13565 
Other farm assets - debt 2309 20093 21019 22493 
Total farm value 24950 27675 28717 30944 
Total farm net equity 17662 20093 21019 22493 
Liquid assets 2890 2741 2594 3174 
Total other net equity 0 92 104 97 
New purchases - mach. 
and eqt. N.A. 2275 2689 4028 
Hours : 
Head 
Scaled crop 1110 1143 1147 1090 
Scaled livestock 821 732 678 698 
% with livestock 0.88 0.86 0.80 0 
Total scaled 1931 1875 1825 1788 
Farm recall N.A. 2617 2351 2369 
Wage 135 160 132 127 
Business N.A. 1 1 1 
Spouse 
Unpaid farm or bus. 
Wage and business 
N.A. 215 163 189 
21 53 74 122 
Controls 
1969 1970 1971 1972 
9759 9907 13370 16051 
4341 4565 6852 8920 
0.20 0.20 0.26 0.30 
11971 12555 13711 13879 
2777 2330 2930 2615 
14815 17923 16564 21723 
3775 28613 29468 32 937 
36545 40386 43646 51654 
25653 28613 29468 32937 
2366 2181 2423 2222 
518 535 601 712 
N.A. 2127 1955 4042 
1060 1104 1115 1077 
974 991 991 891 
0.93 0.96 0.94 0 
2033 2095 2107 1968 
N.A. 2605 2304 2461 
129 162 171 178 
N.A. 2 4 1 
N.A. 98 156 129 
59 84 116 141 
Table A.l, Continued 
Expérimentais Controls 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Other members 
Wage 86 165 68 76 34 96 133 188 
Unpaid N.A. 0 94 97 N.A. 0 61 217 
Age of head 42.6 43.6 44.6 45.6 43.5 44.5 45.5 46.5 
Family size 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.7 
Table A.2. North Carolina sample averages for selected characteristics of farm included in the 
rural income maintenance experiment by year 
Expérimentais Controls 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Sources of income: 
Wage income 1251 1759 1976 1977 2073 2680 3151 3948 
Net business income 4 9 32 49 113 45 -11 131 
Net farm income - surveys 1212 2427 1941 2820 1005 2523 2429 2892 
Net farm income - 1RS 1751 1552 1397 2054 1479 1303 952 2517 
Unearned incomg 
Unusual income 
118 -282 -194 -145 84 -257 -317 -269 
0 8 603 232 0 0 3 0 
Total income 2584 3921 4357 4933 3275 4991 5254 6702 
NIT payments - actual N.A. 1867 1578 1725 N.A. 0 0 
NIT payments - predicted N.A. 919 967 767 N.A. 0 0 0 
% with wage income 0.69 0.85 0.81 0.73 0.81 0.91 0.83 0.83 
Farm summary: 
Tobacco acres 4.42 4.85 4.37 4.71 5.14 6.38 5.60 5 
Total crop sales N.A. 5292 5349 6555 N.A. 7109 7274 8280 
Total livestock sales N.A. 1298 1369 1328 N.A. 1549 1313 1598 
Fertilizer, seed. 
insecticide N.A. 659 577 483 N.A. 625 624 349 
Fuel, repair, machine 
hire N.A. 1009 1093 1160 N.A. 1311 1179 1258 
Feed, vet., breeding 
fees N.A. 625 624 349 N.A. 659 577 483 
Hired labor N.A. 1185 1061 1154 N.A. 1694 1450 1706 
^Includes welfare income, income from assets, and retirement benefits minus childcare, alimony 
child support, and medical expenses. 
^Includes one-time, lump sum payments (e.g., large gifts, inheritances, and windfall income). 
Table A.2. Continued 
Expérimentais 
1969 1970 1971 
Assets : 
Farm land and bldg. -
value 6274 6500 7267 
Farm land and bldg.— 
debt 1449 1273 1246 
7o owning land 0.54 0.54 0 
Farm machinery and eqt. 
- value 1588 2414 2468 
Farm machinery and eqt. 
- debt 679 684 643 
Other farm assets - value 828 983 1612 
Other farm assets - debt 72 61 20 
Total farm value 8690 9897 11347 
Total farm net equity 6490 7879 9439 
Liquid assets 194 330 195 
Total other net equity 244 594 640 
New purchases - mach. 
and eqt. N.A. 367 386 
Hours : 
Head 
Scaled crop 1355 1523 1472 
Scaled livestock 129 168 173 
% with livestock 0.58 0.62 0 
Total scaled 1484 1691 1645 
Farm recall N.A. 1792 1623 
Wage 333 317 316 
Business N.A. 1 1 
Controls 
1972 1969 1970 1971 1972 
7479 7098 7296 7956 8444 
1368 2231 2200 2609 2581 
0. 60 0. ,55 0. 57 0.57 0 
2507 1992 2524 2820 3242 
513 612 927 903 1008 
1448 572 688 546 578 
1016 211 42 25 734 
11434 9662 10509 11322 12263 
8537 6608 7339 7785 7941 
889 459 316 249 294 
758 907 795 1059 1255 
821 N.A. 868 1108 1123 
1538 1457 1950 1861 1812 
175 102 129 133 123 
0. 60 0. ,55 0. 62 0.57 0 
1713 1559 2079 1994 7.934 
1629 N.A. 1816 1597 1.210 
242 464 370 461 631 
2 N.A. 3 4.8 11 
Table A.2, Continued 
Spouse 
Unpaid farm or bus. 
Wage and business 
Other members 
Wage 
Unpaid 
Age of head 
Family size 
Expérimentais Controls 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1969 1970 1971 1972 
N.A. 360 
202 293 
71 197 
N.A. 0 
48.3 49.3 
4.32 4.35 
412 389 
309 290 
194 314 
74.8 52.8 
50.3 51.3 
4.19 4.21 
N.A. 389 
417 397 
99 342 
N.A. 0 
48.4 49.4 
4.55 4.19 
417 291 
478 543 
356 405 
95 137 
50.4 51.4 
3.95 3.88 
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APPENDIX B. DESCRIPTION OF EDITING TECHNIQUES 
General Description of Coding Techniques 
Introduction 
The achievement of a high quality data base has been the single most 
important criterion governing the behavior of the coding and data proces­
sing offices. The construction of a data base where the coefficients on 
the treatment variables would be least biased by processing and coding 
techniques was a guiding principle. Because the staff lacked omniscience, 
this ideal was not perfectly achieved; and the purpose of this appendix 
is to provide an overview of the techniques and procedures used in the 
data processing office for assuring data quality. To put the rest of this 
appendix in proper focus, a list of the initial premises or tenets of the 
data manager (the author) is presented. 
First, given the quantity of data to be collected from the families 
and the unavoidably high prevalence of response errors in the data, the 
data entry procedure was not to be checked on a step by step basis. In 
other words, respondents' errors would not and could not be removed fully 
prior to coding. There seemed little benefit in devising a complex check­
ing mechanism to insure that the data base agreed perfectly with the inter­
views given the large number of interviewer and respondent errors that 
would go undetected. Rather, it was thought that the coded data should be 
placed onto the data base with a minimum of errors, and then the whole 
process from the field to a printed copy of constructed analytical 
variables constructed from the data base would be checked. There is little 
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merit in tracing down errors between interviews if there is no way of 
dealing with them effectively once they are discovered. For example, pre­
sume that in an earlier part of the year, a respondent claimed that he owns 
acres and yet in the asset evaluation section there is no mention of any 
farm land. Why spend the time detecting the inconsistency if no resolu­
tion to the problem exists? 
A second tenet of the data processor was to keep boring, tedious 
clerical work to a minimum, and wherever possible let the computer do the 
work. The physical transcription of the data is necessarily a rather 
boring process. To assign someone to copy the telephone book perfectly 
brings no lasting reward. If one decides to recheck this transcription 
process, not too many errors would be found because the checker would 
become lazy and, consequently, would not find as many errors as really 
existed. A corollary to keeping boring work to a minimum is that human 
beings make mistakes, and the greater number of clerical hours needed, the 
larger will be the number of errors. 
A third requirement was a strict insistence that no missing informa­
tion in critical data fields be recorded onto the data base. It was a 
policy throughout the data collection apparatus that all information 
related to income, assets, and family composition be declared not missing. 
If the respondent could not give an estimate of his machinery value or 
remember the number of hours he worked last week, the respondent was forced 
to make a guess or present other information that allowed a good approxima­
tion to be estimated for the desired answer. For example, if machinery 
value was unavailable, the field would obtain numbers, kind and age of the 
different pieces of machinery and an estimation would be derived in the 
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office. Schedule F's at the end of the year occasionally helped remove 
missing information. If that failed in the field, the office would fabri­
cate the answer based on past information. These fudges, which occurred 
infrequently, were recorded and are available to researchers, both with 
this project and for future use. The rationale for this procedure was 
that the researcher could not be preoccupied with missing data techniques 
on each of 300 variables. Missing value techniques work well on a large 
number of observations and few variables and not vice versa. An educated 
guess for variables like income or assets based upon related variables 
supplied by the respondent may be better than any of the statistical tech­
niques for massaging or correcting missing data, especially considering the 
wealth of information that is available. 
A fourth demand was that everyone in the organization at all levels of 
operation should have a good understanding of the goals of the research 
project and a broad picture of how these goals would be achieved. This 
was done primarily to motivate coders and programmers into a higher sense 
of work value so, hopefully, they in turn would do a better job. This 
led to a rejection of the editor concept of coding an interview where first 
an editor would read over the entire interview and make certain value judg­
ments and a coder would merely transcribe the data during a second opera­
tion. On this project transcription of the data, which is done by the 
coder, is handled by the same individual who edits the interview. Editing 
implies checking to insure that the respondent answered the questions 
according to what the question intended. For example, several times 
farmers would lump business with farm work, saying their net farm income 
was $1100, where in reality they had a net farm income of $1300 and a 
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trucking business on the side that had a net income of -$200. Those would 
be two separate enterprises and, for our research purposes, should be 
treated separately even though for accounting reasons, they were lumped 
together by the respondent. 
The respondent was urged by the interviewing staff to differentiate 
between the two businesses. Having two businesses causes difficulty in 
collecting the information, but separating the two according to type of 
expense was properly the job of the editors based on notes from the inter­
viewer, Other functions would be to question outliers, check consistency 
of information between interviews, and code open-ended questions. 
Chronological development of coding procedures 
With this viewpoint in mind, a brief chronological order of the 
coding operation will be explained. The data as it initially came from 
the field had been checked to insure that all data entries on the inter­
view were asked correctly, that the interview itself contained no missing 
information, and that the interviewers had followed the proper skip logic. 
See [24, Chapter 7] for more details. An appropriate coding instruction 
manual was defined, along with some editing rules, and the coder-editor 
(one person) was to look for inconsistencies in the data as the informa­
tion was transcribed. For example, if in the earlier example assets were 
collected in one section and acres owned were in another section of the 
same interview, the editor insured that both values were positive or both 
values were zero. 
Initially, a large amount of faith was placed in the syntaxing opera­
tion. Syntaxing implies that as the coded cards were processed onto the 
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main data base the cards were checked by computer programs and had to obey 
logical skip patterns and range checks. For example, if a respondent had 
two children, the syntax program insured that two children's data, (e.g. 
age, sex, education, etc.), would be entered onto the data base. If the 
respondent was not a wage earner, the wage earner section would get 
skipped and everything about the wage earning section should be zero or 
designated as nonapplicable. If the respondent rented the house, the 
rental arrangement section would be answered and the home owner section 
skipped. The logical pattern of the interview was followed in the coding 
operation, and a program insured that it was perfectly obeyed. If it 
wasn't, it was brought to the attention of an editor and corrected before 
placing the data onto the data base. Range checks allowed only values 
within a certain range to be placed on the data base. For example, if a 
question could be answered with only a yes or a no, the program assured 
that no other answer except a yes or a no was recorded. The fallacy with 
this approach was that very little checking was done across interviews; 
also there were a number of ranges such as number of hours worked last 
week, which could vary essentially from zero or one hour per week all the 
way to 99. Since this was a two digit field essentially no checking 
occurred. The latter case is an extreme example, but there were several 
instances where a housewife tended the laundromat next door and assured 
us on several occasions that she worked from 7 a.m. to 10 p.m. seven days 
a week. That yielded a very high number of hours worked per week at a 
very low wage rate. 
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Development of initial edit sheets 
The syntax program could not be expanded to perform these edit checks 
across interviews. Separate and independently written edit programs were 
a better approach to the problem. When editors were doing their job well 
and comparing interviews across time, many problems were appearing which 
could not be handled easily. There were many gross inconsistencies between 
interviews that were inexplicable. A policy was established that whenever 
possible a problem resolver was written and sent back to the field for 
resolution, either with the next quarterly interview or on a special call 
back basis. Over 600 of these were sent back, with most of the discrep­
ancies concerning income, assets, and family composition. Because of this 
increasing awareness of sloppy reporting, a new procedure was initiated 
whereby pre-printed forms from previous interviews would be sent to the 
field as the current year's information was gathered. For example, the 
loan sections from pre-enrollment and third quarter were pre-printed so 
that when the interviewer asked about loan sections on the seventh quarter, 
the previous year's information was close at hand. If a new loan was 
mentioned that was over one year old, this was politely brought to the 
respondent's attention and resolved. If one of the huge loans on an 
earlier year no longer appeared, the respondent was probed and asked 
specifically about the loan in question. This resulted in a large number 
of corrections to the data base. 
A serious mistake was made probably in that this was not done more 
frequently. In this setting the initial edit sheets were created with the 
wage edit sheet being done first. The wage rate of the head, hours of the 
head, and wage income of the head for each quarter were printed on top of 
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each other. The primary guideline used in editing this information was 
the wage rate between quarters. This procedure involved going back to the 
interviews a large number of times, and where there were real problems, 
there was no way of resolving them. For example, if the respondent said 
his wage rate was one dollar for one quarter, three dollars the next, and 
two dollars the next, there was no good nor effective way of resolving 
these apparent discrepancies. Furthermore, the interviewer was going back 
to the files a large number of times because relevant information had not 
been printed on the edit sheet. These trips back to the files could have 
been eliminated if it had been noted that a true job change had taken place, 
or that the respondent had been laid off, was sick, or had worked a con­
siderable amount of overtime in a particular quarter. 
Description of General Editing Techniques 
Despite the quality control measures described earlier both in the 
field and in the coding office, it became increasingly clear that there 
were large inconsistencies in the information for one family over time and 
between different data sources. It also became clear that these discrep­
ancies existed on a large number of families. Different data sources were 
the Social Security information as reported to the Baltimore, Maryland 
office and the W-2 and other Internal Revenue Service information supplied 
by the respondent. Presumably this is identical to information supplied 
to 1RS directly from the respondent's employer. Inconsistencies are de­
fined as situations in which certain pieces of evidence in the interview 
support one estimate of a respondent's earnings, while other data items 
support a different (i.e., 20 percent variation in estimate or in some 
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cases a $1000 or more difference) estimate of earnings. Confronted with 
these realities and fully conscious that the resolution of them could 
affect experimental results, the following possibilities were examined. 
The first was resolving no data discrepancies except those arising from 
processing errors and allowing statistical techniques to arrive at an 
appropriate estimate of a respondent's earnings. 
The chief arguments for this approach were that no human bias in 
making editorial decisions would be injected into the data and that a 
large number of statisticians and econometricians would favor this tech­
nique . 
The chief argument against this technique was that much information 
was lost by using statistical techniques. For example, in a family where 
the entire income came from wages, and the 1RS estimate and the Social 
Security estimates were roughly equivalent and yet survey data was $1000 
lower caused by a mysterious reporting of a one dollar lower wage rate and 
a loss of two weeks work in one out of the four quarters, the weight of 
evidence favors the estimate of income that is the higher of the two. 
Probably no other data collection process in the United States has ever 
had access to the amount, kind, and detail of data that this experiment 
enjoyed. The older techniques may not be optimal when considering this 
vast detail of information. 
Consequently, a second possibility was to select a definition of 
income which by some criteria was judged best. However, one serious 
criticism of this approach could be raised. In the analysis phase, many 
more variables besides income (e.g. hours, wage rates) would be examined. 
If the 1RS version of wage income was deemed to be correct yet the 
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quarterly estimate of hours times wage rate was not changed to coincide 
with this estimate, analysis that did not focus on income may be led 
astray. 
A third possibility was to select on the basis of some arbitrary 
rule those cases that were the most inconsistent. On these cases income, 
hours, wage rates and other detail could be changed to agree with the best 
estimate of wage income. The chief criticism of this method is what role 
the arbitrary rule has in subsequent analysis. For example, presume that 
payment reporting is unbiased with a small variation from the truth, while 
control reporting is essentially unbiased but with a wide variation. If 
the rule detected only those X percent above the truth, and 3X percent 
below the truth, the result of the editing would change control estimates 
downward relative to changes made to payment families. This would ulti­
mately cause a negative bias in treatment coefficients estimated by 
ordinary least squares (i.e., it would understate any experimental effect 
that might exist). 
When considering the merits of the above three alternatives a fourth 
possibility emerged by selecting the best features of these alternatives. 
One set of data referred to hereafter as the original data base, was made 
to coincide exactly with what the interview said, i.e., all processing 
errors would be removed. Also some obvious interviewer errors were 
removed. A second set of data, hereafter referred to as the edited data 
base, was constructed from the original data base by removing all data 
inconsistencies. Data inconsistencies were resolved in a way that re­
quired the least number of changes in the data, adjusting for the quality 
and assumed bias of the source of each data item. For example, W-2 forms 
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were rarely changed in a downward direction, however W-2 forms could be 
increased because of in-kind payments and also because respondents may 
have had wage income from employers who did not have to file W-2's. When­
ever appropriate and where respondent cooperation allowed, a contact was 
made with the respondent to allow large discrepancies to be resolved. 
Essentially this solution allowed for an evaluation of the impact of edit­
ing at some later date. Furthermore, independent researchers who might be 
skeptical of the value judgments introduced into the data by RIME staff, 
could rely upon statistical techniques and work primarily with the original 
data base. 
Given the above rationalization there existed several ways of imple­
menting editing. The method chosen involved printing information from the 
data base in a neatly labeled and logical sequence. In addition several 
obvious errors were detected by the computer and printed for correction. 
This later technique, however, was not used on a wide scale primarily 
because of the small number of families. Initially it was thought to be 
infeasible and economically inefficient to program a large number of edit 
checks given the number of families in our sample. A trained staff of 
seven to eight individuals went through roughly a ten page printed format 
for each family. Upon encountering an inconsistency or two different 
estimates of the same variable they first checked to determine whether the 
error was due to processing. These processing errors were corrected both 
on the original and the edited data base. If the error turned out to be 
a true logical inconsistency, all possible data or evidence was brought 
to bear on the inconsistent data relationship. The editors would suggest 
what corrections they thought best to make. These were then reviewed by 
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Bill Harrar or Wendell Primus, and the change okayed by these individuals 
would be placed on the edited data base. Roughly seven man years were 
involved in the editing process. 
At the time editing began, the coding staff was quite small. New 
staff were hired, rather than coders being promoted into that position. 
These newly hired individuals went through an extensive training period. 
One day was involved in acquainting them with the project, the purpose of 
the experiment, the design of the interview, and quality control proce­
dures. The second and third days were spent explaining the design and use 
of the coding instruction manual, the organization of the data base, and 
teaching how to code interviews for one family on a typical quarterly 
interview. The next several days were spent practice coding under close 
supervision, and learning about information collected in each of the 
different quarters and their individual idiosyncrasies. After these 
individuals had mastered the coding process, they were lectured on the 
source of errors in surveys. 
Computer printouts of previously coded information were presented and 
explained. From these printouts certain error checks were defined, and an 
idea given on how to detect errors on the printout. Administrative pro­
cedures were also discussed some time during the training period which 
took place over a three week period. 
In essence, the administrative procedures adopted were quite simple. 
The following items deserve some mention: 
1) Along with the editing, certain information was coded. Primarily, 
information that had been intentionally skipped in the ninth 
quarter interview, identification of which data contained the 
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best estimate of income, and certain other miscellaneous 
information was coded. 
2) The families were divided by region with Bill Harrar making all 
edited data base decisions for North Carolina and Wendell Primus 
making all decisions relating to Iowa. The families were further 
subdivided into farmers, wage earners, and one other category 
containing attritions, other adults and new filers. This allowed 
some specialization by editors and permitted the wage analysis 
to commence at an earlier date. 
3) Because many editors were not familiar with farming, several 
interviewers In Fort Dodge were selected to do the Iowa Farm 
Edit. Bill Harrar assumed the burden of the North Carolina farm 
edit with clerical assistance. 
4) The editing was done in two phases. The first two years of 
experimental data were done first, and it was at this time that 
information from quarter nine was coded. Some previous edit work 
had been done prior to this time, as alluded to in the introduc­
tion. This provided Information on how to proceed in these two 
final edits. Information from these earlier edits enabled the 
computer printout to be designed efficiently, and guided certain 
other administrative decisions. The last edit was of a slightly 
different nature. It Involved checking to insure that corrections 
In the earlier edits had been done correctly while primarily 
editing third year information. After this edit and resulting 
corrections, printout was obtained for every family to insure 
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that corrections made during the final (third year) edit phase 
were done accurately. 
5) The editing of one family was done by one editor. However, the 
farm section was edited independently of the other sections. 
While not allowing for specialization, one editor became com­
pletely familiar with a family's profile and could make appropri­
ate cross checks between the different sections. 
The rest of this appendix will present one sample family, an Iowa 
farmer. Only the computer printouts for the farm section and asset section 
will be presented. Along with these computer printouts a brief descrip­
tion of the printout, editing guidelines used by the editors, abbrevia­
tions used in the printout, and examples of how inconsistencies in the 
data and between the different sources of data were resolved are provided. 
A Specific Example: The Farm Section 
Description 
The farm section is comprised of five different sections. The first 
section prints in matrix form detailed income and expense items by quarter 
for both the first and second data bases. It also shows itemized schedule 
F's when available. 
At the end of this section is a summary listing showing total gross 
income, expenses, depreciation, interest, and net farm income by year from 
both the survey data and 1RS. Section two shows accounting equations which 
predict sales of grain from a farmer's acres, yield per acre, and an 
average imputed price. On the right hand side of the equation is the 
actual grain sold from a year's crop, inventory on hand, and the amount 
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fed to livestock. Section three is a similar section for livestock. At 
the end of each year, the farmer reported the number of each type of 
animal sold. This times an average price was compared to the actual sales 
during the year. Near the bottom of this page are the inventories on hand 
for each type of livestock at quarters one, five and nine. Section four is 
an accounting equation estimating, usually from acres and a predicted 
amount per acre, the expenses incurred throughout the year. This is then 
compared with the actual expenses. The final section entitled Farm 
Operation Edit Sheet shows rental arrangements by land parcel for each 
year. In addition, it shows in summary form the number of acres grown 
each year and the number of livestock sold by type each year. 
Editing guidelines 
1) Net farm income between 1RS and quarterly should be within ten 
percent or $300, whichever is greater adjusting for some con­
ceptual differences between the two estimates. This check was 
used primarily as a signal that something might be astray. 
Income and expense items were not necessarily changed to agree 
with the check. 
2) Total predicted sales should be within total production by ten 
percent or $500, whichever is greater. 
3) Total predicted livestock sales should be within ten percent or 
$500 of actual livestock sales, whichever is greater. 
4) Large changes in rental arrangements between years were investi­
gated. 
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5) Shifts in production of more than 20 percent in dollar terms 
between years were investigated. 
6) The edit checks that were possible on the farm were innumerable 
given the detail of our data. The main checks are described 
above. Essentially these involved resolving differences between 
1RS and survey data, checking the consistency of the data via 
accounting equations, and examining large changes in behavior 
over time. 
Example 
Presume that 1RS gross farm income is $4000 more than the quarterly 
interviews. It might be added parenthetically that amounts of this mag­
nitude were not unusual. First, an examination would be conducted to 
determine which income type caused the bulk of the discrepancy. Typically 
this might be more than one type, but assume for this example that most of 
the discrepancy was due to a difference in cattle sales. Next the editor 
insured that there were no coding mistakes in recording cattle sales. If 
no coding mistakes were found, all the evidence relating to cattle sales 
would be accumulated. 
This would involve looking at feed expenditures, the dollar value of 
cattle purchases, the number sold, an indication whether this was more, 
less or equivalent to the previous year's sales for the year in question, 
and sales during the preceding and following years. 
The estimate that would be recorded on the edited data base would be 
the one that was most consistent with the other evidence. Certain value 
judgments about the different sources of data were also presumed. For 
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example, values given to 1RS on the income side were generally judged 
to be lower bounds. Outside of clerical errors, not many reasons exist 
why a farmer would overreport income to 1RS, The number of cattle sold 
per year was judged to be fairly accurate, particularly if a farmer sold 
only one load of cattle during the year. This is contrasted with an esti­
mate of hogs sold, where typically many different sized bunches could be 
sold during a year's time. In this case the number reported at the end 
of the year was presumed to be less accurate. 
Another example of an inconsistency is the following. Presume 1RS 
corn sales are $10,000, quarterly sales are $13,000, and predicted sales 
are $20,000. In this case, coding or processing errors would be investi­
gated first. Assuming coding errors did not exist, investigation was 
made to determine whether misclassification of soybean or other grain 
sales had occurred. Also information was gathered that determined whether 
the grain could still be on hand or had been fed to livestock. This was 
determined by comparing cattle sales minus cattle purchases with feed 
costs. A record of sales after the inventory date of March 1 provides 
some information about inventory value. In many instances discrepancies 
were resolved by increasing the inventory on hand. If all of these areas, 
along with an investigation of possible crop damage, produced nothing, the 
sale values would be changed to approximately $18,000. The above situa­
tion happened infrequently. Usually a discrepancy could be resolved by 
some combination of the activities mentioned above. 
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Abbreviations 
Ql(69), 
Q1 (70): 
Ql(69): 
1RS: 
SCH_F: 
IRS_D: 
PSALES: 
INV: 
STOCK ADJ: 
SHR: 
PRFT: 
TOB: 
because quarters overlapped year boundaries, an effort 
was made to split the quarter into the appropriate 
year 
refers to the income and expenses allocated to 1969. 
Internal Revenue Service 
itemized schedule of income and expenses used by farmers 
in reporting to 1RS 
a coder check to determine whether Schedule F was coded 
properly 
predicted sales 
inventory as of March 1 for each year in question 
value of corn that was fed to livestock; unless sold, 
all hay and oats were assumed fed to livestock 
share 
profit 
tobacco 
Table B.l. Income and expense summary for household X: first data base 
Description 
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Income 
Cattle (including 
dairy), horses 0 963 0 0 1381 2344 2344 0 650 0 0 180 830 3406 
Swine (hogs) 529 0 0 1755 336 2091 1755 954 2155 1952 977 0 6038 6654 
Corn, soybean. 
other grain, 
gener. 3364 5027 159 1401 7087 13674 9409 0 536 548 2641 0 3725 3725 
Custom work 302 0 0 0 281 281 325 201 0 0 300 440 941 941 
Dividends (mainly 
patronage) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 0 32 32 
Farm commodity 
loan 0 0 0 0 2018 2018 4700 2373 0 0 230 2208 4811 6600 
Acre div. payments > 
land conser. 0 0 0 1308 0 1308 1308 0 0 1396 33 0 1429 1658 
Gas tax refunds 
(state and fed.) 129 132 108 216 18 474 504 0 213 131 39 0 383 345 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 77 0 0 77 877 
Crop, livestock 
insur. claims 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 119 0 0 0 0 119 0 
Totals less live­
stock purchased 4324 6122 267 4680 11121 22190 20345 3679 3504 4104 4220 2828 18335 24238 
First quarter total = 10446 Fifth quarter total = 11917 
Table B.l. Continued 
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Description  ^ 5 o- o- o" h 
Expense 
Labor hired. 
Soc. Sec. 
hired help 0 0 75 0 137 212 
Repairs, maint. 0 158 425 0 590 1173 
Interest 68 70 0 0 0 70 
Rent-Farm/bus. 
pasture, other 615 0 0 0 615 615 
Feed purchased 101 370 286 8 1585 2249 
Seed, plants. 
insecticides, 
etc. 0 0 208 282 0 490 
Fertilizers, lime 
misc. 404 1074 0 0 1231 2305 
Machine hire 72 440 111 148 0 699 
Supplies purch. 0 144 75 0 383 602 
Vet.-livestock 
medicine 0 9 10 112 60 191 
Gas, fuel, oil 114 932 343 98 766 2139 
Taxes (state and 
fed.) 0 0 0 0 30 30 
Insurance (farm 
not personal) 0 0 138 0 27 165 
Utilities (farm 
share only 22 56 77 81 126 340 
Freight, truck 
and pickup costs 0 0 0 0 318 318 
Tax-not state. 
fed., soc. sec. 0 0 30 0 0 30 
Car, legal, bank 
other bus, costs 0 0 60 4 294 358 
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CO 
333 0 0 311 242 52 605 605 
1876 512 188 111 436 230 1477 1477 
1101 0 318 0 4 983 1305 1308 
615 0 0 0 0 615 615 615 
2286 1065 684 2032 261 769 4811 4811 
280 0 74 0 0 532 606 606 
1892 621 0 0 0 0 621 2075 
509 0 106 6 0 284 396 665 
515 0 57 44 127 49 277 254 
401 102 43 34 110 396 675 675 
1872 613 167 9 574 652 2015 2015 
0 307 64 0 0 0 371 0 
348 0 0 186 0 0 186 136 
292 24 115 60 66 29 294 349 
404 0 65 114 179 0 358 0 
60 0 6 0 0 0 6 6 
1050 0 9 59 34 222 324 1519 
Table B.l. Continued 
Description 
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Poultry, sheep, 
swine purch. 0 0 0 
Depreciation 0 0 0 
Totals less 
livestock purch. 1328 3183 1838 
First quarter total = 4410 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 0 
0 1508 
0 
0 
50 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
50 0 
0 2512 
733 6132 11886 12733 2937 1514 2966 2029 3820 13266 15809 
Fifth quarter total = 6726 
Gross farm income less 
livestock purchased 
Farm expenses except 
interest and depreci­
ation 
Depreciation 
Interest 
Net farm income 
1970 
Quarterly 
22190 
11886 
1507 
1101 
7696 
1RS 
20811 
12849 
1507 
1101 
5354 
1971 
Quarterly 
18335 
13266 
2512 
1308 
1249 
1RS 
24267 
15808 
2512 
1308 
4639 
1RS D 
24238 
15808 
2512 
1308 
4610 
Table B.2. Income and expense summary for household X: second data base 
Description 
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Income 
Cattle (includ­
ing dairy). 
horses 0 963 0 0 1381 2344 2344 0 650 2451 0 180 3281 3406 
Swine (hogs) 529 0 0 1755 336 2091 1755 954 2155 1952 1593 0 6654 6654 
Corn, soybean. 
other grain, 
gener. 3364 5027 159 1401 5456 12043 9409 0 536 548 2641 0 3725 3725 
Custom work 302 0 0 0 325 325 325 201 0 0 300 440 941 941 
Dividends(mainly 
patronage) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 0 32 32 
Farm commodity 
loan 0 0 0 0 2018 2018 4700 2373 0 1789 230 2208 6600 6600 
Acre div. pay­
ments , land con-
ser. 0 0 0 1308 0 1308 1308 0 0 1396 262 0 1658 1658 
Gas tax refund 
(state and fed.) 129 132 108 216 48 504 504 0 213 131 39 0 383 345 
Other 0 0 0 0 129 129 0 0 0 77 0 0 77 877 
Crop, livestock 
insur. claims 0 0 0 0 138 138 0 119 0 0 0 0 119 0 
Totals less 
livestock purch. 4324 6122 267 4210 9831 20430 20345 3679 3504 8344 5065 2828 23420 24238 
First quarter total = 10446 Fifth quarter total = 11917 
Table B.2. Continued 
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w  ^ g* ® 
Description o- o* o" o- o" H 
Expense 
Labor hired. Soc. 
Sec., hired 
help 0 0 75 0 137 212 
Repairs, uiain-
tenance 0 158 425 600 590 1773 
Interest 68 70 0 0 0 70 
Rent-farm/bus., 
pasture, other 615 0 0 0 615 615 
Feed purchased 101 370 286 8 1585 2249 
Seed, plants. 
insecticides, 
etc. 0 0 208 282 0 490 
Fertilizers, lime 
mise. 404 1074 0 0 1231 2305 
Machine hire 72 440 111 148 0 699 
Supplies purch. 0 144 75 0 383 602 
Veterinary -
livestock medi­
cine 0 9 10 112 60 191 
Gas, fuel, oil 114 932 343 98 765 2139 
Taxes (state and 
fed.) 0 0 0 0 30 30 
Insurance (farm-
not personal) 0 0 138 0 27 165 
Utilities (farm 
share only) 22 56 77 81 126 340 
Freight, truck 
and pickup costs 0 0 0 0 318 318 
Tax-not state. 
fed., Soc. Sec, 0 0 30 0 0 30 
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CO 
333 0 
1876 512 
1101 0 
615 0 
2286 1065 
280 0 
1892 621 
509 0 
515 0 
401 102 
1872 613 
0 307 
348 0 
292 24 
404 0 
60 0 
0 311 
188 111 
318 0 
0 0 
684 2032 
74 0 
0 0 
106 275 
57 44 
43 34 
167 9 
64 0 
0 186 
115 60 
65 114 
6 0 
242 52 
436 230 
4 983 
0 615 
261 769 
0 532 
0 1454 
0 284 
127 49 
110 386 
574 652 
0 0 
0 0 
66 29 
179 0 
0 0 
605 605 
1477 1477 
1305 1308 
615 615 
4811 4811 
606 606 
2075 2075 
665 665 
277 254 
675 675 
2015 2015 
371 0 
186 186 
294 349 
358 0 
6 6 
Table B.2. Continued 
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Car, legal. 
bank, other 
bus. costs 0 0 60 4 294 358 1050 0 9 59 34 222 324 1519 
Poultry, sheep. 
swine purch. 0 0 0 470 0 470 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 0 
Depreciation 0 0 0 0 0 0 1508 0 0 0 0 0 0 2512 
Totals less 
livestock purch. 1328 3183 1838 1333 6182 12486 12733 2937 1514 3235 2029 5274 14989 15808 
First quarter total = 4410 Fifth quarter t». ':al = 6726 
Gross farm income less 
livestock purchased 
Farm expenses except 
interest and depreci­
ation 
Depreciation 
Interest 
Net farm income 
1970 
Quarterly 
20430 
12486 
1507 
1101 
5336 
1RS 
20811 
12849 
1507 
1101 
5354 
1971 
Quarterly 
23420 
14989 
2512 
1308 
4611 
1RS 
24267 
15808 
2512 
1308 
4639 
1RS D 
24236 
15303 
2512 
1308 
4610 
Table B.3. Income and expense summary for household X 
Description Q9(1972) QIO Qll 
Income 
Cattle (including dairy). 
horses 0 0 0 
Swine (hogs) 278 2507 1624 
Corn, soybean, other grain. 
gener. 0 1054 93 
Custom work 0 0 0 
Dividends (mainly patronage) 0 0 0 
Farm commodity loan 5134 0 0 
Acre div. payments, land 
conser. 0 0 1744 
Gas tax refund (state and 
fed.) 76 39 39 
Other 0 0 0 
Crop, livestock insur. 
claims 0 0 0 
Totals less livestock purch. 5488 3200 3200 
Expense 
Labor hired, Soc, Sec. 
hired help 18 137 125 
Repairs, maintenance 179 366 250 
Interest 86 9 51 
Rent-farm/bus., pasture 
other 0 0 0 
Feed purchased 691 560 691 
Seed, plants, insecticides, 
etc. 0 0 0 
Fertilizers, lime, misc. 1454 0 0 
Machine hire 0 0 0 
Supplies purchased 68 118 107 
1971 
Q12 Total SCH F (Total) SCH F 
3604 3604 3604 3281 3406 
1352 5761 5304 6654 6654 
2307 3454 3454 3725 3725 
462 462 462 941 941 
0 0 20 32 32 
5310 10444 10135 6600 6600 
0 1744 1744 1653 1658 
248 402 464 383 345 
0 0 0 77 877 
0 0 0 119 0 
3203 25091 25187 23420 24238 
177 457 492 605 605 
581 1376 1464 1477 1477 
967 1113 1113 1305 1308 
615 615 615 615 615 
1036 2978 2976 4811 4811 
445 445 445 606 606 
50 1504 1501 2075 2075 
301 301 301 665 665 
225 518 454 277 254 
Table B.3. Continued 
Description Q9(1972) QIO Qll Q12 Total SCH F 
1971 
(Total) SCH F 
Veterinary -
livestock medicine 0 33 45 0 78 78 675 675 
Gasoline, fuel, oil 534 172 450 1557 2713 2914 0 0 
Storage, warehousing 0 0 0 118 118 118 0 0 
Taxes (state and federal) 0 0 0 0 0 0 371 0 
Insurance (farm - not 
personal) 0 234 0 200 434 0 186 136 
Utilities (farm share only) 86 121 88 138 433 434 294 349 
Freight, truck and pickup 
costs 110 79 69 126 384 383 358 0 
Tax - not state, federal. 
Soc. Sec. 0 0 31 0 31 31 6 6 
Car, legal, bank, other 
bus. costs 119 132 257 336 844 1097 324 1519 
Poultry, swine, sheep 
purchased 0 400 300 80 780 0 50 0 
Depreciation 0 0 0 0 0 2569 0 2512 
Totals less livestock purch . 3259 1952 2113 5905 13229 13303 14989 15808 
1970 1971 1972 
Quarterly 1RS Quarterly 1RS Quarterly 1RS IRS_D 
Gross farm income less 
livestock purchased 20430 20811 23420 24267 25091 25187 25187 
Farm expenses except in­
terest and depreciation 12486 12849 14989 15808 13229 13372 13303 
Depreciation 1507 1507 2512 2512 2569 2569 2569 
Interest 1101 1101 1308 1308 1113 1113 1113 
Net farm inc ome 5336 5354 4611 4639 8180 8133 8202 
Table B.4. Iowa crop production for household X - 1970, 1971 and 1972 
Grain Acres Yield/ 
Acre 
Total 
Yield 
Price PSALES Qtrs. Inv. Stock Adj Total 
Prod. 
1970 
Corn 
Oats 
S oybeans 
Total 
1971 
Corn 
Soybeans 
Total 
1972 
Corn 
Soybeans 
Total 
77.00 
5.50 
85.19 
78.10 
90.69 
78.10 
87.45 
87.0 
45.0 
29.0 
90.0 
32.0 
92.0 
37.0 
6699.0 
247.5 
2470.5 
7029.0 
2902.1 
7185.2 
3235.6 
1.17 
0 .61  
2.55 
1.21 
2.90 
1.35 
3.29 
7837.82 
150.97 
6299.80 
14288.59 
8505.08 
8416.03 
16921.10 
9700.01 
10645.28 
20345.29 
7803 
0 
2044 
7572 
2641 
12378 
1879 
0 
0 
2850 
0 
3680 
0 
4174 
591 
0 
0 
1905 
0 
1955 
0 
8394 
0 
4894 
13288 
9477 
6321 
15798 
14333 
6053 
20386 
F^or 1970, Quarters 4, 5; For 1971 Quarters 8, 9; and 1972, Quarters 12, 13. 
Table B,5. Livestock production module for household X 
Type Number Sold/ Ave. Price 
Produced 
1970 
Cattle (feeder) 19 148.049 
Total cattle 
Hogs (feeder) 88 19.449 
Total hogs 
Total livestock 
1971 
Cattle (feeder) 20 156.149 
Total cattle 
Hogs (market) 135 39.599 
Hogs (feeder) 108 12,319 
Total hogs 
Total livestock 
1972 
Cattle (feeder) 32 194.849 
Total cattle 
Hogs (feeder) 160 22.699 
Hogs (breeding) 1 88.000 
Total hogs 
Total livestock 
Pred. Total Sales During Year 
2812 
2812 2344 
1711 
1711 2091 
4524 4435 
3122 
3122 3281 
5345 
1330 
6676 6654 
9799 9935 
6235 
6235 3604 
3631 
88 0 
3719 5761 
9955 9365 
Table B.5. Continued 
Type 
Bull 
Ram 
Ewes 
Stock cows 
Young breeding st 
Boar 
Sows 
Feeder pigs 
Feeder pigs 
Feeder pigs 
01 
Number Price/Unit 
1 300 
1 20 
11 19 
29 200 
7 160 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
05 
Number Price/Unit 
2 200 
0 
0 
31 250 
12 110 
1 100 
25 100 
56 12 
41 8 
50 30 
QÎ 
Number Price/Unit 
1 300 
0 
0 
36 300 
2 130 
1 160 
25 130 
0 
0 
0 
Table B.6. Livestock and crop expense module for household X 
Type Acres or Amt, Price Total 
Income/ 
Expenses 
1970 
Acre diversion payment 
Rental expense 
Fertilizer - corn 
Fertilizer - beans 
Total fertilizer 
Seed 
Fuel 
Repairs 
Depreciation 
Feed - feeder cattle 
Feed - feeder pigs 
Total feed 
Veterinary 
Total expenses 
1971 
Acre diversion payment 
Rental expense 
Fertilizer - corn 
Fertilizer - beans 
Total fertilizer 
Seed 
Fuel 
Repairs 
Deprec iat i on 
Feed - feeder cattle 
Feed - market hogs 
Feed - feeder pigs 
Total feed 
19 
40 
77 
85 
167 
304 
15000 
15000 
19 
88 
4435 
18 
40 
71 
82 
153 
306 
17625 
17625 
20 
135 
108 
67.000 
15.000 
18.169 
8.619 
10.000 
5.500 
0.081 
0.149 
122.029 
11.000 
0.029 
67.000 
15.000 
18.169 
8.619 
10.000 
5.500 
0.081 
0.149 
124.029 
29.639 
11.000 
1325 
600 
1399 
734 
2133 
1676 
1676 
1229 
2249 
2318 
968 
3286 
133 
12986 
1206 
600 
1290 
710 
2000 
1533 
1687 
1445 
2643 
2480 
4001 
1188 
7669 
1308 
615 
2305 
490 
2139 
1773 
1507 
2249 
191 
11269 
1658 
615 
2075 
606 
2015 
1477 
2512 
4811 
Table B.6. Continued 
Type Acres or Amt. Price Total 
Income/ 
Expenses 
Veterinary 
Total expenses 
1972 
Acre diversion payment 
Rental expense 
Fertilizer - corn 
Fertilizer - beans 
Total fertilizer 
Seed 
Fuel 
Repairs 
Depreciation 
Feed - feeder cattle 
Feed - feeder pigs 
Total feed 
Veterinary 
Total expenses 
9935 
20 
40 
71 
79 
150 
301 
17950 
17950 
32 
160 
9365 
0.029 
67.000 
15.000 
18.169 
8.619 
10.000 
5.500 
0.081 
0.149 
129.739 
11.000 
0.029 
298 
17879 
1373 
600 
1290 
685 
1975 
1505 
1655 
1471 
2692 
4151 
1760 
5911 
280 
16092 
675 
14786 
1744 
615 
1504 
445 
2713 
1376 
2569 
2978 
78 
12278 
Table B.7. Farm operation edit sheet family X 
Rental Land Agreements 
Parcel Num. Term # of Acres Type # of Acres Amount 
1970 
1 
2 
Rented in 160.00 Fixed cash amt. - no tob. 40.00 
Share of crop or profit 120.00 
Rented in 240.00 Share of crop or profit 240.00 
15 $ per acre 
50 7o of crop/prft 
50 7o of crop/prft 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
Rented in 
Rented in 
Rented in 
Rented in 
Rented in 
Rented in 
240.00 Share of crop or profit 200.00 
Fixed cash amt.-no tob. 40.00 
160.00 Share of crop or profit 160.00 
240.00 Fixed cash amt.-no tob, 40.00 
Share of crop or profit 200,00 
160,00 Share of crop or profit 160.00 
160.00 Share of crop or profit 160.00 
240.00 Share of crop or profit 240.00 
50 7o of crop/prft 
15 $ per acre 
50 7o of crop/prft 
15 $ per acre 
50-% of crop/prft 
50 % of crop/prft 
50 °L of crop/prft 
50 7o of crop/prft 
Description of Crops 
Crop 73 Acr M/L 72 Acr 71 Acr 70 Acr 69 Acr Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Deg. of 
Yld/73 Yld/72 Yld/71 Yld/70 Satis.-72 
Com 142.00 same 142.00 142.00 140.00 140.00 92.0 bu 90.0 bu 87.0 bu Satisfied 
Soybeans 190.00 more 159.00 164.89 154.89 134.89 37.0 bu 32.0 bu 29.0 bu Satisfied 
8.00 less 
Bldgs, etc. 60.00 18.00 21.09 
Pasture 40.00 
Oats 10.00 30.00 45.0 bu 
Feedgrn Pr 41.00 36.00 36.00 36.00 
Table B.7. Continued 
# Sold/73 
Kind __________ 
Feeder pigs 720 
Feeder calves 22 
# litters farrowed 70 
Breeding hogs 
Market hogs (fattened) 
Sheep (lambs) 
Wool 
Livestock Production 
M/L # Sold/72 # Sold/71 # Sold/70 # Sold/69 Degree of 
Sat isf act ion/72 
More 160 108 88 Satisfied 
Same 32 20 19 20 Satisfied 
Err 
1 
135 
Satisfied 
5 
45 
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A Specific Example: The Asset Section 
Description 
Fairly self-explanatory. The top section shows value and debt for 
major classifications of assets at each of the different time periods 
asked. The middle section shows changes to these classifications such 
as new acquisitions, property traded or sold, and depreciation. The 
last section shows a detailed debt picture by purpose and loaning 
institution. It should be noted that the debts under purpose are 
exactly equivalent to the ones under loaning institution. 
Editing guidelines 
1) Net equity should be within ten percent or $1000, whichever 
is greater, of the previous time period's net equity unless 
mitigating circumstances prevailed, e.g., inheritances, 
extremely large or negative incomes, etc. 
2) Home asset information was checked for consistency with 
the housing section. 
3) Land ownership was checked for consistency with the last 
part of the farm section, in particular, the Farm Edit 
Operations section. 
4) Within each broad category of assets, and dependent 
upon the asset classification, all large changes were 
checked. 
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Example 
Presume the following for net equities at each of the different time 
periods : 
Pre-enrollment $12,500 
1st Quarterly 20,000 
5th Quarterly 23,000 
9th Quarterly 15,000 
13th Quarterly 30,000 
In a situation like this, an initial tendency would be to increase net 
equity for the ninth quarterly and pre-enrollment interviews and perhaps 
lower net equity at the thirteenth quarterly interview. During thirteenth 
quarter however, especially in livestock inventories, there was a tremen­
dous increase in prices, which would account for inventories increasing. 
All relevant information to the ninth quarter would be gathered. Assume 
that the following facts become known: depreciation increases tremen­
dously between fifth and ninth, yet there are no machine acquisitions nor 
increases in machine inventory shown; presume further that machine hire 
expense has decreased and that liquid assets present in fifth quarter no 
longer exist; also that there is a machine debt in eleventh quarter that 
is inconsistent with information at either the ninth or thirteenth quar­
terly interview. In this case, machine inventory would be increased by 
a multiple of the increase in depreciation. If the discrepancy were not 
in machinery inventories the following would be investigated: unsealed 
grain inventories would be checked for consistency with the crop produc­
tion section described earlier; the pre-enrollment values would be 
Table B.8. Asset information for household X 
Pre-enrollment First Fifth Ninth Thirteenth 
Value Debt Value Debt Value Debt Value Debt Value Debt 
Land & buildings 2500 2500 
Machinery 14000 15000 2500 17625 5300 17950 2000 15381 2000 
Livestock & farm inv. 10000 10000 7438 2500 14570 5400 14770 11020 17010 11701 
Business inventory 468 87 30 
Liquid 9600 9425 9300 12100 16300 
Unsealed grain 1500 2850 50 2850 50 3680 4174 1139 
Totals 35100 10000 34713 5050 44813 10750 48587 13020 55395 17340 
Net equity 25100 29663 34063 35567 38055 
Assets information was checked and agrees with 5th quarter totals 
Depreciation Investment De - Investment 
Depreciation New Acquisition Traded or Sold Inherited Total 
Quarter 9 to Quarter 13 
Farm machinery & equipment 2569 -2569 
Farm livestock & inventory 725 - 725 
Farm land and buildings 2500 2500 
Quarter 5 to Quarter 9 
Farm machinery & equipment 2512 3271 434 325 
Farm livestock & inventory 900 - 900 
Quarter 1 to Quarter 5 
Farm livestock & inventory 470 - 470 
Farm machinery & equipment 1507 4210 2703 
Table B.8. Continued 
Loan and Debt Information 
Pre-enrollment Third Quarter Seventh Quarter Eleventh Quarter 
Purpose 
Farm machinery or equipment 
General farm operating expense 
Car (private) & repair 
Medical expenses 
Loaning Institution 
Commercial private bank 
Loan or finance company 
Stores or business firms 
6000 
2480 
500 
45 
6545 
0 
2480 
0 
14040 
0 
0 
14040 
0 
0 
0 
14000 
0 
0 
14000 
0 
0 
0 
16680 
0 
0 
3240 
13440 
0 
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checked to see which classifications were different from first quarter. 
If the differences were in items such as unsealed grain or livestock, no 
changes would be made since the pre-enrollment interview was administered 
at a different time of the year compared to quarters one, five, nine, and 
thirteen. The pre-enrollment interview was obtained prior to crop har­
vesting time. If the differences were in land values, the value of land 
would be increased so that it approximately corresponded to the value 
reported at the other quarters. 
Conclusion 
This has been a rather lengthy appendix. Undoubtedly despite these 
efforts there still exists in the data a large number of processing and 
respondent errors. Hopefully the impact of misreporting and processing 
errors in conclusions has been substantially reduced by the procedures 
outlined here. 
On the positive side, the editing process, in the opinion of the 
author, allows for more confidence that the results are valid. All value 
judgments and imputations of RIME researchers have been opened to 
scrutiny. This permits the investigation of editing bias. At a minimum, 
it may provide some information about the mean and variance of response 
errors. Combining this information with several statistical assumptions, 
one could determine the range of plausible coefficient estimates due to 
response errors. Furthermore, the approach taken here may be the only 
method for obtaining this critical information about the possible variance 
of response errors. In this modern day of computer technology, there is 
195 
no reason not to adopt, in certain instances, clerically assigned or 
computer algorithmically generated multiple data values for the same 
variable. 
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APPENDIX G. PRESENTATION OF THE FULL REGRESSION 
MODELS REPORTED IN CHAPTER FOUR 
Table C.l. Iowa coefficient estimates for a selected model for selected dependent variables* 
Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Net 
Farm 
Income 
Gross 
Farm 
Income 
Total 
Recall 
Hours 
Head 
Recall 
Hours 
Adjusted 
Scaled 
Hours 
Total 
Scaled 
Hours 
Scaled 
Crop 
Hours 
Scaled 
Livestock 
Hours 
HR69^  1.781 
(37.0) 
15.70 
(0.1) 
1.258 
(1.4) 
1.295 
(0.4) 
.9373 
(0.1) 
1.208 
(0.0) 
1.324 
(0.0) 
.9421 
(0.0) 
HR69^  -.003 
(42.0) 
-.0021 
(2.5) 
-.0002 
(10.0) 
-.0002 
(4.3) 
, - .00003 
(60.1) 
-.00007 
(13.0) 
-.0002 
(23.6) 
-.00004 
(56.1) 
AGE -28.50 
(69.0) 
-410.6 
(1.3) 
39.02 
(3.5) 
19.95 
(21.5) 
2.202 
(82.3) 
-3.445 
(66.9) 
-6.993 
(8 .6 )  
5.403 
(51.7) 
EDUC -245.0 
(15.8) 
-58.29 
(88.4) 
30.21 
(49.8) 
12.07 
(75.6) 
-59.69 
(1.3) 
-36.12 
(6.5) 
5.048 
(60.9) 
-26.56 
(17.1) 
DR -15.76 
(47.6) 
162.4 
(0.2) 
10.90 
(5.6) 
9.109 
(6.7) 
1,135 
(71.0) 
4.731 
(5.8) 
3.521 
(1.1) 
1.782 
(47.7) 
FE .0216 
(30.2) 
.2075 
(0.0) 
.0095 
(7.8) 
.0049 
(29.3) 
-.0019 
(50.9) 
-.0015 
(53.7) 
.00009 
(94.1) 
-.0019 
(43.0) 
ÛHDWBH -.7538 
(47.4) 
-1.206 
(58.7) 
-.3885 
(9.8) 
-.3243 
(10.0) 
-.3896 
(0.3) 
-.3356 
(0.3) 
-.1063 
(6.8) 
-.2786 
(1.3) 
AGE55 -10.94 
(67.5) 
86.66 
(15.1) 
-9.660 
(15.1) 
-4.428 
(45.0) 
-3.482 
(33.4) 
.2658 
(92.8) 
2.259 
(12.7) 
-2.523 
(38.9) 
V^ariable definitions are included in the text. Number in () is the significance level 
expressed as a percent. 
F^or scaled crop and livestock hours, HR69 is the 1969 value of the dependent variable. 
Table C.l. Continued 
Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Net 
Farm 
Income 
Gross 
Farm 
Income 
Total 
Recall 
Hours 
Head 
Recall 
Hours 
Adjusted 
Scaled 
Hours 
Total 
Scaled 
Hours 
Scaled 
Crop 
Hours 
Scaled 
Livestock 
Hours 
D71 461.8 
(49.0) 
1558. 
(12.3) 
-195.7 
(4.0) 
-296.5 
(0.0) 
4.011 
(94.5) 
15.56 
(79.0) 
12.69 
(63.6) 
3.433 
(94.9) 
D72 3612. 
(0.0) 
7067. 
(0.0) 
64.66 
(49.4) 
-138.3 
(6.5) 
-142.4 
(1.6) 
-122.1 
(3.7) 
-25.13 
(35.0) 
-96.20 
(7.2) 
HR69*C/E 2.684 
(30.3) 
-7.651 
(20.3) 
-.4454 
(50.5) 
-.5304 
(36.3) 
-.0584 
(87.1) 
-.3113 
(28.9) 
-.1069 
(77.1) 
-.2418 
(33.8) 
HR69^ *C/E -.0005 
(37.3) 
.0012 
(32.0) 
.00008 
(54.5) 
.00009 
(45.7) 
-.00001 
(85.6) 
.00004 
(50.8) 
.00002 
(89.6) 
.00008 
(34.9) 
D70*C/E 2078. 
(69.5) 
10819. 
(37.5) 
3912. 
(0.4) 
3141. 
(0.8) 
410.8 
(57.3) 
705.4 
(23.8) 
141.6 
(66.1) 
509.0 
(30.1) 
D71*C/E 2359. 
(65.7) 
10716. 
(38.0) 
3860. 
(0.5) 
3163. 
(0.8) 
318.6 
(66.2) 
631.1 
(29.1) 
129.9 
(68.8) 
444.4 
(36.6) 
D72*C/E 707.8 
(89.4) 
8616. 
(48.0) 
3621. 
(0.8) 
3008. 
(1.2) 
417.2 
(56.7) 
711.8 
(23.4) 
108.8 
(73.7) 
544.0 
(26.8) 
AGE55*C/E -4.148 
(90.8) 
-132.5 
(11.1) 
18.62 
(4.5) 
12.28 
(12.9) 
-1.567 
(75.2) 
-5.008 
(11.7) 
-3.899 
(5.9) 
.8440 
(83.4) 
PN 1662. 
(0.0) 
2314. 
(0.0) 
47.24 
(32.1) 
28.02 
(45.9) 
44.24 
(12.9) 
39.66 
(16.0) 
3.296 
(80.2) 
40.11 
(12.5) 
DR*C/E -6.048 
(82.9) 
-106.3 
(10.1) 
-4.790 
(50.7) 
-2.605 
(67.9) 
-2.585 
(50.4) 
-6.767 
(3.3) 
-4.765 
(0.4) 
•2.903 
(35.6) 
Table C.l. Continued 
Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Net 
Farm 
Income 
Gross 
Farm 
Income 
Total 
Recall 
Hours 
Head 
Recall 
Hours 
Adjusted 
Scaled 
Hours 
Total 
Scaled 
Hours 
Scaled 
Crop 
Hours 
Scaled 
Livestock 
Hours 
AGE*C/E -130.4 
(15.3) 
35.82 
(86.5) 
-72.36 
(0.2) 
-54.81 
(0.8) 
-7.629 
(54.4) 
-3.720 
(71.7) 
3.018 
(56.0) 
-11.01 
(29.1) 
CONSTANT 5655. 
(25.1) 
6867. 
(54.4) 
-1543. 
(22.2) 
-485.6 
(65.9) 
777.8 
(25.1) 
437.9 
(42.9) 
40.47 
(89.9) 
213.5 
(67.6) 
.28 .51 .22 .26 .58 .70 .68 .62 
OVERALL F 6.0 16.0 4.5 5.4 21.3 36.5 32.7 24.7 
Table C.2. Iowa coefficient estimates for a selected model wj.th treatment parameters for selected 
dependent variables 
Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Net 
Farm 
Income 
Gross 
Farm 
Income 
Total 
Recall 
Hours 
Head 
Recall 
Hours 
Adjusted 
Scaled 
Hours 
Total 
Scaled 
Hours 
Scaled 
Crop 
Hours 
Scaled 
Livestock 
Hours 
HR69^ .9205 
(63.7) 
13.75 
(0.2) 
1.044 
(3.9) 
1.088 
(1.3) 
.8662 
(0.1) 
1.093 
(0.0) 
.9956 
(0.2) 
.9003 
(0.0) 
HR69^ -.0002 
(65.3) 
-.0018 
(3.9) 
-.0001 
(23.7) 
-.0001 
(11.9) 
-.00002 
(72.8) 
-.00005 
(23.7) 
-.00003 
(79.4) 
-.00003 
(67.0) 
AGE -80.41 
(10.5) 
-397.3 
(0.0) 
-4.932 
(70.1) 
-12.89 
(24.7) 
-1.338 
(83.9) 
-7.472 
(17.7) 
-7.679 
(0.8) 
-1.139 
(83.6) 
EDUC -259.1 
(15.2) 
-222.8 
(58.2) 
24.86 
(59.7) 
11.43 
(77.8) 
-65.05 
(0.7) 
-44.58 
(2.8) 
-1.076 
(91.9) 
-34.08 
(8.1) 
DR -18.94 
(18.2) 
94.68 
(0.3) 
5.471 
(13.9) 
5.333 
(9.5) 
-.3872 
(83.7) 
.7794 
(62.3) 
.5139 
(54.3) 
.1156 
(94.1) 
FE .0207 
(33.2) 
.2267 
(0.0) 
.0073 
(18.5) 
.0032 
(50.2) 
-.0017 
(55.5)1 
-.0010 
(68.8) 
.00007 
(95.4) 
-.0018 
(45.0) 
ÛHDWBH -.6381 
(56.2) 
-1.040 
(64.5) , 
-.3723 
(12.5) 
-.3148 
(11.9) 
-.3529 
(0.8) 
-.3022 
(1.0) 
-.1004 
(9.4) 
-.2466 
(2.8) 
D71 460.5 
(51.8) 
1556. 
(13.4) 
-195.9 
(3.9) 
-296.6 
(0.0) 
3.594 
(95.1) 
15.18 
(79.6) 
12.63 
(63.6) 
3.068 
(95.4) 
^Variable definitions are included in the text. Number in () is the significance level 
expressed as a percent. 
^For scaled crop and livestock hours, HR69 is the 1969 value of the dependent variable. 
Table C.2. Continued 
Dependent V 
Net Gross Total Head 
Independent Farm Farm Recall Recall 
Variables Income Income Hours Hours 
D72 3610. 
(0.0) 
7064. 
(0.0) 
64.41 
(4.9.7) 
-138.4 
(6.5) 
AGE 55 -13.61 
(46.3) 
12.80 
(75.8) 
1.362 
(77.7) 
2.961 
(47.7) 
HR69*C/E 3.885 
(12.2) 
-6.193 
(27.1) 
-.1708 
(79.3) 
-.2460 
(66.2) 
HR69^«C/E -.0007 
(19.5) 
.0012 
(29.2) 
.00002 
(88.6) 
.00003 
(80.2) 
C/E -4004. 
(17.5) 
6712. 
(30.3) 
418.9 
(57.7) 
375.5 
(56.3) 
D71*C/E 281.3 
(78.4) 
-101.7 
(94.6) 
-51.71 
(70.6) 
22.34 
(83.6) 
D72*C/E -627.7 
(54.2) 
-1169. 
(43.6) 
-269.5 
(5.0) 
-119.5 
(26.9) 
G50 -1219. 
(34.0) 
-126.5 
(96.5) 
336.3 
(31.1) 
301.7 
(29.3) 
GlOO -1043. 
(41.4) 
-6183. 
(3.1) 
118.1 
(72.2) 
115.2 
(68.9) 
T30 -951.9 
(40.9) 
-1100. 
(67.0) 
-109.7 
(71.4) 
-97.98 
(70.5) 
Adjusted Total Scaled Scaled 
Scaled Scaled Crop Livestock 
Hours Hours Hours Hours 
143. C 
( 1 . 6 )  
-4.662 
(5.9) 
.0827 
(80.4) 
-.00004 
(58.7) 
-85.96 
(82.4) 
-90.88 
(28.7) 
27.73 
(74.5) 
268.8 
(11.4) 
153.0 
(36.7) 
-58.96 
(70.0) 
-122.6 
(3.8) 
-2.298 
(26.7) 
-.1998 
(47.6) 
.00002 
(66 .2 )  
232.7 
(47.5) 
-73.09 
(38.9) 
25.57 
(76.3) 
-177.7 
(21.3) 
-213.2 
(13.6) 
-72.24 
(57.5) 
-25.22 
(34.5) 
.4738 
(66.3) 
.1918 
(59.8) 
- .0001  
(51.2) 
-41.85 
(85.1) 
-11.40 
(76.7) 
-31.01 
(42.2) 
19.56 
(79.6) 
-101.3 
(17.6) 
-61.84 
(36.5) 
-96.69 
(7.2) 
-2.230 
(26.7) 
-.1755 
(46.8) 
.00006 
(45.2) 
-8.063 
(96.0) 
-63.46 
(41.3) 
54.39 
(48.3) 
-200.5 
(15.0) 
-167.2 
(24.3) 
-11.72 
(92.6) 
Table C.2. Continued 
Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Net 
Farm 
Income 
Gross 
Farm 
Income 
Total 
Recall 
Hours 
Head 
Recall 
Hours 
Adjusted 
Scaled 
Hours 
Total 
Scaled 
Hours 
Scaled 
Crop 
Hours 
Scaled 
Livestock 
Hours 
T70 382.4 
(80.4) 
8400. 
(1.6) 
3.957 
(99.2) 
66.80 
(84.7) 
71.96 
(72.6) 
2.938 
(98.6) 
-71.37 
(43.1) 
53.89 
(75.0) 
CONSTANT 9415. 
(1.9) 
13426. 
(13.4) 
803.2 
(43.8) 
1298. 
(14.7) 
1148. 
(3.1) 
1010. 
(2.4) 
441.6 
(9.5) 
661.5 
(9.6) 
.20 .50 .20 .24 .59 .70 .66 .62 
OVERALL F 4.0 15.3 3.8 4.9 21.8 35.3 29.7 25.1 
Table C.3. North Carolina coefficient estimates for a selected model for selected dependent 
variables 
Dependent Variables 
Net Gross Total Head Adjusted Total Scaled 
Independent Farm Farm Recall Recall Scaled Scaled Crop 
Variables Income Income Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours 
HR69^ 1.929 2.681 .8330 .7880 .4595 .7596 1.047 
(2.3) (19.3) (5.1) (2.6) (6.6) (2.8) (0.1) 
HR69^ -.0003 .0003 -.0001 -.0001 -.00001 .00002 -.00005 
(11.2) (59.4) (17.9) (15.8) (81.6) (85.6) (53.3) 
AGE -8.307 36.68 -1.431 -5.938 -8.049 -15.43 -15.61 
(85.4) (73.8) (95.0) (75.2) (54.6) (40.2) (37.9) 
EDUC 97.38 441.0 -9.454 -24.53 15.89 43.10 39.36 
(14.3) (0.7) (77.7) (37.3) (41.6) (11.1) (12.8) 
DR 3.259 -8.501 6.549 4.777 2.748 5.994 7.137 
(76.7) (75.0) (23.5) (29.4) (39.6) (18.0) (8.9) 
FE -.0080 .1189 .0349 .0281 .0022 -.0021 -.0130 
(74.8) (5.0) (0.6) (0.7) (76.0) (83.5) (18.7) 
ÙHDWBH -.8011 -1.851 -.3023 -.3819 -.2141 -.3510 -.3400 
(0.2) (0.6) (0.9) (0.0) (0.6) (0.1) (0.1) 
AGE 55 12.46 9.038 .8215 2.199 .1550 1,383 1.845 
(34.8) (77.9) (90.2) (68.9) (96.8) (79.7) (72.0) 
^Variable definitions are included in the text. Number in the () is the significance level 
expressed as a percent. 
^For scaled crop, HR69 is the 1969 value of the dependent variable. 
Table C.3. Continued 
Dependent Variables 
Net Gross Total Head Adjusted Total Scaled 
Independent Farm Farm Recall Recall Scaled Scaled Crop 
Variables Income Income Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours 
D71 -53.22 335.8 -88 « 86 -181.5 18.65 -60.83 -65.65 
(85.5) (67.8) (47.2) (6.0) (83.6) (59.3) (55.5) 
D72 584.7 1805.0 -503.0 -503.2 -59.44 -50.54 -47.36 
(5.0) (3.0) (0.0) (0.0) (52.0) (66.5) (67.8) 
RACE -594.3 -5392.0 -234.9 -121.2 -326.6 -344.9 -325.2 
(29.5) (0.2) (41.0) (60.7) (5.1) (13.5) (13.3) 
HR69*C/E -.5348 1.022 -.2021 -.4708 .4090 .7112 .1906 
(63.9) (71.2) (72.3) (31.9) (22.3) (12.5) (63.6) 
HR69^*C/E .0002 -.0006 .0001 .0001 .00008 .0002 -.00008 
(56.2) (34.0) (56.4) (32.5) (31.2) (8.8) (41.2) 
D70*C/E -342.1 2467.0 913.1 1272.0 -688.1 1377.0 -834.4 
(91.2) (74.2) (55.6) (32.1) (44.9) (27.3) (47.4) 
D71*C/E -525.8 2233.0 930.2 1269.0 -660.5 1306.0 -763.2 
(86.5) (76.6) (54.8) (32.2) (46.7) (29.8) (51.2) 
D72*C/E -496.6 1992.0 1295.0 1577.0 -597.2 1309.0 -775.2 
(87.2)1 (79.1) (40.3) (21.9) (51.1) (29.7) (50.6) 
AGE55*C/E -17.85 -18.04 3.214 1.287 -6.263 -5.575 -4.982 
(32.5) (68.2) (72.4) (86.4) (24.1) (44.9) (47.8) 
PN 709.1 853.4 -28.05 -43.70 116.6 161.9 162.1 
(0.0) (5.0) (69.4) (43.7) (2.0) (1.2) (1.0) 
Table C.3. Continued 
Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Net 
Farm 
Income 
Gross 
Farm 
Income 
Total 
Recall 
Hours 
Head 
Recall 
Hours 
Adjusted 
Scaled 
Hours 
Total 
Scaled 
Hours 
Scaled 
Crop 
Hours 
DR*C/E -7.400 
(59.3) 
9.084 
(78.7) 
-9.496 
(17.2) 
-8.221 
(15.2) 
-5.000 
(22.0) 
-7.384 
(19.0) 
-9.780 
(6.5) 
AGE*C/E 14.47 
(80.4) 
-83.67 
(55.4) 
-12.15 
(67.8) 
-10.43 
(66.6) 
6.589 
(70.0) 
13.52 
(56.7) 
11.99 
(59.6) 
RACE*C/E -349.1 
(63.0 
1353.0 
(44.2) 
-99.59 
(78.4) 
-270.5 
(36.8) 
115.1 
(58.9) 
203.7 
(48.9) 
175.2 
(52.2) 
CONSTANT 294.6 
(91.0) 
-111.9 
(98.6) 
1160.0 
(37.5) 
1140.0 
(29.2) 
954.9 
(21.3) 
1311.0 
(21.6) 
1099.0 
(27.6) 
R2 
.25 .38 .23 .30 .40 .49 .52 
OVERALL F 4.1 7.6 3.7 5.3 8.3 12.1 13.5 
Table C.4. North Carolina coefficient estimates for a selected model with treatment parameters for 
selected dependent variables 
Dependent Variables 
Net Gross Total Head Adjusted Total Scaled 
Independent Farm Farm Recall Recall Scaled Scaled Crop 
Variables Income. Income Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours 
HR69^ 1.704 2.741 .6333 .5712 .4078 .6954 .9841 
(3.1) (14.7) (10.7) (8.1) (5.6) (2.1) (0.0) 
HR69^ -.0003 .0002 -.00007 -.00006 .000006 .00005 -.000003 
(11.9) (66.5) (44.2) (45.2) (90.1) (45.6) (96.0) 
AGE -4.042 -33.03 -9.357 -14.79 -6.107 -8.898 -8.793 
(89.3) (64.5) (53.1) (23.6) (45.2) (43.6) (42.8) 
EDUC 108.7 390.3 -13.45 -32.47 14.14 40.86 35.59 
(10.3) (1.5) (68.5) (24.1) (43.3) (10.8) (15.1) 
DR .2472 -.3550 .5040 -.1357 .0046 .9597 .7476 
(96.96) (98.2) (87.6) (96.0) (99.8) (69.9) (75.4) 
FE -.0112 .1298 .0359 .0298 .0029 -.0009 -.0114 
(65.2) (2.9) (0.4) (0.4) (66.4) (92.4) (22.8) 
ÛHDWBH -.7876 -2.031 -.3177 -.4039 -.2152 -.3424 -.3187 
(0.3) (0.2) (0.5) (0.0) (0.4) (0.1) (0.1) 
AGE55 6.514 5.355 4.197 4.749 -1.748 .0299 .5589 
(47.2) (80.5) (35.3) (20.8) (47.6) (99.3) (86.8) 
^Variable definitions are included in the text. Number in () is the significance level expressed 
as a percent. 
^For Scaled Crop, HR69 is the 1969 value of the dependent variable. 
Table C.4. Continued 
Net Gross 
Independent Farm Farm 
Variables Income Income 
D71 -20.71 393.2 
(94.5) (62.7) 
D72 581.1 1853.0 
(6.1) (2.5) 
RACE -899.4 -4012.0 
(1.9) (0.0) 
HR69*C/E -.6440 .0141 
(54.9) (99.6) 
HR69^*C/E .0002 -.0004 
(40.5) (54.9) 
C/E 791.4 2204.0 
(43.2) (36.6) 
D71*C/E -466.1 -591.7 
(25.1) (58.6) 
D72*C/E -246.7 -652.9 
(55.2) (55.5) 
G50 -1303.0 -3623.0 
(3.9) (1.7) 
GlOO 342.8 -1190.0 
(58.5) (43.0) 
Dependent Variables 
Total 
Recall 
Hours 
Head 
Recall 
Hours 
Adjusted 
Scaled 
Hours 
Total 
Scaled 
Hours 
Scaled 
Crop 
Hours 
-88.77 
(46.9) 
-181.6 
(5.8) 
24.31 
(79.0) 
-53.92 
(64.1) 
-59.87 
(59.7) 
498.9 
(0.0) 
•497.2 
(0.0)  
-59.13 
(52.6) 
-52.86 
(65,5) 
-52.98 
(64.7) 
370.5 
(5.0) 
-325.8 
(3.9) 
•321.9 
(0.2) 
-311.9 
(3.1) 
-274.2 
(4.5) 
-.2237 
(67.6) 
.00005 
(68.5) 
455.4 
(36.0) 
26.90 
(87.0) 
380.9 
(2.5) 
532.1 
(9.1) 
-.3357 
(45.2) 
.00006 
(57.3) 
657.2 
(11.3) 
12.51 
(92.2) 
303.9 
(2.1) 
-462.3 
(7.8) 
.2794 
(33.8) 
-.00007 
(34.1) 
-59.64 
(82.8) 
-19.20 
(87.6) 
74.59 
(55.1) 
-553.4 
(0 .1)  
.5085 
(21.5) 
-.0002 
(7.5) 
-142.2 
(71.2) 
7.192 
(96.3) 
49.11 
(75.7) 
-798.5 
(0 .1)  
.1505 
(68.7) 
-.0001 
(22.3) 
159.1 
(64.1) 
8.283 
(95.6) 
44.20 
(77.6) 
-744.2 
(0.2) 
.6983 -276.5 104.1 31.33 
(99.8) (29.0) (54.1) (89.6) 
-78.39 
(73.4) 
Table C.4, Continued 
Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Net 
Farm 
Income 
Gross 
Farm 
Income 
Total 
Recall 
Hours 
Head 
Recall 
Hours 
Adjusted 
Scaled 
Hours 
Total 
Scaled 
Hours 
Scaled 
Crop 
Hours 
T30 -1215,0 
(6.8) 
-4441.0 
(0.6) 
-749.9 
(2.4) 
-709.1 
(1.0) 
-601.6 
(0.1) 
-760.0 
(0.3) 
-741.2 
(0.3) 
T70 -396.6 
(60.9) 
-2298.0 
(21.8) 
-227.2 
(55.8) 
-221.8 
(49.2) 
-438.8 
(3.8) 
-448.1 
(13.1) 
-401.7 
(16.6) 
CONSTANT 608.9 
(74.9) 
3587.0 
(43.2) 
1800.0 
(5.8) 
1919.0 
(1.6) 
989.3 
(5.6) 
1102.0 
(13.0) 
887.2 
(20.1) 
.22 .40 .25 .31 .46 .54 .55 
OVERALL F 3.6 8.6 4.2 5.8 11.0 15.1 16.0 
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APPENDIX D. PRESENTATION OF THE FULL REGRESSION 
MODELS REPORTED IN CHAPTER FIVE 
Table D.l. North Carolina regression equations explaining the changes between the original and 
edited data bases 
Dependent Variables 
DIFF ABB DIFF ABS 
Independent Total Total Scaled Scaled 
Variables Family Income Family Income Crop Hours Crop Hours 
Constant 405.2 664.9 95.05 -157.2 
1 Age .9541 -3.843 .6788 2.273 
(.1) (-.3) (.2) (.8) 
1 Educ 45.18 69.55 -3.662 8.494 
(.9) (1.8)" (-.4) (1.0) 
1 Quick Test Score -16.34 6.556 -2.884 -3.684 
(-.8) (.4) (-.7) (-1.0) 
1 Tobacco Yield .0222 -.2894 -.0324 .0127 
(.1) (-.8) (-.4) (.2) 
2 Number Different 38.11 68.92 -19.07 -13.26 
Crop Operations (.4) (1.0) (-1.1) (-.8) 
2 Number Different 122.0 -43.04 24.10 -23.76 
Livestock Operations (.8) (-.4) (.8) (-.9) 
2 7o of Labor in Major -1.300 2.773 -.9009 -.2379 
Crop Enterprise (-.3) (.8) (-1.0) (-.3) 
lumbers in front of each line indicate what variables were grouped together for the partial 
F-statistics reported in Table 5.12. 
^Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table D.l. Continued 
Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
DIFF 
Total 
Family Income 
ABS 
Total 
Family Income 
DIFF 
Scaled 
Crop Hours 
ABS 
Scaled 
Crop Hours 
2 7o of Labor in Major 
Livestock Enterprise 
-.3086 
(-.1) 
5.750 
(2.1)= 
-.7852 
(-1.2) 
.2648 
(.4) 
2 Number of Different 
Landlords 
180.5 
(1.3) 
389.9 , 
(3.7)'' 
-5.136 
(-.2) 
20.82 
(.8) 
2 % of Land Owned or 
Rented-Cash Basis 
-1.171 
(-.3) 
-3.535 
(-1.3) 
.7547 
(1.0) 
.1550 
(.2) 
3 Total Family Income 
Edited DB® 
.0574 
(1.0) 
.00061 
(.01) 
.0927 
(3.2)* 
.1052 
(3.8)4 
3 Total Farm Value .0554 
(3.7)* 
.0529 
(4.7)3 
-.0021 
(-.8) 
.0011 
(.4) 
4 Number of Quarters 
From Records 
-357.2 , 
(-3.6)4 
-271.5 , 
(-3.6)4 
24.09 
(1.3) 
7.6834 
(.4) 
5 D71 -817.3 , 
(-1.9)b 
-509.5 , 
(-1.6)b 
48.40 
(.6) 
1.388 
(1.0) 
5 D72 -848.8 , 
(-1.9)'' 
-843.5 , 
(-2.5)'' 
127.0 . 
(1.6)b 
183.5 , 
(2.4)4 
^Significant at the 5 percent level. 
'^Significant at the 1 percent level. 
^Total scaled hours, Edit DB was substituted for the variable in the scaled hours equations. 
Table D.l. Continued 
Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
DIFF 
Total 
Family Income 
ABS 
Total 
Family Income 
DIFF 
Scaled 
Crop Hours 
ABS 
Scaled 
Crop Hours 
6 C/E 40.14 
(.1) 
-420.9 
(1.1) 
31.71 
(.2) 
55.25 
(.6) 
6 C/E * Total Family 
Income 
-.0441 
(-.6) 
-.0476 
(-.9) 
-.0342 
(-.9) 
-.0677 
(-1.8)6 
7 D71*C/E 246.0 
(.4) 
384.6 
(.9) 
10.82 
(.1) 
19.67 
(.2) 
7 D72*C/E 795.6 
(1.4) 
1150.0 , 
(2.6)4 
-127.1 
(-1.2) 
-192.7 
(-2.0)= 
8 DIS^ -.4353 
(-2.7)4 
-.1799 
(-1.5) 
-. 0314 
(-.9) 
-.0826 
(-2.6)4 
8 DIS*C/E^ .7658 
(3.0)3 
.7081 
(3.6)4 
.0350 
(.7) 
.0946 
(2.0)C 
G 
u 
.1808 
1966.0 
.2954 
1491.0 
.0715 
361.0 
.1256 
341.5 
^DIS is total scaled hours for the current year minus 1969 total scaled hours. 
Table D.2. Iowa regression equations explaining the changes between the original and edited data 
bases^ 
Dependent Variables 
DIFF ABS DIFF ABS 
Independent Total Total Scaled Live- Scaled Live-
Variables Family Income Family Income stock hours stock hours 
Constant 3537,0 116.9 295.6 -28.97 
1 Age 2.627 3.790 -2.454 -1.298 
(.1) (.1) (-1.0) (-.6) 
1 Educ 97.13 91.35 -29.98, -18.59 
(.6) (.7) (-2.4)b (-1.6) 
1 Quick Test Score -79.55 -24.58 1.87 3.339 
(-1.2) (-.5) (.4) (.8) 
1 Corn Yield -25.35 -4.233 -.2427 .4548 
(-1.8): (-.4) (-.2) (.5) 
2 # Different Crop -132.21 123.7 27.78 8.673 
Operations (-.4) (.5) (1.2) (.4) 
lumbers in front of each line indicate what variables were grouped together for the partial 
F-statistics reported in Table 5.13. 
'^Significant at the 5 percent level. 
^Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table D.2. Continued 
DIFF 
Independent Total 
Variables Family Income 
2 # Different Livestock 7.537 
Operations (.04) 
2 7o of Labor in Major 15.3 
Crop Enterprise (.7) 
2 % of Labor in Major 10.60 
Livestock Enterprise (1.2) 
2 # of Different Landlords -278.3 
( - . 8 )  
2 % of Land Owned or 3.743 
Rented-Cash Basis (.4) 
3 Total Family Income .1811 
Edited DB (2.5) 
3 Total Farm Value .0131 
(1 .2 )  
4 # Quarters from -581.5 , 
Records (-1.9) 
5 D71 902.6 
(.9) 
5 D72 356.5 
,  : (.3) 
"Significant at the 1 percent level 
Dependent Variables 
ABS DIFF ABS 
Total Scaled Live- Scaled Live-
Family Income stock hours stock hours 
-140.2 2.986 8.896 
(-.10) (.2) (.7) 
12.39 1.569 2.748 
(.7) (1.0) (1.9) ^  
12.72 -.8846 -.6878 
(1.8)- (-1.4) (-1.2) 
382.3 -25.97 -.7767 w 
(1.3) (-1.0) (-.03) 
5.456 .0408 .7006 
( . 8 )  ( . 1 )  ( 1 . 2 )  
.0265 .10Û5 .1788 
(.4) (2.4)0 (4.6)* 
.0383 .00045 -.00018 
(4.5)* (.6) (-.3) 
-585.7 -22.54 -72.57, 
(-2.3)= (-1.0) (-3.5)* 
829.3 -43.57 43.42 
(1.0) (-.6) (.7) 
163.7 
(.1) 
-43.34 
(-.5) 
52.05 
( . 6 )  
Table D,2. Continued 
Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
DIFF 
Total 
Family Income 
ABS 
Total 
Family Income 
DIFF 
Scaled Live­
stock hours 
ABS 
Scaled Live­
stock hours 
6 C/E 325.8 
(.3) 
-947.7 
(-1.1) 
-37.39 
(-.5) 
58.29 
(.8) 
6 C/E * Total Family 
Income 
.2522 
(2.5)b 
.3215 
(3.6)4 
.1261 
(2.6)4 
.0711 
(1.6)c 
7 D71*C/E . -377.5 
(-.3) 
-1006.0 
(-1.0) 
22.32 
(.3) 
-38.24 
(-.5) 
7 D72*C/E -215.7 
(-.2) 
-1036.0 
(-1.0) 
102.0 
(1.2) 
44.06 
(.5) 
8 DIS 1.653 
(1.8)C 
-.2169 
(-.0) 
-.0987 
(-1.5) 
-.0590 
(-1.0) 
8 DIS*C/E -3.435 
(-3.0)d 
1.179 
(-1.2) 
.2210 
(2.6)4 
.1726 
(2.2)b 
a 
u 
.2257 
4228.0 
.2759 
3455.0 
.2344 
301.7 
.3041 
279.0 
Table D.3. North Carolina coefficient estimates for a selected model explaining work disincentives 
for selected dependent variables contrasting the original and edited data bases 
Constant 
HR69 
HR69^ 
AGE 
EDUC 
DEBT RATIO 
NET FARM EQUITY 
A OFF-FARM HRS 
Dependent Variables 
Orig Edit Orig Edit Orig Total 
Net Farm Net Farm Gross Farm Scaled Scaled 
Income Income Income Hours Hours 
1510.0 
1.657 
(1.95)' 
576.5 
1.886 
(3.13) 
3277.0 
2,694 
(1.68)' 
4456.0 
2.757 
(1.79)' 
1823.0 
.7177 
(2.91)^ 
-.00025 
(-1.32) 
2.892 
(.09) 
109.6 
(1.47) 
-.0003 
(-2.14)^ 
-17.90 
(-.79) 
106.8 
(2.04)' 
.00019 
(.53) 
-57.10 
(-.94) 
434.2 , 
(3.09)* 
.00025 
(.69) 
-77.05 
(-1.33) 
481.2 , 
(3.59)* 
.00002 
(.33) 
-22 .02  
(-2.35)= 
33.53 
(1.55) 
-2.958 
(-.44) 
-.0257 
(-1.27) 
-2.587 
(-.52) 
-.0117 
(-.64) 
•10.67 
(-.84) 
.0494 
(1.28) 
-5.444 
(-.43) 
.1120 
(2.39)C 
-1.864 
(-.95) 
-.0058 
(-.98) 
-.6427 
(-1.90)* 
-.6485 
(-2.45)= 
-1.682, 
(-2.64) 
-2.058, 
(-3.03) 
-.1785 
( -1 .82)^ 
^Significant at the 10 percent level. 
^Significant at the 1 percent level. 
^Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Table D.3. Continued 
Dependent Variables 
Orig Edit Orig Edit Orig Total 
Net Farm Net Farm Gross Farm Scaled Scaled 
Income Income Income Hours Hours 
D71 760.0 -8.209 882.3 332.6 -134.0 
(1.26) (-.02) (.78) (.31) (-.77) 
D72 1158.0 577.1 2227.0 1908.0 -213.7 
(1.90)* (1.34) (1.93)C (1.73)* (-1.21) 
# Males 13-15 344.0 -78.12 -570.8 -877.4 265.1 
(.76) (-.24) (-.67) (-1.07) ((2.02)C 
# Females 13-15 180.0 390.4 392.8 371.7 205.2 
(.37) (1.15) (.43) (.43) (1.46) 
# Males 16-20 -79.38 244.4 378.5 465.3 182.4 
(-.25) (1.08) (.62) (.80) (1.95)* 
# Females 16-20 606.7 301.4 1212.0 1057.0 140.7 
(1.72)* (1.21) (1.82)* (1.66)* (1.37) 
# Males 21-60 -8.313 -3.198 -530.5 -266.7 -18.24 
(-.01) (-.01) (-.42) (-.22) (-.09) 
# Females 21-60 -64.58 -92.07 133.1 77.82 -42.95 
(-.14) (-.29) (.16) (.10) (-.33) 
RACE -5.367 -623.3 -5105.0 -4652.0 , -579.4 
(-.01) (-1.49) (4.65)* (-4.35)* (-3.43)* 
AGE55 206.8 206.2 494.5 499.0 55.10 
(1.76)* (2.44)C (2.22)C (2.31)C (1.61) 
Table D.3. Continued 
Orig 
Net Farm 
Income 
Edit 
Net Farm 
Income 
Dependent Variables 
Orig 
Gross Farm 
Income 
Edit 
Scaled 
Hours 
Orig Total 
Scaled 
Hours 
HR69*C/E .9509 -.2472 .9892 .4225 .7743 
(.81) (-.30) (.45) (.20) (2.27)C 
HR69^*C/E -.00019 .00008 -.00057 -.00043 -.0002 
(-.70) (.42) (-1.14) (-.90) (-2.5)= 
C/E 29.44 686.0 -332.4 -83.83 -1000.0 
(.02) (.73) (-.13) (-.03) (-2.55)= 
D71*C/E -623.1 -487.9 -796.0 -501.6 33.47 
(-.77) (-.86) (-.52) (-.34) (.14) 
D72*C/E -731.7 -262.5 -988.7 -718.5 218.2 
(-.89) (-.45) (-.64) (-.48) (.92 
AGE55 -119.9 -162.8 -408.6 -457.1 -13.41 
(-1.05) (-2.00)^ (-1.89)* (-2.19)C (-.40) 
RACE*C/E -721.6 -409.0 1696.0 1312.0 411.4 
(-.98) (-.79) (1.22) (.98) (1.93)* 
.17 .28 .44 .50 .61 
Table D.3. Continued 
Dependent Variables 
Edit Total 
Scaled 
Hours 
Orig 
Adj Scaled 
Hours 
Edit 
Adj Scaled 
Hours 
Orig 
Scaled Crop 
Hours 
Edit 
Scaled Crop 
Hours 
Constant 1741.0 1247.0 1321.0 1474.0 1474.0 
HR69 .5858 
(1.24) 
.4033 
(2.01)= 
.3227 
(1.86)* 
.9912 
(4.39)5 
.8796 
(4.12)5 
HR69^ .00007 
91.4) 
.0000 
(.00) 
.00003 
(.75) 
-.00003 
(-.6) 
.00002 
(.4) 
AGE -23.04 . 
(-2.64)" 
-14.32 
(-1.88)* 
-15.98 
(-2.46)= 
-19.63 
(-2.15)= 
-21.74 
(-2.56)= 
EDUC 33.64 
(1.67) 
21.32 
(1.21) 
13.38 
(.89) 
30.69 
(1.46) 
31.51 
(1.61) 
DEBT RATIO .8457 
(.44) 
-2.109 
(-1.32) 
-.4623 
(-.33) 
-3.176 
(-1.70)* 
.4185 
(.23) 
NET FARM EQUITY -.0042 
(-.59) 
-.0071 
(-1.48) 
.00093 
(.18) 
-.0078 
(-1.37) 
-.0139 
(-1.99)= 
A OFF-FARM HRS -.2501 
(-2.45)C 
-.0704 
(-.88) 
-.1329 
(-1.75)* 
-.1759 
(-1.84)* 
-.2176 
(-2.19)= 
D71 -23.83 
(-.15) 
-75.20 
(-.53) 
46.41 
(.38) 
-98.58 
(-.58) 
-36.17 
(-.23) 
D72 -48.83 
(-.29) 
-141.5 
(-.98) 
-61.41 
(-.50) 
-204.1 
(-1.19) 
-54.51 
(-.34) 
Table D.3. Continued 
Dependent Variables 
Edit Total 
Scaled 
Hours 
Orig 
Adj Scaled 
Hours 
Edit 
Adj Scaled 
Hours 
Orig 
Scaled Crop 
Hours 
Edit 
Scaled Crop 
Hours 
# Males 13-15 322.1 
(2.62)* 
249.2 
(2.33)= 
303.2 , 
(3.31)* 
219.7 ^ 
(1.72)* 
283.0 
(2.37)= 
# Females 13-15 292.9 
(2.24) 
129.1 
(1.13) 
190.9 
(1.96)= 
136.2 
(1.00) 
248.5 
(1.95)* 
# Males 16-20 143.0 
(1.63)* 
184.7 
(2.42)C 
128.1 
(1.96)= 
165.3 
(1.81)* 
124.4 
(1.46) 
# Females 16-20 ^ 121.0 
(1.26) 
151.9 
(1.82)* 
78.02 
(1.09) 
112.1 
(1.12) 
90.53 
(.97) 
# Males 21-60 -71.80 
(-.40) 
2.673 
(.02) 
3.685 
(.03) 
32.13 
(.17) 
28.23 
(.16) 
# Females 21-60 -48.05 
(-.39) 
4.198 
(.04) 
8.185 
(.09) 
-41.58 
(-.33) 
-45.21 
(-.38) 
RACE -459.1 , 
(-2.85)* 
-308.2 
(-2.24)= 
-513.8 . 
(-3.45)* 
-515.6 , 
(-3.18)* 
-519.4 , 
(-2.72)* 
AGE55 76.55 
(2.35)C 
33.26 
(1.20) 
53.72 
(2.21)= 
49.41 
(1.49) 
71.64 
(2.26)= 
HR69^C/E 1.030. 
(3.28)* 
.4687 
(1.69)* 
.6066 
(2.59)* 
.2422 
(.80) 
.4454 
(1.59) 
HR69^*C/E -.0003 
(-4.29)* 
-.00009 
(-1.5) 
-.00014 
(-2.8)* 
-.0001 
(-1.43) 
-.00018 
(-2.57)= 
Table D,3. Continued 
Dependent Variables 
Edit Total Orig Edit Orig Edit 
Scaled Adj Scaled Adj Scaled Scaled Crop Scaled Crop 
Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours 
C/E -976.1 , -527.7 -532.2 -457.9 -470.3 
(-2.7) (-1.65)* (-1.98) (-1.36) (-1.52) 
D71*C/E -32.09 102.0 -42.43 -16.05 -19.84 
(-.15) (.53) (-.26) (-.07) (-.09) 
D72*C/E 25.41 170.7 66.26 193.9 34.0 
(.11) (.88) (.40) (.84) (.16) 
AGE55*C/E -31.65 -22.22 -44.43 -17.13 -28.88 
(-1.01) (-.82) (-1.90)* (-.53) (-.95) 
RACE*C/E 282.6 63.01 180.2 329.6 246.6 
(1.41) (.36) (1.20) (1.62) (1.29) 
.66 .48 .60 .62 .68 
Table D.4. Iowa coefficient estimates for a selected model explaining work disincentives for 
selected dependent variables contrasting the original and edited data bases 
Dependent Variables 
Orig 
Net Farm 
Income 
Edit 
Net Farm 
Income 
Orig 
Gross Farm 
Income 
Edit 
Scaled 
Hours 
Orig Total 
Scaled 
Hours 
Constant 
HR69 
HR69^ 
AGE 
EDUC 
DEBT RATIO 
NET FARM EQUITY 
4 OFF-FARM HRS 
13070.0 
-1.459 
( - .68)  
.00052 
(1 .16)  
-109.5 
(-2.58)* 
-264.0 
(-1.53) 
-34.76 
(-2.82)* 
-.0475 
( -2 .02)°  
-.1215 
(-.13) 
8936.0 
1.357 
(.79) 
-.00023 
( - . 6 8 )  
-90.00 . 
(-2.41)* 
-247.7 
(-1.66)= 
-17.76 
(-1.52) 
.0165 
(.92) 
-1.090 
( -1 .16)  
10130.0 
13.67 
(3.63)* 
-.0016 
(-2.05)" 
-446.1 
(-5.99)* 
316.5 
(1.04) 
99.89 
(4.61)* 
.0653 
(1.58) 
-.7654 
(-.45) 
9299.0 
15.65 ^ 
(4.61)* 
-.00208 
(-3.10)* 
-393.1 
(-5.33)* 
-132.0 
(-.45) 
107.9 ^ 
(4.69)* 
.2063 
(5.81)* 
-2.300 
(-1.24) 
751.4 
.9793 
(4.47)* 
-.00005 
(-1.00) 
-8.191 
(-1.89)C 
-12.44 
(-.70) 
-1.806 
(-1.44) 
.0031 
(1.29) 
-.0745 
(-.75) 
*Significant 
^Significant 
at the 1 percent level, 
at the 5 percent level. 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
TABLE D.4. Continued 
Dependent Variables 
Orig 
Net Farm 
Income 
Edit 
Net Farm 
Income 
Orig 
Gross Farm 
Income 
Edit 
Scaled 
Hours 
Orig Total 
Scaled 
Hours 
D71 268.3 
(.30 
465.6 
(.58) 
426.3 
(.27) 
1607.0 
(1.02) 
46.27 
(.50) 
D72 4277.0 
(4.70)* 
3617.0 
(4.54) 
6916.0 
(4.33)* 
7103.0 
(4.52)* 
-119.4 
(-1.29) 
AGE55 182.0 
(1.11) 
37.40 
(.26) 
783.7 
(2.72)* 
516.0 
(1.83)C 
6.221 
(.37) 
HR69*C/E 5.540, 
(2.11)b 
2.911 
(1.31) 
-9.904, 
(-2.15)b 
-9.433, 
(-2.14)* 
.1161 
(.43) 
HR69^*C/E -.0014 
(-2.64)* 
-.00049 
(-1.11) 
.0014 
(1.51) 
.00154 
(1.77)= 
-.00006 
(-1.2) 
C/E -4840.0 
(-1.58) 
-3224.0 
(-1.22) 
11680.0 . 
(2.18)* 
11758.0 
(2.25) 
-62.12 
(-.20) 
D71*C/E -41.01 
(-.03) 
263.5 
(.23) 
944.0 
(.41) 
-82.15 
(-.04) 
-88.29 
(-.66) 
D72*C/E -1919.0 
(-1.46) 
-649.6 
(-.56) 
-1357.0 
(-.59) 
-1024.0 
(-.45) 
-66.26 
(-.50) 
AGE55*C/E -233.7 
(-1.19) 
-269.2 
(-1.55) 
-586.3 
(-1.70)C 
-762.8 , 
(-2.23)* 
-27.59 
(-1.38) 
R2 
.21 .21 .50 .57 .69 
Table D.4. Continued 
Edit Total Orig 
Scaled Scaled Crop 
Hours Hours 
Constant 887.9 216,2 
HR69 1.176 1.031 
(6.93)* (4.58)* 
HR69^ -.00Û06 -.00004 
(-2.0)* (-.4) 
AGE -9.206, -5.201 
(-2.50) (-2.79)* 
EDUC -39.32 4.731 
(-2.68)* (.64) 
DEBT RATIO .6933 .2456 
(4.65)* (.43) 
NET FARM EQUITY -.00134 .00053 
(-.76) (.52) 
6 OFF-FARM HRS -.2877 -.0407 
(-3.11) (-.92) 
D71 15.02 21.10 
(.19) (.53) 
D72 -122.8 -18.43 
(-1.56) (-.47) 
Dependent Variables 
Edit Orig Scaled Edit Scaled 
Scaled Crop Livestock Livestock 
Hours Hours Hours 
275.9 
1.048 
(4.59)* 
-.00005 
(-.5) 
-5.308 
(-2.89)* 
.8030 
( .11) 
.4134 
(.71) 
.00005 
( .06)  
-.0856 
(-1.80)C 
12.46 
(.32) 
-25.45 
(-.65) 
395.8 
.6895 
(4.09)* 
.00002 
(.33) 
-2.354 
(-.58) 
-.1381 
( - .01)  
.00081 
(.36) 
-.1183 
( -1 .26)  
25.87 
(.30) 
-99.79 
(-1.14) 
691.4 
.9009 
(6.26)* 
-.00002 
(-.4) 
-3.597 
( -1 .01)  
-28.80 ,  
( -2 .06)*  
-.0324 
(-.03) 
-.0019 
(-1.13) 
-.2544 
(-2.85)* 
3.156 
(.04) 
-96.57 
(-1.28) 
Table D.4. Continued 
Dependent Variables 
Edit Total Orig Edit Orig Scaled Edit Scaled 
Scaled Scaled Crop Scaled Crop Livestock Livestock 
Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours 
AGE55 5.690 8.384 4.849 -1.420 -3.370 
(.40) (1.15) (.70) (-.09) (-.26) 
HR69*C/E -.3481 .1059 .1011 .0034 -.1909 
(-1.58) (.39) (.38) (.02) (-1.07) 
HR69^*C/E .00005 -.00008 -.00007 -.00005 .00006 
(1.25) (-.73) (-.64) (-.71) (1.00) 
C/E 349.3 25.35 10.49 -102.8 -59.55 
(1.34) (.15) (.06) (-.75) (-.50) 
D71*C/E -72.52 -17.05 -10.81 -74.38 -63.76 
(-.64) (-.30) (-.19) (-.59) (-.58) 
D72*C/E 26.27 -33.35 -30.28 -36.33 54.01 
(.23) (-.59) (-.53) (-.29) (.50) 
AGE55*C/E -29.95 ^ -21.55 . -19.58 . -7.028 -5.739 
(-1.75)C (-2.55)^ (-2.38)" (-.39) (-.36) 
.80 .79 .79 .61 .75 
